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As individuals, we define our group identities by categorizing others and 
ourselves into many social categories like gender, race, religion, nationality, political 
convictions, and profession, among many others. This categorization process confers us 
a notion of “who” we are, which social groups we belong, and more importantly, how 
we are expected to behave. This thesis revolves around two phenomena at the core of 
group identity literature; discrimination and intergroup conflicts. Group identity is 
considered an underlying factor of discriminatory behaviors and the emergence of 
conflicts between members of social groups. There is extensive evidence showing that 
the mere categorization into social categories is enough to trigger discrimination against 
members of other social groups. Moreover, human history provides many examples of 
conflicts and genocides rooted in group identity diversity more than in economic 
disputes. However, not all social group members discriminate in the same magnitude, 
nor all social groups are involved in conflicts. The first paper of this thesis proposes an 
empirical measure that goes beyond categorizing individuals into social categories. Using 
willingness to acquire representative goods of social groups, this paper measures and quantify 
group identity intensity to investigate reinforcing and attenuating factors of group identity. The 
results found provide evidence on how convergence and divergence in behaviors among 
social group members reinforce and attenuate the group identity intensity of individuals, 
which is crucial in predicting the emergence of intergroup conflicts at the collective level and 
strong degrees of discrimination at the individual level. The literature studying the effects of 
group identity on individual decision-making has largely focused on studying discrimination 
and intergroup conflicts assuming individuals’ group identity is known and observable. 
However, many group identities rely on convictions and beliefs that are not directly 
observable from individual physical traits, and therefore, might be uncertain (e.g. 
religion, ideology). The second paper presented in this thesis explores the effects of 
group identity uncertainty on discrimination patterns when individuals decide whom to 
interact with and its repercussions on collective coordination efficiency. Managing 
group identity diversity and uncertainty is a major factor in determining organizations 
and firms' profit and success, especially when a diverse workforce might find it difficult 
to coordinate and cooperate. The results found in the second paper shed light on the role 
group identity uncertainty plays in individual interaction preferences and offer several 
 
xvi 
managerial insights for deterring discrimination among employees to interact and 
increase their coordination efficiency when working in teams.  Finally, the last paper 
presented in this thesis, contributes to the literature of policies and interventions aimed 
at mitigating discrimination and prejudices between members of social groups in 
conflict. While this literature has focused on studying how the contact between 
members of different social groups reduces discrimination and prejudices, there is a lack 
of evidence on interventions with same purposes not requiring contact between 
individuals. The last paper presented in this thesis exploits a natural occurring context in 
which individuals of two social groups currently in conflict see themselves forced to 
cooperate in order to achieve a superordinate common goal without being able to get in 
contact. This context offers the opportunity to put the emphasis not in the contact 
between individuals but in the superordinate common goals as a mitigating factor of 
discrimination. Results show that individuals got more selfish as the superordinate 
common goal was gradually achieved. Furthermore, individuals from one social group 
also increased their discrimination as the common goal was gradually achieved. These 
results highlight superordinate common goals mitigate discrimination and selfishness. 





















   
 3 
1.1. Overview 
Identity Economics departs from concepts traditionally studied in other social 
sciences like Psychology and Social Psychology to incorporate the notion of identity 
into economic models and analysis. After the pioneering work of Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), a growing literature on the economics of identity has studied and documented 
group identity effects on a wide range of individual decision-making and its 
implications in many economic and social contexts. One of the prominent issues 
addressed within this literature is the causes and consequences of discriminatory 
behaviors based on group identity. On the other hand, some researcher had also focused 
on studying how to effectively manage group identity diversity to reduce discrimination 
between individuals and avoid its negative social and economic consequences. The 
main goals of this thesis are to deepen on the triggers of discrimination and investigate 
how discriminatory behaviors between individuals with different group identity, 
especially between individuals of social groups in conflict, can attenuate. 
To begin with, this thesis examines how individual group identity fluctuates as a 
result of comparing own behaviors with that of other social group members. Although 
theory models assume group identity reinforces when members of a social group align 
their behaviors and devaluates when there are divergences, such fluctuations on group 
identity have not been estimated and quantified yet. A natural question then is whether 
convergence in behaviors among individuals with the same group identity reinforces 
their group identity as much as it is devalued when their behaviors diverge. Using a 
laboratory-in-the-field experiment in which the group identity of participants is 
empirically measured and quantified, I found that acting like other social group 
members is what most participants react to and increase their group identity twice than 
when it reduces as a consequence of acting differently than other social group members. 
Next, this thesis investigates the effects of group identity uncertainty on 
discrimination patterns, and how the effects of group identity on individual interaction 
preferences interrelate with potential economic incentives. Although some group 
identities like gender or ethnicity are observable from individual physical traits, many 
others like religion or ideology are not. Despite the attention devoted to studying 
discrimination between individuals that categorize each other into the same or different 
group identity, less attention has been paid to studying how individuals whose group 
identity is uncertain discriminate against each other. Are those individuals whose group 
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identity is uncertain discriminated against more than those individuals with different 
group identity? Using a laboratory experiment, I find that it depends on the time 
horizon. Concretely, results show individuals with a different group identity are 
discriminated against more than individuals whose group identity is uncertain in the 
short term. In contrast, individuals whose group identity is uncertain are discriminated 
against more than individuals with different group identity in the long term. Results 
found in this experiment also show that high economic incentives to interact with other 
participants are an effective tool to make discrimination patterns on individual 
interaction preferences disappear. 
Finally, this thesis explores the role superordinate common goals among 
individuals have in deterring discrimination between members of different social 
groups, some of them currently involved in a conflict. There is extensive evidence 
showing that under certain conditions, interactions among individuals with different 
group identity are effective on reducing discriminatory behaviors among them. For 
instance, it has been shown that the mere contact in a neutral frame between individuals 
might not be enough to reduce discrimination, whereas interactions requiring 
cooperation among individuals to achieve a superordinate common goal have been 
proved to be very effective on reducing discriminatory behaviors. However, it is 
possible to reduce discrimination among individuals from different social groups if they 
do not interact? Would superordinate common goals not requiring contact between 
individuals able to mitigate discrimination? Results found in an online experiment 
highlight superordinate goals as a mitigating factor of discriminatory behaviors between 
individuals with different group identity, but not between individuals from social groups 
in conflict.  
 
1.2. Group identity formation 
Group identity, also known as social identity, is defined as the individual’s sense 
of belonging to social groups. The Social Identity Theory developed by Tajfel and 
Turner (1979, 1985), together with its extension, the Self-Categorization Theory 
(Turner et al., 1987), describe the reflexive process through which individuals form 
their group identities.1 These theories refer to groups of people that have a particular 
                                               
1 See McCall and Simmons (1978) for an alternative theory of identity formation based on the roles 
individuals adopt within the society.  
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physical or psychological attribute in common as social groups. Social groups 
distinguish and classify individuals in regards a wide array of social categories like 
ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, gender, ideology, occupation, sexual orientation, or 
language, among many others. According to these theories, individuals’ group identity 
formation mostly relies on social categorization, identification, and social comparison.2 
First individuals categorize other individuals and themselves into social groups of many 
social categories according to their physical attributes, belief, and convictions (e.g., 
ethnic categorization relies on physical attributes, whereas religious categorization 
relies on belief and behaviors). Thereafter, individuals perceive themselves as members 
of several social groups and identify with other social group members. As a result, other 
individuals in a same social group are categorized as in-group and individuals in 
different social groups as out-group. Once individuals have formed their group 
identities and developed a sense of belongingness to social groups, individuals increase 
their self-esteem through positive distinctiveness. Positive distinctiveness refers to 
social comparisons that accentuate the perceived similarities with the in-groups and the 
perceived differences with the out-groups in those dimensions in which the in-groups 
are judged more positively than the out-groups (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). These social 
comparisons at the group level can serve as a mechanism to simplify and process 
information and usually lead individuals to form generalized opinions, beliefs, and 
expectations about members of a particular social group, which are known as 
stereotypes (Oakes et al., 1994). 
Categorizing others and oneself into social groups confers individuals a notion of 
“who” they are in the society, which social groups they belong to, and more 
importantly, how they are expected to behave. Social groups use to differentiate from 
each other not only by the attributes of its members, but also by how they members 
behave. Members of different social groups might hold different beliefs about 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviors in particular social contexts. In accordance with 
these beliefs, social groups establish “social norms” that prescribe how their members 
should and should not behave in different contexts (Sherif, 1936; Elster, 1989; Lapinski 
and Rimal, 2005; Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2011; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014). When 
individuals adhere to social groups, they must conform and follow social norms to 
preserve the social group cohesion and reputation (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). When a 
                                               
2 Often, group identity can also emerge from perceptions of shared goals and fates with other individuals 
(Lewin, 1948).  
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group member transgress a social norm, group members might try to repress the 
inappropriate behavior, punish the transgressor, or ultimately, expulse the transgressor 
from the group in order to restore the identity and status of the social group and its 
members. 
Although group identity has been one of the main topics at the core of Psychology 
and Social Psychology literature, it has not been until recently that the notion of group 
identity has awakened the research interest of economists. The pioneer and seminal 
economic model proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduces the notion of 
group identity into the utility function of individuals and define the “gains” and “losses” 
in utility experienced by individuals when following or transgressing a social group 
prescription (social norm). The identity-based utility function of individuals they 
proposed assumes that individuals following the social group prescriptions affirm and 
reinforce their group identity obtaining a utility “gain.” In contrast, individuals deviating 
from prescribed behaviors by the social group devaluate their group identity and cause a 
“loss” in utility to themselves and to the other social group members. Furthermore, the 
model states that in the case of transgressing a prescription, the magnitude of individual 
and collective “losses” in utility will determine when social group members will react to 
the transgression, even incurring a cost, to modify the behavior of the transgressor.3  
However, there are some interesting questions to which the model developed by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) does not provide specifications. For instance, are the 
“gains” in utility derived from following a particular prescription higher than the 
“losses” derived from not follow it? Are utility “gains” and “losses” context dependent? 
That is, does deviating from a particular prescription in a social context, like not going 
to pray at church on Sunday, cause the same “loss” in utility than deviating from it in an 
individual context like not praying at home before going to sleep? Do the answers to 
these questions generalize to most social groups? Answering these questions will 
provide a better understanding of individual preferences and behaviors and contribute to 
enriching the identity-based analysis aimed at tackling intergroup conflicts, secessionist 
political movements, discriminatory behaviors, and the formation of stereotypes. 
                                               
3  There is literature in Economics showing punishments are effective on deterring free-riding and 
sustaining cooperation in public good contexts. See Chaudhuri (2011) for a review of that literature. 
Although the “social norm” notion used in this literature is not established by a particular social group, 
the operating mechanism of punishments in public good contexts is similar to the reactions to of social 
group members to the transgressors of social group prescriptions defined in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  
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Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a lab-in-the-field experiment aimed at 
investigating the extent to which converging and diverging behaviors among social 
group members reinforce and attenuate group identity. The experiment was conducted 
in three Catalan-Spanish-Speaking regions. The group identity of participants was 
empirically measured through their willingness to acquire goods with representative 
attributes of social groups. The good used to measure individual group identity was the 
Catalan and Spanish translation of a book. To assess the effect on participants' group 
identities derived from acting similar or different than other social group members, 
participants played two games during the experiment with the purpose to create a 
precedent in each participant about their own behavior that later on in the experiment 
will allow them to compare their own behavior with those of other social group 
members. The results found quantify how much participants reinforce their group 
identity when realize they have acted like other social group members and how much 
they attenuate their group identity when realize they have acted different than other 
social group members. These results are of special interest for deepen into the reasons 
individuals increase or decrease their attachment to a particular group identity, which is 
a crucial factor in predicting the emergence of intergroup conflicts at the collective level 
and strong degrees of discrimination at the individual level. 
 
1.3. Discrimination  
The effects of group identity formation on individual decision-making extends 
beyond prescriptions and social norms established in social groups. Group identity also 
influences how individuals treat other individuals (even when there is not established by 
the social group a particular social norm or prescription about it).  Sometimes, the mere 
categorization of individuals as in-group and out-group might lead individuals to 
differently behave depending on whether interact with members of the same or different 
social groups. This phenomenon is widely known as intergroup bias or discrimination 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Brewer, 1979; Hewstone et al., 2002; Becker, 1957, 2010). 
Discrimination patterns can either be positive or negative. 4  The two most common 
                                               
4 Economists also distinguish between two sources of discrimination, taste-based and statistical. Taste-
based discrimination refers to discrimination patterns based on group identity categorization, whereas 
statistical discrimination refers to discriminatory behaviors that emerge in contexts of a lack or limited 
information that make individuals to be perceived and evaluated as a members of a particular social group 
instead of being evaluated by their own attributes and qualifications. See Guryan and Charles (2013) and 
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patterns of discrimination are in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. In-group 
favoritism refers to behaviors and decisions entailing a more favorable treatment of 
members of the same social group. In contrast, out-group derogation refers to behaviors 
and decisions treating members of other social group more unfavorably. Although it is 
less common, we can also find evidence of positive discrimination patterns against the 
out-groups, and negative discrimination patterns against the in-groups.  
After the pioneer work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), a growing literature on the 
economics of identity has documented group identity effects on a wide range of 
individual decision-making.5 For instance, it has been found individuals tend to interact 
and associate more often with other individuals with whom sharing group identity, 
phenomena known as homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; McPherson et al., 2001; 
Currarini et al., 2009; Currarini et al., 2016; Kets and Sandroni, 2019), that might 
eventually result in segregation and has important implications in education decisions 
and outcomes (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Echenique et al., 2006; Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2002), employment rates and salaries (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; 
Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), and belief formation through information diffusion 
(Golub and Jackson, 2012). Group identity also influences individual preferences for 
allocation and redistribution economic resources (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Ben-Ner et 
al., 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010; Currarini and Mengel, 2016; Kranton et al., 2016; 
Kranton and Sanders, 2017), cooperation (Eckel and Grossman 2005; Goette et al., 
2006; Ruffle and Sosis, 2006; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007, Charness et al., 2014) and 
coordination among individuals (Chen and Li, 2011; Goyal et al., 2020), punishment 
and reward behaviors (Bernhard et al., 2006; Chen and Li, 2009; Currarini and Mengel, 
2016), and pro-social behaviors like charitable giving (Kessler and Milkman 2018; 
Charness and Holder, 2019).  
One of the main research lines within this literature addresses the effects and 
repercussion of group identity within firms and organizations. As pointed out by 
Ashforth and Mael (1989), Haslam (2004), and Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2010), 
inculcating a common organizational group identity to individuals is a major factor for 
both individuals’ motivation and satisfaction in their jobs as well as for firms and 
organizations success and profits. Specially, when the workforce is diverse and 
                                                                                                                                         
Lang and Lehmann (2012) for a reviews and discussions of empirical and theoretical work, respectively, 
in the economics of discrimination. 
5 See Charness and Chen (2020) for a literature review on the effects of group identity on individual 
decision-making. 
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employees from different cultural, religious, professional, and linguistic backgrounds 
might found difficulties or to be reluctant to cooperate, coordinate, and trust each other 
when working in teams (Hjort, 2014).  
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) developed a theoretical model to study how 
economic incentives at work interrelate with workers organizational identity. The model 
establishes two different employees’ social categories, insider and outsider. The insider 
employees are those employees that share the organization’s mission and values, and 
therefore, their goals at work are aligned with those of the organization. In contrast, the 
outsider employees do not feel identified with the organization’s mission and values, 
and their main motivation at work are the economic incentives they receive. In other 
words, the utility that outsider employees obtain from their jobs is the positive utility 
they derive from their salary minus the disutility of the effort they are required to exert 
at work, and therefore, they will always try to minimize their efforts in the workplace. 
Insider employees on the other hand, derive positive utility form the mere fact to work 
in an organization they feel identified with, which implies that insider employees will 
demand a lower salary and exert a high effort at workplace than outsider employees.6 
A common organizational group identity can also play a major role in determining 
workgroups efficiency and productivity. There is empirical and experimental evidence 
that workgroup members reach better outcomes and productivity when they perceive 
themselves as in-group or members of the same social group since their willingness to 
cooperate, coordinate, and trust each other, increase. For instance, Goette et al. (2006) 
provides unmistakable evidence that sharing group identity promotes cooperation 
among individuals. Authors exploit the random assignation of individuals to different 
platoons in the Swiss Army to study cooperative behaviors in a simultaneous Prisoner’s 
Dilemma between individuals who were assigned either to the same or different 
platoon. Results show cooperation rates are significantly higher  in interactions between 
members of the same platoon as compared to in interactions between members of 
different platoon. Similar results have been found in laboratory experiments where 
participants play cooperative strategic games. Charness et al. (2007) found that 
participants tend to cooperate more in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Battle of the 
Sexes games when participants play the games with other participants with same group 
identity. Eckel and Grossman (2005), Ruffle and Sosis (2006) and Charness et al. 
                                               
6 Similarly, Besley and Ghatak (2003, 2005) and Prendergast (2007) argue that worker motivation and 
effort are higher when their preferences are aligned to the organization mission and values. 
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(2014) also found evidence that sharing group identity can promote cooperation 
amongst individuals in Public Good Game settings.  
Also coordination is crucial in determining workgroups performance, specially, in 
joint production processes in which the lower performer in the team determines the 
overall outcome of the workgroup. Coordination games with multiple Nash equilibria, 
also known as Weakest-Link Games and Minimum-Effort Games (Van Huyk et al., 
1990), have been used to study coordination efficiency in such joint production 
contexts. There is evidence that inculcating a common group identity is an effective 
mechanism through which firms can avoid workgroup members end up systematically 
providing the minimum effort.7 In Chen and Chen (2011), experimental participants 
play 50 rounds of the Minimum-Effort Game with a different participant each round 
(random matching protocol). In the in-group treatments participants play the game with 
in-group participants, whereas in the out-group treatments participants play the game 
with out-group participants. Results show that group identity significantly affects 
participants’ effort decisions. In all experimental sessions in which participants must 
coordinate their efforts with other in-group participants, effort decisions converge to the 
highest effort level and thereby increase coordination efficiency. In contrast, the average 
effort level provided by participants when playing with out-group participants remains 
very low along rounds, resulting in workgroups where providing the minimum effort 
level is the norm.   
Trust also plays a determinant role within organizations and commitment among 
workgroup members (Mayer et al., 1995; Jones and George, 1998; Dirks and Ferrin, 
2001). There is also extensive experimental evidence using the Trust Game showing 
that individuals trust other individuals with same group identity more than individuals 
with different group identity (Glaeser et al., 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Heap 
and Zizzo, 2009; Guillen and Ji, 2011; Binzel and Fehr, 2013). 
To summarize, there is evidence pointing out that a common organizational group 
identity increase individuals commitment to organizations and firms, and can boosts 
cooperation, coordination and trust in workgroup settings.  
                                               
7   Other factors that have been proved to contribute solving coordination problems and improve 
coordination efficiency are communication (Cooper et al., 1992; Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Blume and 
Ortmann, 2007), group competition (Bornstein et al., 2002), economic incentives (Brandts and Cooper, 
2006), precedents of successful coordination (Webber, 2006), and endogenous group formation (Riedl et 
al., 2016; Goyal et al., 2020). 
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However, individuals might care about other group identities from those instilled 
in the workplace. In particular, individuals might care about group identities based on 
belief and convictions (Golman et al., 2016) that are non-observable from individual 
physical traits, and therefore, might be uncertain. Despite the extensive evidence 
documenting group identity effects on individual decision-making and its repercussion 
at workplace, there is a lack of evidence on how group identity uncertainty affects 
individual’s willingness to coordinate and its implications for managing group identity 
within firms and organizations. Deciding the extent to which employees know each 
other and its contexts may be crucial in determining their willingness to coordinate and 
cooperate, and consequently, their productivity.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis presents a laboratory experiment designed to investigate 
the effects of group identity uncertainty on discrimination patterns when individuals 
decide whom to interact with and its repercussions on collective coordination 
efficiency. In this experiment participants are induced either to a weak or strong 
artificial group identity. Thereafter, participants play a Weakest-Link game in which 
must decide with whom to interact and coordinate regarding other participants who had 
been induced with the same group identity (in-group), participants who had been 
induced with different group identity (out-group), and participants that it is not known 
which group identity had been induced (unknown-group). This novel decision context 
including unknown-group individuals enables investigating the effects of group identity 
uncertainty on individual interaction preferences and willingness to coordinate, which 
are crucial factors in determining workgroups productivity. Results from the laboratory 
experiment show that reinforcing group identity using a group-solving task contributes 
to collective coordination efficiency through increasing individuals’ initial willingness 
to provide high efforts for coordinating. Furthermore, individuals whose group identity 
is uncertain are negatively discriminated against more than individuals with a different 
group identity, in the long term. Nonetheless, all discrimination patterns vanish when 
interactions entail high and mutual potential economic incentives. The findings offer 
several managerial implications for deterring discrimination among individuals to 






1.4. Intergroup conflicts  
One of the main consequences of group identity formation and discriminatory 
behaviors has been and stills being, the emergence and escalation of intergroup 
conflicts. In some cases, conflicts lead to violent and bloody wars (Rummel, 1997). 
Since the end of the Second World War, the number of armed conflicts around the 
world has gradually increased and reached its maximum number in 2019, most of them 
occurring within country boundaries (intrastate conflicts).8 In other cases, conflicts had 
developed in a more subtle way and without violence (here, violence refers to killing 
behaviors). For instance, the intergroup conflict regarding the independence of 
Catalonia from Spain has developed during the last decades without violence and not 
having to mourn any death. 
Several intergroup conflict theories shed light on the reasons individuals from 
different social categories get involved in conflicts and develop prejudices, stereotypes, 
and discriminatory behaviors. 9  Intergroup conflicts can emerge as a result of 
competitive relationships between different social groups over limited resources 
(Campbell 1965; Sherif, 1966; Esteban and Ray, 2011), by the mere fact of individuals 
categorizing each other into different social categories (Tajfel and Turner, 1985, 1979; 
Basu, 2005; Esteban et al., 2012), or by a combination of both structural and 
psychological factors (Stephan and Stephan, 2000).  
These conjectures on the intergroup conflict sources are supported by the classic 
natural experiment of Sherif et al. (1961) in an Oklahoma summer camp for kids. In this 
experiment, known as Robbers Cave experiment, kids were randomly assigned to one of 
two groups when arrived to the summer camp without being aware about the existence 
of the other group of kids. Then, kids of each group developed a sense of group by 
interacting and living together for a week, choosing names for their group, and 
decorating flags and clothes with these names. After that, researchers informed kids 
about the existence of the other group, which led kids to form negative prejudices 
towards kids of the other group even before they get in contact and know each other. 
Lately, experimenters introduced competitive activities between kids of the two groups. 
The competitive atmosphere did origin conflicts that extended far beyond the 
                                               
8  See https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/ (active dyads and conflicts by year) and 
https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/ (armed conflicts by conflict type and year). 
9 See Böhm et al. (2018) for a review of these theories and empirical measures used to assess conflict-
related individual attitudes.  
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competitive activities, resulting in behaviors intended to harm kids of the other group 
during the regular camp life. Finally, researchers tried to mitigate the conflict by putting 
in contact kids of the two groups under neutral conditions (without either a competitive 
or cooperative connotation). However, a conflictive relationship between the two 
groups of kids was already created, and the mere contact under neutral conditions 
resulted in a failure on mitigating the conflict between the two groups of kids, even 
exacerbating stereotypes and prejudices between them. It was not until kids of the two 
groups had to cooperate in order to achieve superordinate common goals that conflict 
attenuated. 
As later stressed by Pettigrew (1998), the Intergroup Contact Theory developed 
by Allport (1954) can explain why the mere contact between the kids in the Oklahoma 
summer camp did not mitigate the intergroup conflict they were experiencing. The 
Intergroup Contact Theory defines four conditions under which the contact between 
members of different social groups in conflict has to occur in order to reduce prejudices 
and discrimination. The first condition is equality of group status within the situation. 
Although group status might sometimes be difficult to define, equally group status 
refers to recognizing members of the two social groups have the same rights. The 
second and third conditions are the presence of common goals that require cooperation 
between members of the two social groups to be achieved. Prejudice reduction through 
contact requires aligning the goals of the two social groups and a real cooperative effort 
between members of the two social groups to achieve the goals. Finally, intergroup 
contact requires the support of authorities, law or third parties that can establish norms 
of acceptance and exert social sanctions and punishments if abuses occur. 
There exists an extensive literature in Social Psychology studying interventions 
rooted in the Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 1954) aimed at reducing 
discrimination and prejudices between members of different social groups. 10  More 
recently, economists has started contributing to this literature by exploiting natural 
occurring policies and interventions to study how contact between individuals from 
different social groups can influence integration, prejudices, and discrimination among 
them. 
                                               
10 See Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for a meta-analysis on more than 500 studies testing the Intergroup 
Contact Theory. See also Paluck and Green (2009) for a literature review. See also Bertrand and Duflo 
(2017) for a pervasive review of field experimental methods and evidence on discrimination and 
stereotypes and interventions aimed at mitigating them.  
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For instance, Bazzi et al. (2019) exploit a national Transmigration program 
conducted in Indonesia in the 1980s that relocated two million migrants into new 
communities to unite more than 700 ethnolinguistic groups. The newly formed villages 
were ethnically diverse in different degrees. This large-scale experiment at national 
level offered an opportunity to test how intergroup contact affects integration among 
individuals and the adoption of a new national identity. Furthermore, the exogenously 
created variation on ethnic diversity within villages also allowed for studying how 
different segregation and fractionalization degrees affect public goods and conflicts 
between different ethnic groups. Taking the use of national Indonesian language at 
home as the main variable, results show that individuals did get more integrated in 
villages with many small ethnic groups than in villages with few large groups. Also, 
contribution to public goods became higher in more ethnically diverse and 
fractionalized villages, and the likelihood of intergroup conflict was lower. 
Another example is Carrell et al. (2015) who exploit the random assignation of 
first year students to squadrons in the U.S. Air Force Academy. This setting allows not 
only for studying the mere intergroup contact but the quantity and quality of such 
contact too. Since squadrons are composed of several members with different academic 
aptitudes exposure to other race individuals varies along two dimensions, the number of 
other squadron members of a different race and whether squadron members of the other 
race are of higher aptitude or not. Results show that white students exposed during their 
first year to higher aptitude black peers reported in a survey a higher degree of 
acceptance towards African American individuals. More interestingly, both the number 
of black peers and their academic aptitude are positively correlated with the likelihood 
of white students rooming with new black peers in their second year.    
The effects of contact between members of different social groups have also been 
tested by exploiting roommate random assignations among college students. Boisjoly 
(2006) found that after living with Afro-American roommates, white students at 
Harvard reported, in ex-post surveys, more positive attitudes toward affirmative action 
policies and having more frequent social interactions with individuals from other 
ethnicities. Similarly, Corno et al. (2019) found that white students in a South African 
university reduced their negative stereotypes (measured using Implicit Association Test) 
and increased their interactions with students of other races after living with a roommate 
of a different race. Interestingly, the authors also found a positive effect on black 
students’ academic performance derived from the intergroup contact as a roommate 
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with white students. Black students in mix race rooms increased their average grades 
and the number of exams passed, and decreased their dropout rates.  
Also in a college environment, (Rao, 2019) exploits a governmental policy change 
that affected several elite private schools in Delhi. The policy consisted in integrating 
poor students in rich student classrooms. The author investigate the effects of 
introducing poor students at the classroom level and at more personal level, controlling 
by rich students who are assigned to a study group or as a partner with poor students, on 
academic performance, pro-social behaviors and discrimination. To do so, the author 
combines observational data, a lab experiment, and a field experiment. Results show no 
significant impact on academic performance by the fact of merging rich and poor 
students in a classroom. However, rich students became more pro-social. This result 
relies on the increase on volunteering of rich students to help their school fund-rise for 
charitable causes. Moreover, rich students also became more generous when playing a 
set of dictator games in the lab choosing more often an equal split of a particular 
amount of money between themselves and another anonymous participant. Finally, 
discrimination is measure using a field experiment in which student must choose 
teammates for a relay race being aware of others ability (how fast they run) and 
socioeconomic status (rich or poor student). The first finding in these regards is that 
high economic incentives for winning the relay race make rich students to discriminate 
much less than when economic incentives for winning are lower. Second, the mere 
exposure to poor students in the past, make rich students to discriminate, in overall, 
12% less when choosing their teammates. 
Despite the amount of research done to test under which conditions intergroup 
contact between members of different social groups reduce their discrimination and 
prejudices, less attention has been paid to investigate whether Intergroup Contact 
Theory conditions proposed by Allport (1954) could also attenuate prejudices and 
discrimination without requiring individuals to get in contact. In particular, there is a 
lack of evidence on whether superordinate common goals could reduce discrimination 
between members of social groups in conflict even if physical interactions do not occur 
among them.  
Chapter 4 presents an online experiment aimed to test whether superordinate 
common goals not requiring individuals to get in contact can attenuate discriminatory 
behaviors between members of social groups in conflict; Catalans pursuing the 
independence of Catalonia from Spain, and Spaniards against it. The Catalan 
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independentist movement has been historically rooted in a Catalan national identity 
sense that finds one of its main distinctive traits in the Catalan language. During the last 
decade, concretely since 2009, a series of referendums for the independence of 
Catalonia had been held in different municipalities and regions of Catalonia, putting the 
intergroup conflict at the front in the political arena. The pick of tensions and 
confrontation in this conflict occurred on the 1st of October 2017, with the last and 
largest referendum for the independence of Catalonia celebrated. The experiment 
exploits a natural occurring context in which the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic 
and the intergroup conflict between Catalans and Spaniards overlapped in time, forcing 
members of both social groups in conflict to cooperate in order to achieve the 
superordinate common goal of reducing the spread of the covid-19 virus. Note the 
cooperation required among individuals to achieve the superordinate common goal 
consisted of individuals not getting in contact with each other. The “unlockdown” 
process implemented at a national level by the Spanish government from beginnings 
May to the end of June 2020 offered a natural environment in which the collective 
perception of achieving the common goal of reducing the spread of Covid-19 virus 
gradually increased as people were gradually “unlocked”. Along this “unlockdown” 
process, participants in the experiment played five times a modified version of a Take-
or-Give Dictator Game inspired in List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). In this version of 
the Dictator Game, both the dictator and the four receivers are endowed with the same 
amount of money. Natural group identity is introduced in the Dictator Game through 
displaying to participants when deciding as a dictators which language the receivers had 
chose to conduct the experiment (in each group there was one receiver who chose to 
conduct the experiment in Catalan, another in Spanish, another in English, and another 
whose language chosen remained under uncertainty). The dictator can either transfer 
any amount of its endowment by giving to any receiver, or by taking any amount of any 
receiver’s endowment. This experiment investigates how redistribution decisions 
towards members of different language group identities evolved as participants move on 
through the “unlockdown” process, that is, as the superordinate common goal was 
gradually achieved and the perception of the common threat decreased. Results show 
that, overall, all participants became more selfish as the superordinate common goal 
was gradually achieved and were gradually unlocked. Moreover, discrimination patterns 
of participants who chose to conduct the experiment in Spanish also increased as they 
were gradually unlocked, whereas discrimination of participants conducting the 
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experiment in Catalan remained constant during the “unlockdown” process. These 
results highlight that superordinate common goals not requiring individuals to interact 
mitigate discrimination and selfishness. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis revolves around the triggers of discriminatory behaviors and the 
potential mitigating factors of such behaviors. This thesis is structured in the form of a 
monograph composed of three complete and interrelated manuscripts. 11   Each 
manuscript focuses on a particular dimension related to discrimination patterns between 
individuals. The first manuscript serves as a starting point and focuses in reinforcing 
and attenuating factors of group identity. It measures group identity and quantify its 
fluctuations as a consequence of behavior comparisons among members of a particular 
social group. Group identity and its intensity is a crucial factor in predicting the 
emergence of intergroup conflicts and the intensity of discriminatory behaviors. A 
better understanding on group identity fluctuations and the reasons leading individuals 
to reinforce or attenuate their attachment to a particular group identity might provide 
useful insights for attenuating discrimination between individuals from different social 
groups. The second manuscript focuses on studying the role group identity uncertainty 
plays in discriminatory behaviors when individuals decide with whom to interact. The 
main goal of this manuscript is to test whether individuals are more willing to interact 
with other individuals from a different social group or with other individuals whose 
group identity remains uncertain. This manuscript also studies whether discrimination 
patterns on individual interaction preferences can be mitigated by economic incentives. 
The third manuscript focuses on studying how discrimination patterns on economic 
resource allocation decisions between individuals from different social groups, some of 
them currently in conflict, evolve as a superordinate common goal is gradually 
achieved. The main hypothesis of this manuscript is that the need to cooperate to 
achieve a superordinate common goal can mitigate discrimination among individuals 
from different social groups even if they do not get in contact.   
The three manuscripts complement each other by studying the effects of group 
identity in individual decision-making in different decision contexts. Furthermore, each 
manuscript explores different mechanisms through which discriminatory behaviors can 
                                               
11 The references of each manuscript are provided at the end of each chapter. 
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mitigate. Overall, these manuscripts contribute to a better understanding on the triggers 
of discrimination patterns between individuals and provide insights on which factors 
can effectively mitigate such discriminatory behaviors.   
 
1.6. Methodology of the thesis 
The overarching research approach of this thesis relies on experimental methods 
widely used in Experimental and Behavioral Economics. This thesis consists of three 
experiments through which decisions of experimental participants are collected in a 
controlled environment and economically incentivized to better understand how group 
identity influences individual decision-making. 
A key decision when designing an experiment aimed at studying how group 
identity affects individual decision-making is whether to use natural group identities or 
artificial group identities induced in the laboratory. Natural group identities refer to 
group identities participants bring with them from their real life regarding social groups 
outside the laboratory. Experiments using natural group identities have the advantage of 
being able to address research questions directly related to a particular sample of the 
population with a particular group identity, which usually confers its results a greater 
external validity. Furthermore, using natural group identities allow for studying 
particular relationships between different social groups (some social groups might have 
friendly or fraternal relationships, other keep neutral relationships, and others might be 
involved in conflict relationships). Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of this thesis use Catalan 
and Spanish language group identities to exploit these advantages and measure 
fluctuations of these group identities and how discrimination between members of the 
two social groups evolve as a superordinate common goal is gradually achieved.    
Another experimental approach widely used in Social Psychology and Economics 
to study how group identity affects individual decision-making is known as minimum 
sense paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). This procedure consists on inducing a minimum 
sense of an arbitrary and artificial group identity to experimental participants. This 
procedure has the advantage that avoids stereotypes, status, and expectations attached to 
members of a particular social group interfere in the decisions of experimental 
participants. To consider the induced group identities to be minimal, the procedure 
through which are induced has to accomplish some criteria; participants have to be 
assigned to non-overlapping groups, participants of the same group cannot interact nor 
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communicate among them, the anonymity of participants has to be preserved, 
participants’ individual and group interest cannot be in conflict. The minimum sense 
paradigm is a useful experimental tool that allows for establishing causality between 
group identity membership and differences in the behaviors of experimental 
participants. Lane (2016) and Pechar and Kranton (2018) meta-analyzed experiments 
using the minimum sense paradigm and concluded that the mere categorization of 
participants into different arbitrary group identities is enough to activate a group sense 
that influence individual decision-making.  
Another advantage of using artificial group identities is that it offers the 
opportunity to manipulate group identity saliency from a “minimum” to a “strong” 
sense. Within the Experimental and Behavioral Economics literature, communication 
and interdependence in participants’ payoffs have been introduced in tasks developed 
by experimental participants induced with the same group identity to reinforce and 
intensify their group identity sense. For instance, Eckel and Grossman (2005) and 
Charness et al., (2014) use cooperative tasks among participants induced with the same 
group identity and show that interdependence in payoffs increase the saliency of their 
group identity. Similarly, Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) found that 
introducing communication among participants induced with the same group identity 
while developing independent tasks also reinforce their group identity sense. Other 
factors that are effective on enhancing experimental participants’ group identity 
saliency is the public exposure of their decisions (Charness et al., 2007) and payoffs 
(Ioannou et al., 2015) to the other group identity members. Finally, confronting 
participants induced with different group identity also reinforce the saliency of their 
group identity (Eckel and Grossman 2005). A common finding in these experiments is 
that reinforcing group identity tends to increase the effects of group identity on 
individual decision-making. Chapter 3 of this thesis separately uses the minimum sense 
paradigm and a group-solving task to reinforce group identity to explore the effects of 
increasing group identity saliency on individuals’ interaction preferences and collective 
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This paper proposes empirically measure group identity through willingness 
to acquire goods with representative attributes of social groups. The 
advantages of such an incentivized measuring method are that it provides a 
revealed preference measure that quantifies group identity and enables 
investigating the extent to which individuals reinforce or devalue their 
group identities from comparing their own behaviors with those of other 
social group members. This paper presents a laboratory-in-the-field 
experiment conducted in three Catalan-Spanish-Speaking regions, in which 
group identities of participants are measured using the Catalan and Spanish 
translation of a particular book. Besides, group identity variations resulting 
from acting similar or different from other social group members in a social 
and individual context are disentangled and quantified. Results found show 
both Catalan and Spanish participants reinforce by more than 10% their 
Spanish group identity when receiving information pointing they have acted 
like other Spanish participants. Besides, Spanish participants attenuate their 
Catalan group identity by almost a 6% when receiving information pointing 

























Group identity, also known as social identity, is defined as the individual’s sense 
of belonging to social groups. Theories and models of group identity assume individuals 
tend to reinforce their group identity and increase their utility when aligning their 
behaviors with other social group members. In contrast, it is assumed individuals 
devalue their group identity and lose utility when behaviors among social group 
members diverge. However, there is a lack of evidence on how much individuals 
reinforce and attenuate their group identity due to comparing their own behaviors with 
those of other social group members, perhaps, because measures able to quantify group 
identity are not abundant. This paper proposes empirically measuring group identity 
through willingness to acquire goods with representative attributes of social groups to 
investigate the extent to which converging and diverging behaviors among social group 
members reinforce and attenuate group identity. 
The Social Identity Theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1985), together 
with its extension the Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987), describe the 
reflexive process through which individuals form their group identities. These theories 
refer to groups of people that have a particular physical or psychological attribute in 
common as social groups. Social groups distinguish and classify individuals in regards a 
wide array of social categories like ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, gender, 
ideology, occupation, sexual orientation, or language, among many others. According to 
these theories, individuals’ group identity formation mostly relies on social 
categorization, identification, and social comparison. First individuals categorize other 
individuals and themselves into social groups of many social categories according to 
their attributes, belief, and behaviors (e.g., ethnic categorization relies on physical 
attributes, whereas religious categorization relies on belief and behaviors). Thereafter, 
individuals perceive themselves as members of several social groups and identify with 
other social group members. As a result, other individuals in a same social group are 
categorized as in-group and individuals in different social groups as out-group. Once 
individuals have formed their group identities and developed a sense of belongingness 
to social groups, individuals increase their self-esteem through positive distinctiveness. 
Positive distinctiveness refers to social comparisons that accentuate the perceived 
similarities with the in-group and the perceived differences with the out-group in those 
dimensions in which the in-group are judged more positively than the out-group (Hogg 
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and Abrams, 1988). 
In the same spirit, the seminal economic model proposed by Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) introduces the notion of group identity into the utility function of individuals. 
The identity-based utility function of individuals they proposed provides explanations 
for individual behaviors that violate traditional economic assumptions of rationality and 
self-interest. The model also elaborates on the reasons and mechanism leading 
individuals to differently behave depending on the social context and whether 
interacting with an in-group or an out-group individual. The model states that social 
groups prescribe how its members should and should not behave in different contexts 
and with different people. 12  Some classic examples are the ten commandments of 
Christians and different clothing between men and women. The model argues that social 
group members that follow prescriptions affirm or reinforce their group identity 
obtaining a utility “gain.” In contrast, social group members deviating from prescribed 
behaviors devaluate group identity and cause a “loss” in utility to themselves and the 
other group members. 
However, there are some interesting questions to which the model developed by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) does not provide specifications. For instance, are the 
“gains” in utility derived from following a particular prescription higher than the 
“losses” derived from not follow it? Are utility “gains” and “losses” context dependent? 
That is, does deviating from a particular prescription in a social context, like not going 
to pray at church on Sunday, cause the same “loss” in utility than deviating from it in an 
individual context like not praying at home before going to sleep? Do the answers to 
these questions generalize to most social groups? Answering these questions will 
provide a better understanding of individual preferences and behaviors and contribute to 
enriching the identity-based analysis aimed at tackling intergroup conflicts, secessionist 
political movements, discriminatory behaviors, and the formation of stereotypes. 
To investigate the effects of following and deviating from social group 
prescriptions in individuals' group identity, it is necessary to measure and quantify 
individual group identity. Unlike previous studies, this paper complements individual 
group identity measures obtained from a survey with an empirical measure based on 
individuals' willingness to acquire goods with identity attributes representative of social 
groups. The identity attributes of goods are those features of goods that people associate 
                                               
12 The notion of prescriptions in the Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model is very similar to the concept of 
social norms, which at least dates back to Sherif (1936). 
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with a particular social group. Examples of goods with identity attributes include flags 
and t-shirts of nations, sport teams, and political parties. Identity attributes of goods are 
also related to the production and supply process of the good. For instance, the place 
where a movie is filmed, the nationality of its director, and the language used during the 
projection, might be perceived by consumers as identity attributes. According to Social 
Psychologists individuals consider their possessions as parts of themselves and a central 
component to maintain and support their group identities (Belk, 1988; Tuan, 1980; 
Furby, 1978), which suggest that individuals’ willingness to acquire goods with identity 
attributes of social groups they belong to might reflect their group identities.  
Measuring group identity through willingness to acquire goods with identity 
attributes offers several advantages. First, it is a process through which individuals 
reveal their preferences. Compared to survey measures in which participants declare 
which are their preferences without any implication for their payoffs or outcomes, 
eliciting group identity through incentivized decisions on willingness to acquire goods 
with identity attributes provides an empirical measure closer to the true group identity of 
individuals. There exists a vast literature studying the differences on eliciting individual 
preferences between hypothetical and real payoff schemes in many strategic and non-
strategic settings.13 However, to the best of my knowledge, measuring group identity of 
individuals through incentivized decisions remains unexplored. Another advantage of 
measuring group identity through willingness to acquire goods with identity attributes is 
that it offers a measure beyond categorizing individuals into different social groups and 
allows for quantifying the intensity of group identity. 
This paper presents a laboratory-in-the-field experiment aimed at empirically 
measuring individual group identity through willingness to acquire goods with identity 
attributes, and how individual group identity is affected by social group member 
behaviors. The good used to measure individual group identity is a book. The Catalan 
and Spanish translation of the book are used to manipulate the identity attribute of the 
good, which is the language. The experiment was conducted in three Catalan-Spanish-
Speaking regions. Importantly, the idiosyncrasy of Catalan language in each of the three 
regions where the experiment was conducted, Catalunya, Illes Balears, and Comunitat 
Valenciana, have some similarities regarding its group identity connotation, and 
differences regarding the role of Catalan language in the education system and the 
                                               
13 See Holt and Laury (2005) for a comparison on individual risk aversion preferences obtained using 
real versus hypothetical incentives. 
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frequency it is spoken by the population. First, these three regions belong to the 
“Catalan Countries”, a term that refers to the territories where people speak Catalan or 
one of its variants like Majorcan, in Illes Balears, or Valencian, in Comunitat 
Valenciana. Although the Catalan Countries term has never corresponded to any official 
political or administrative unit, it links the Catalan language with Catalan national 
feelings in some Catalan speakers. 14  On the other hand, the usage of the Catalan 
language in each of these regions is very different. While in Catalunya and Illes Balears 
the Catalan is the vehicular language in the education system and its knowledge is 
compulsorily required to access the university, in the education system of Comunitat 
Valenciana the Catalan is optional. There are three key factors to measure participants' 
group identity through their willingness to acquire the Catalan and Spanish book 
versions are; participants do not already possess none of the book versions, participants 
do not have reading comprehension problems for any language, and participants feel 
identified with both languages. One the one hand, participants not being able to read one 
of the book versions might reduce the willingness to acquire it. Similarly, participants 
already possessing one of the book versions might not have any incentive to acquire 
such book version. To avoid reading comprehension problems and already possessing 
one of the book versions influence participant willingness to acquire both book versions, 
the experiment was conducted, from shortly before until shortly after the publication 
date of the book versions, in high schools where teaching included Catalan and Spanish 
languages.   
To assess the effect on participants' group identities derived from acting similar or 
different than other social group members in a particular social and individual context, it 
is first needed participants share group identities to perceive each other as members of 
the same social groups. In this regard, more than 97% of participants declared to 
identify, at least to some extent, with both Catalan and Spanish languages.  Besides, it is 
needed they can compare each other behaviors in a particular social and individual 
context. To make it possible, participants played during the experiment two games that 
are commonly used to measure cooperation and risk preferences. The main purpose of 
these games is to create a precedent in each participant about their own behavior in each 
                                               
14 Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) found empirical evidence that students exposed for a longer time to 
the Catalan language in the compulsory education system developed stronger Catalan feelings and 
preference for Catalanist political parties (i.e. political parties founded in Catalonia). Moreover, in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, there is robust evidence of discrimination between Spanish people based on 
Catalan and Spanish language. 
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of these two contexts that later on in the experiment will allow them to compare their 
own behavior with those of other social group members. The game used to measure 
cooperation preferences is played by participants in a social context, whereas the game 
used to measure risk preferences is played by participants in an individual context. 
Decisions in the first experimental session were used to create feedback about the 
average cooperative degree and the favorite risk option of participants who declared to 
identify more with the Catalan or Spanish language (henceforth referred as to Catalan 
and Spanish participants, respectively). The information contained in these feedback 
served as a reference point of the behavior either in the social or individual context of 
Catalan and Spanish participants; the average cooperative level of Catalan/Spanish 
participants in the social context, and the favorite risk option of Catalan/Spanish 
participants in the individual context. Note that participants might perceive a particular 
feedback differently depending on their own decisions in the two games. Participants 
who were less cooperative than the average cooperative level of Catalan/Spanish 
participants might realize Catalan/Spanish participants were more cooperative than 
themselves, which might be perceived as something “positive.” Contrarily, participants 
who were more cooperative might perceive the feedback as something “negative” about 
Catalan/Spanish participants. Similarly, participants who received the feedback 
regarding the favorite risk option of Catalan/Spanish participants and chose the same 
risk option might realize they acted like most Catalan/Spanish participants and perceive 
the feedback as “positive” information, whereas those who acted differently by choosing 
a different risk option as “negative” information.    
 Results show that participants’ group identity intensity revealed through their 
willingness to acquire Spanish and Catalan book versions is highly significantly 
correlated with their group identity intensity declared toward both languages in a 
survey. Furthermore, participants react to both “positive” and “negative” information 
about other social group member behaviors. The information to which more participants 
react is the “positive” information referring to Spanish participants. Most participants 
that receive such information increase their willingness to acquire the Spanish book 
version by approximately 10%, and do it so in a similar magnitude both when the 
information refers to the individual and social context. On the other hand, Spanish 
participants decrease their willingness to acquire the Catalan book version by almost 
6% when receive “negative” information referring to Catalan participants. These 
findings offer a novel empirical measure that allows for quantifying group identity 
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fluctuations, and provide evidence on reinforcing and attenuating factors of group 
identity. 
This paper contributes in the first place, to the literature studying the triggers of 
discriminatory behaviors and intergroup tensions and conflicts. Group identity has been 
considered one of the main triggers of intergroup tensions and conflicts (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1985, 1979; Basu, 2005; Esteban and Ray, 2008; Esteban et al., 2012). As a 
consequence, several indexes had been developed to inform and predict the emergence 
and escalation of intergroup conflicts. Examples include fractionalization (Alesina et at., 
2003; Fearon, 2003) and polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Wolfson, 1994; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2003, 2005) indexes. Moreover, there is evidence 
that increasing group identity saliency tend to increase differences in individual 
decision-making toward in-group and out-group individuals (Eckel and Grossman, 
2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011; Charness et al., 
2014). The experiment presented in this paper contributes to this literature by providing 
an additional empirical measure of individual group identity intensity that could be 
useful on predicting intergroup conflicts, and shows how other social group member 
behaviors affects individual group identity intensity, which might contribute to increase 
and attenuate discriminatory behaviors. 
This paper also contributes to a better understanding of reinforcing and attenuating 
factors of individual group identity. In the pioneer model proposed by Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) individuals increase their utility when acting like other social group 
members and experience a disutility when acting differently. However, the model does 
not distinguish between behaviors occurring in individual or social contexts. Results 
found in this paper are in line with the model predictions of Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), and provide additional evidence on how other social group member behaviors in 
a social and individual context affects individual group identity.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the 
experimental design and descriptive statistics of participants. In Section 2.3 results are 
analyzed, and Section 2.4 concludes discussing the results. 
 
2.2. Experimental design  
The experiment is comprised of 4 stages that are common to all participants in the 
experiment. Stage 1 is designed to elicit cooperative and risk attitudes of participants. 
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The Stage 1 has several purposes. First, to enable participants compare their behaviors 
in particular contexts later on during the experiment. Second, to obtain variables of 
cooperation and risk preferences at the participant level that might potentially affect the 
results. Stage 2 is mainly designed to identify participants that would have some reading 
comprehension problems either with Catalan or Spanish language and which 
participants already possessed either the Catalan or Spanish book versions at the time of 
conducting the experiment. These are two crucial factors that can influence participant 
decisions in Stage 3. Stage 3 is design to measure the group identity of participants 
toward the Catalan and Spanish language through their willingness to acquire both book 
versions. Stage 3 is also used to investigate how participant group identity fluctuates 
when participants compare their own behavior in Stage 1 with that of other social group 
members. Stage 4 is designed to measure participant declared group identity intensity 
toward the Catalan and Spanish language. The main purpose of Stage 4 is to 
complement the empirical group identity measure obtained in Stage 3 and check 
whether these two measures are correlated or not.   
In Stage 1, participants made two decisions. At the beginning of Stage 1 
participants were told they were going to play two games in which they have the 
opportunity to accumulate valuable points to win final prizes. First, participants played 
one round of a Public Good Game (PGG) in groups of four. In the PGG participants 
were endowed with 6 points and decided how many points to share with the other three 
anonymous members of the group and how many to keep for themselves. Participants 
knew that the total points shared by the members of the group will be doubled and 
distributed equally among all group members. Secondly, participants played a Lottery 
Choice Game and chose one lottery option among six lottery options with different risk 
degrees. As in Eckel and Grossman (2002), the purpose of the Lottery Choice Game is 
to measure participant risk aversion, but in a more intuitive and simple context in which 
the expected payoff of each lottery option is kept constant, and the only difference is the 
risk degree of each of them. The first lottery option was a safe option that provided the 
participant 5 points regardless the result of a coin toss. The second lottery option 
provided 6 or 4 points depending on the result of a coin toss. The risk degree of each 
lottery option gradually increases until the sixth lottery option, which provided 10 or 0 
points depending on the result of a coin toss.  
In Stage 2, while participants filled up a reading habits questionnaire, the 
experimenter tossed a coin and computed each participant's total points obtained in 
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Stage 1. At the end of the questionnaire, the final prizes were revealed to participants. 
Participants were told the final prizes were the recently published Harry Potter book 
written either in Catalan or Spanish. Participants were also asked if they would have 
some comprehension difficulty reading some of the book versions and whether they 
already preordered or had in their possession some version of the book. 
In Stage 3 participants have to decide how to split their total points obtained in 
Stage 1 between the two book versions. The book was “Harry Potter and the Cursed 
Child,” written either in Catalan or Spanish.15 Each point allocated to a particular book 
version granted participants a 1% of probability to win the book version they allocate 
the point. Note that the representative identity attribute, the language, is the only 
difference between the book versions and it was highlighted at the time participants 
made their decision to allocate their points.  
In stage 4 participants filled up a questionnaire of more than 40 questions mixing 
language identification questions with other questions to avoid participants answering 
the identification questions just after their points allocation decisions and try to 
minimize participants would answer to such questions concerned about consistency 
with their decisions of allocating points. The first set of twenty questions were 
regarding demographics, religion and smoking habits. In the next questions, participants 
were asked about their language usage within the family unit and social circles. Then, 
participants were asked about their identity degree, on a scale from 0 to 5, regarding 
Catalan and Spanish languages, and also regarding Majorcan language in sessions 
conducted in the Illes Balears and regarding Valencian language in sessions conducted 
in the Comunitat Valenciana. Finally, participants were asked about sports preferences 
and time spent on the internet, watching television, and using the mobile phone.    
 
2.2.1. Treatments  
The experiment has a Control in which participants do not receive information 
about the behavior of other participants and six Treatments in which participants receive 
information about the behavior of other participants. Experimental treatments vary the 
                                               
15 Harry Potter is a series of seven fantasy novels often considered cornerstones of modern young adult 
literature that have inspired children worldwide to become substantial readers. “Harry Potter and the 
Cursed Child” is a book that contains the script for a stage play telling an additional story adding to the 
stories of the seven previous novels. “Harry Potter and the Cursed Child” became the most preordered 
book of 2016 in Amazon, which suggested that it might be a potential incentive for participants in the 
experiment (all of them teenagers). At the end of the year it became the bestselling book of 2016 in the 
U.S. and U.K. 
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information participants receive in Stage 3 before they split their points between the two 
book versions. The feedback participants receive in Treatment sessions provides 
information about how other Catalan or Spanish participants in a previous experimental 
session did behave either in the PGG or Lottery Choice Game. 
Four feedback were formed to distinguish between the effects that behaviors of 
other participants in a social or individual context might have in participants' group 
identities. In the Spanish Social Information (SSI) and Catalan Social Information (CSI) 
treatments, participants are informed about the average number of points shared in the 
PGG either by Spanish or Catalan participants, respectively. In the Spanish Individual 
Information (SII) and Catalan Individual Information (CII) treatments, participants are 
informed about the lottery option most chosen by Spanish and Catalan participants, 
respectively, in the Lottery Choice Game. Besides, two additional treatments were 
designed, the Spanish-Catalan Social Information (SCSI) and the Spanish-Catalan 
Individual Information (SCII) treatments, in which participants were allowed to choose 
about which participants, Spanish or Catalan, they wanted to receive the feedback 
information. Table 1 summarizes the information features of feedback provided to 
participants in each treatment. 
 
Table 1: Feedback features in experimental treatments 
 
2.2.2. Feedback formation  
Decisions of participants in the first Control Treatment session were used to 
create the feedback information which was provided to participants. Figure 1 shows the 
average points shared in the PGG by Catalan and Spanish participants in the first 




Public Good Game Lottery Choice Game Spanish Catalans Obs.
Control Treatment No No No No No 65
Spanish Social Information No Yes No Yes No 71
Catalan Social Information No Yes No No Yes 58
Spanish Individual 
Information
No No Yes Yes No 67
Catalan Individual 
Information
No No Yes No Yes 56
Spanish-Catalan Social 
Information
Yes Yes No Yes/No Yes/No 40
Spanish-Catalan Individual 
Information
Yes No Yes Yes/No Yes/No 35
Information
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Spanish participants shared, on average, approximately 2 points in the PGG. The two 
feedback referring either to Catalan or Spanish participants’ behavior in the social 
context of the PGG were: 
  
Before you decide how to assign your points, you should know that in a previous 
session of this experiment, participants that identified more with 
CATALAN/SPANISH language decided to share 2 points (on average) in the 
first game. 
 










Note: The figure reports the average shared points in the Public Good Game by Catalan 
and Spanish participants in the first experimental session. 
 
Providing feedback about the PGG to participants brings them a reference point 
about the cooperative degree of other Catalan or Spanish participants. However, 
participants might perceive PGG feedback differently depending on their own decisions 
in the PGG. For instance, participants that shared more than 2 points in the PGG might 
consider as selfish other participants of a particular group identity when receiving PGG 
feedback. In contrast, participants that have shared 2 points or less in the PGG might 
consider other participants of a particular group identity to be generous when receiving 
a PGG feedback. Recall that sharing points in the PGG benefit the other participants in 
the group at the expense of incurring a cost for oneself. 
To distinguish between these potentially different perceptions over the same 
feedback information a distinction between “positive” and “negative” feedback 
information received by participants is done. To illustrate these positive and negative 
feedback categorizations, consider these two examples: 
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1. A participant that shared 4 points in PGG will be considered to receive negative 
information when receiving PGG feedback, as this participant has a higher 
cooperative degree than the average cooperative degree of Catalan and Spanish 
participants.  
2. A participant that shared 1 point in PGG will be consider to receive positive 
information when receiving PGG feedback, as this participant has a lower 
cooperative degree than the average cooperative degree of Catalan and Spanish 
participants. 
 
To generate the Lottery Choice Game feedback the same procedure as in PGG 
feedback was followed. Figure 2 shows the percentage of Catalan and Spanish 
participants that chose each lottery option in the first experimental session. 
 











Note: Percentage of Catalan and Spanish participants in the first experimental session 
choosing each lottery option. 
 
Although Figure 2 shows Catalan and Spanish participants have very different 
risk preferences, the safe lottery (lottery option 1) was the most chosen lottery option by 
Catalan and Spanish participants in the first experimental session. The two feedback 
referring either to Catalan or Spanish participants’ behavior in the individual context of 
the Lottery Choice Game were: 
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Before you decide how to assign your points, you should know that in a previous 
session of this experiment, the lottery option 1 (front coin side = 5 points and 
behind coin side = 5 points) in the second game was the favorite lottery option 
of participant that identified more with CATALAN/SPANISH language. 
 
Similarly, providing feedback about the Lottery Choice Game to participants 
brings them a reference point about the most chosen lottery option of Catalan and 
Spanish participants. Again, the same feedback might be differently perceived by 
participants depending on their own choice in the Lottery Choice Game. Those 
participants who had chosen the lottery option 1 might perceive the feedback as they 
had acted as most participants of a particular group identity, whereas participants 
choosing another lottery option might perceive the feedback as they had acted 
differently.  
To distinguish between these potentially different perceptions over the same 
feedback information a distinction between “positive” and “negative” feedback is done. 
To illustrate these positive and negative feedback categorizations, consider these two 
examples: 
 
1. A participant that chose the lottery option 4 will be considered to receive negative 
information when receiving Lottery Choice Game feedback, as this participant did not 
act like the majority of participants of any group identity.  
2. A participant that chose the lottery option 1 will be consider to receive positive 
information when receiving Lottery Choice Game feedback, as this participant 
did act like the majority of participants of both Catalan and Spanish participants. 
 
2.2.3. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in Spanish in a total of four bilingual high schools 
in three Catalan-Spanish-speaking regions, two in Catalunya, one in Illes Balears, and 
one in Comunitat Valenciana.16 In all these high schools Spanish and Catalan languages 
were used as a teaching language. A total of 20 sessions were conducted from 26th of 
September to 24th of October 2016.17 The experimenter read aloud the experimental 
                                               
16 See experimental instructions in Appendix A. 
17 The experiment was conducted from shortly before until shortly after the publication of the Spanish 
and Catalan versions of the book, which were published the 28th of September 2016. Only a 3% of 
participants declared to be in possession of some version of the book, and a 13% declared they would 
have some linguistic comprehension problem to read some version of the book. 
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instruction of each experimental stage at the beginning of each experimental stage. A 
total of 469 students took part in the experimental sessions, which lasted no more than 
one hour each. The maximum number of points participants can earn in the PGG is 
reached and equal to twelve when all group members share all their points. The 
maximum number of points participants can earn in the Lottery Choice Game is equal 
to 10. The average probability (total points obtained by participants) of winning a book 
was 13.9%. A total of 80 books and 469 highlighter pens were provided to participants 
as a final prize and show-up fee respectively.  
 
2.2.4. Descriptive statistics 
The average age of participants was 13.64 years old, of which a 49% were girls 
and 51% boys. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the average of group identity 
measures, average shared points in the PGG, and the average lottery option chosen of 
participants. Participants are categorized by the language with which they declared to 
identify more separately categorizing immigrant participants (“Indifferent” refers to 
participants that declared to identify the most with Catalan and Spanish languages and 
in the same degree). Spanish and Catalan group identity intensity were reported by 
participants in the final questionnaire of Stage 4 in a scale from 0 to 5, and the identity 
gap variable is the difference, in absolute value, between the Spanish and Catalan group 
identity intensity. Recall that in the PGG participants decided how many out of their six 
points to share with the other participants in their group, which is a measure of 
participants’ cooperation degree. On the other hand, in the Lottery Choice Game 
participants choose a lottery option, from 1 to 6, which were increasing in their risk 
degree, which provides a proxy variable of participants’ risk preferences.  
Table 2 shows that a total of 200 Spanish, 46 Catalan, 92 Indifferent, 2 Valencian, 
21 Majorcan, and 31 Immigrant participants which represents the 51.02%, 11,73%, 
23,47%, 0.51%, 5.36% and 7.91% of the sample, respectively, correctly conducted the 
experiment. In terms of average shared points Spanish participants are not significantly 
different than Catalan participants, (p-value = 0.68)18 nor as compared to Indifferent 
participants (p-value = 0.71), being the average shared points 2.38, 2.30 and 2.23, 
respectively. Regarding risk preferences, the favorite lottery option of Catalan, Spanish 
                                               
18 To compare measures across treatments, I use the non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney test, using 
participants as a unit of observation. 
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and Indifferent participants is the safe lottery option 1 (for the 25.42% of Catalan, 
32.86% of Spanish and 29.66% of Indifferent participants). However, Catalans are 
significantly riskier than the rest of participants at aggregate level (p-value = 0.059), 
whereas Spanish participants (p-value = 0.235) and Indifferent participants (p-value = 
0.864) are not, with average risk levels of 3.34, 2.76, and 2.84, respectively. 
Table 2 also shows that the average group identity intensity regarding the main 
linguistic group identity is 4.91, 4.89 and 4.30 for Spanish, Catalan and Indifferent 
participants, respectively. These measures are not significantly different between 
Spanish and Catalan (p-value = 0.34), although it is significantly lower for Indifferent 
participants as compared to Spanish and Catalans participants pooled together (p-value 
= 0.00). These measures reveal that most participants that declared Spanish or Catalan 
language to be the language they more identify with do it so at the maximum group 
identity intensity degree of 5. However, these participants might differ on how strongly 
identify with the language they do not identify the most, that is, how strongly Spanish 
participants identify with the Catalan language and how strongly Catalan participants 
identify with the Spanish language. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: The table reports the averages of Spanish and Catalan language group identity 
measures reported by participants in stage 4 and decisions made by participants in the 
games of Stage 1. The identity gap variable reports the difference, in absolute value, 
between Spanish and Catalan language group identity intensity. Participants are 
categorized in this table by the language they declared to feel more strongly identify with. 
Indifferent participants declared the same group identity intensity for Catalan and Spanish 
languages. Participants not born in Spain are categorized as Immigrants. Standard 












Spanish 200 4.91                                        
(0.32)
2.53                                        
(1.17)
2.37                             
(1.21)
2.38                            
(1.48)
2.76                                        
(1.77)
Catalan 46 3.06                                        
(0.85)
4.89                                        
(0.37)
1.82                             
(0.87)
2.30                            
(1.63)
3.34                                        
(1.94)
Indifferent 92 4.30                                        
(1)
4.30                                        
(1)
0                           
(0)
2.23                                        
(1.63)
2.84                                        
(1.85)
Valencian 2 4.50                                        
(0.70)
3                                
(0)
1.5                               
(0.34)
2                                        
(1.41)
1                                        
(0)
Majorcan 21 3.28                                        
(0.84)
2.33                                        
(1.01)
0.94                             
(0.89)
2.04                            
(1.24)
2.57                                        
(1.69)
Immigrant 31 4.70                                        
(0.86)
3.19                                        
(1.32)
1.51                            
(0.96)
2.03                             
(1.32)




Regarding to the secondary linguistic group identity of Catalan and Spanish 
participants, the average group identity intensity is significantly different (p-value = 
0.01), being 2.53 for Spanish participants and 3.06 for and Catalan participants (there is 
not a secondary linguistic group identity for Indifferent participants). As a consequence, 
the identity gap measure of Spanish participants is significantly higher as compared to 
that of Catalan participants (p-value = 0.002). Hence, Catalan participants declared to 
feel more identify with the Spanish language than Spanish with the Catalan language. 
 Figure 3 shows the distribution of participants by identity gap (it takes negative 
values for Catalan participants). Valencian, Majorcan and Immigrant participants are 
categorized as Catalan, Spanish or Indifferent, according to their Spanish and Catalan 
group identity intensity reported in Stage 4. As it can be observed, there are 53 Catalan 
participants (13.5%), 97 Indifferent participants (24.7%), and 242 Spanish participant 
(61.8%). The inequality of Catalan and Spanish participants in terms of observations is 
mainly caused by the sample composition of participants from experimental sessions 
conducted in the Comunitat Valenciana, where there were 71 Spanish participants, 1 
Catalan participant, and 3 Indifferent participants. Note that the composition of Catalan, 
Spanish, and Indifferent participants of each experimental session is endogenous since it 
depends on participants' group identity towards the Catalan and Spanish language. 
Therefore, this is not something under the experimenter's control. Besides, the 
publication date of the Catalan and Spanish book versions was suddenly anticipated by 
one month during summer 2016, which forced to conduct the experiment in the high 
schools that earlier confirm their participation, and limited the capacity to conduct all 
experimental sessions before the publication date. On top of that, the experimental 
sessions in Comunitat Valenciana were the last to be conducted, so the imbalance 
between the number of Catalan and Spanish participants was generated at the end of the 
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of participants by identity gap levels. 
 
Figure 3 also shows that there are some observations with an identity gap of 5, 
which implicitly means these participants reported to identify nothing with Catalan 
language. Despite these three observations and two more observations of Catalan 
participants, the rest of participants declared to identify with both Catalan and Spanish 
language at least to some extent. 
 
2.3. Results  
This results section first analyzes if individual group identity measures declared 
by participants in the questionnaire are reflected by their willingness to acquire the two 
book versions through their allocation of points.   
Figure 4 depicts the average proportion of points allocated to the Spanish book 
version conditional on participants’ identity gap (including all participants in the 
experiment). The position of a bubble indicates a pair of proportion allocation and 
identity gap. The size of a bubble indicates the number of participants that are in a given 
pair. The black line plots the average proportion allocation conditional on the identity 
gap. Conditional means and their respective standard errors are depicted in green for 
Catalan participants, in blue for Spanish participants, and in yellow for Indifferent 
participants. Figure 4 shows a clear positive correlation between the proportion of 
points allocated the Spanish book version and the identity gap, suggesting that as the 
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identity gap increase (for values distancing from 0) the higher the proportion of points 
allocated to the book version written in the language participants reported to identify 
more with. This trend in the empirical decision of allocating points is therefore in 
accordance with the individual group identity measures provided by participants in the 
Stage 4 questionnaire. Furthermore, it turns out that conditional means of Spanish 
participants are closer to the allocation level 1 than conditional means of Catalan 
participants to the allocation level 0, for all identity gap levels. This fact supports the 
statement that Catalans participants feel more identified with the Spanish language than 
Spanish participants with the Catalan language.  
 
Figure 4: Means of points allocated to the Spanish book version conditional on identity 
gap 
 
Note: The figure depicts the average proportion of points allocated to the Spanish book 
version conditional on identity gap levels.  
 
Since each point gives 1% of probability to win the book version the point is 
allocated to, probabilities to win one, both, or none book versions, depend on the points 
allocation decision. Consider a participant with 20 points. This participant has a 
probability of 20% to win one book version if s/he concentrates all points into one book 
version and a probability of 80% to win none of the book versions. In contrast, if s/he 
decides to allocate 10 points to each book versions, probabilities will be 9% to win one 
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book version but not the other for each book version, a 1% to win both book versions 
and 81% to win none of the book versions. This example illustrates the trade-off 
participants face between the probabilities to win both book versions and the probability 
to win none of the book versions. Following with the example, the cost to increase a 1% 
the probability to win both book versions entails an increment of 1% in the probability 
to win none of the book versions. There might be two different reasons leading a 
participant to allocate all the points to one of the two book versions. First, one of the 
versions might have no utility for the participant. Second, a participant who is risk 
averse might try to minimize the probability to win nothing.  
For this reasons, it is worth to separately analyze the interrelation between points 
allocated to a particular book version and the identity gap for participants who split 
points between the two book versions and those who concentrate all the points in one 
book version. Concretely, to check if the positive correlation between the points 
proportion allocated to the Spanish book version and identity gap measure remains 
when participants allocating all the points to a particular book version are excluded, and 
whether the proportion of participants allocating all their points to a particular book 
version increases as the identity gap increases.  
Figure 5 shows that the positive correlation between the mean of points 
participants allocate to the Spanish version book and their identity gap remains when 
participants concentrating all their point in one book version are excluded. 
 
Figure 5: Means of points allocated to the Spanish book version by participants who 













Note: The figure depicts the average proportion of points allocated to the Spanish book 
version conditional on identity gap levels. Only participants that allocated points to both 
book versions are included. 
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Figure 6 shows the proportion of participants within each identity gap level 
allocating all their points to one book version increase as the identity gap increases (this 
trend is weak for Catalan participants). In other words, the probability that a participant 
allocate all the points to one book version is increasing with the distance from the 
identity gap level 0. 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of participants allocating all the points to one book version 














Note: The figure shows the proportion of participants allocating all their points to one book 
version by identity gap levels. 
 
Therefore, participants’ willingness to acquire goods with representative identity 
attributes of social groups reflects their group identity intensity toward social groups. 
 
Result 1. Willingness to acquire representative goods of social groups empirically 
measures group identity. 
  
To investigate how others’ behaviors affect group identity intensity of participants 
an OLS regression analysis is conducted. Table 3 shows the estimation results 
clustering robust standard errors at the participant level. In columns 1 and 2 all 
participants in the experiment are pooled together. In columns 3, 4, and 5, Catalan, 
Spanish, and Indifferent participants are separately analyzed. In all columns, the 
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dependent variable is the proportion of points allocated by participants to the Spanish 
book version. The independent variables, Spanish/Catalan, take value 1 for participants 
declaring to identify more with the Spanish/Catalan than the Catalan/Spanish language, 
and 0 otherwise. Indifferent variable takes value 1 for participants declaring te same 
group identity intensity for Spanish and Catalan languages, and 0 otherwise. Valencian, 
and Majorcan variables take value 1 for participants that declared to identify more with 
Valencian and Majorcan languages, respectively, than with Spanish and Catalan 
languages, and 0 otherwise. Identity gap variable is the difference, in absolute value 
between the group identity intensity of Spanish and Catalan language. Immigrant 
variable takes value 1 for participants not born in Spain and 0 otherwise. Total Points 
variable is the total points obtained in Stage 1, Shared Points variable is the amount of 
points shared in the PGG, Lottery Option is the lottery option chosen in the Lottery 
Choice Game. Difficult variable takes value 1 for participants declaring they would have 
a comprehension problem to read some of the book versions and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, a set of dummy variables referring to the information received by 
participants in the experimental treatment sessions are included. Catalan Positive 
Information variable takes value 1 for participants receiving positive information about 
Catalan participants regardless it refers to the PGG or the Lottery Choice Game, and 0 
otherwise.19 Catalan Positive Social Information variable takes value 1 for participants 
receiving positive information about Catalan participants in the PGG, and 0 otherwise. 
Catalan Positive Individual Information variable takes value 1 for participants receiving 
positive information about Catalan participants in the Lottery Choice Game, and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, Spanish Positive Information variable takes value 1 for 
participants receiving positive information about Spanish participants regardless it 
refers to the PGG or the Lottery Choice Game, and 0 otherwise. Spanish Positive Social 
Information variable takes value 1 for participants receiving positive information about 
Spanish participants in the PGG, and 0 otherwise. Spanish Positive Individual 
Information variable takes value 1 for participants receiving positive information about 
Spanish participants in the Lottery Choice Game, and 0 otherwise. Variables referring 
to negative information follow the same structure as the variables referring to the 
positive information.  
                                               
19 The categorization rule used to decide when to consider a participant receives positive or negative 
information is exposed in section 2.2. feedback formation. 
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As expected, Table 3 shows the coefficients of interactions between Spanish and 
Identity gap variables and between Catalan and Identity gap variables are statistically 
significant in columns 1 and 2. Similarly, the coefficients of Identity gap variable in 
columns 3 and 4 are also statistically significant. These coefficients show the proportion 
of points allocated to the book version written in the language a participant identify 
more with is higher for participants with higher identity gap values, which provides 
support for the result 1 previously found. Interestingly, the coefficient of Spanish 
Positive Information variable in column 1 is significant and positive, which means that 
at aggregate level participants receiving positive information about Spanish participants 
significantly allocate more points to the Spanish book version. As shown in columns 3 
and 4, both Catalans and Spanish participants allocate more points to the Spanish book 
version when receive positive information about Spanish participants. Even more, this 
effect holds at aggregate level regardless the information participants receive is about 
the social environment of the PGG or the individual environment of the Lottery Choice 
Game, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients of Spanish Positive Social 
Information and Spanish Positive Individual Information in column 2. Concretely, 
participants allocate approximately 10% more points to the Spanish book version when 
receive positive information about Spanish participants either from the individual or 
social context. Interestingly, we can also observe some reactions to negative 
information. The coefficient of Catalan Negative Information is statistically significant 
in column 4, which shows that Spanish participants allocate significantly less points to 
the Catalan book version, almost 6% less, when they receive negative information about 
Catalan participants. In the other hand, although only at the 10% of significance, 
Indifferent participants tend to allocate more points to the Spanish book version when 
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Table 3: OLS regression analysis  
 
 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are reported in parentheses with 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
VARIABLES
(1)                    
Proportion of points 
allocated to Spanish 
book                         
(All participants)
(2)                    
Proportion of points 
allocated to Spanish 
book                        
(All participants)
(3)                     
Proportion of points 
allocated to Spanish 
book                       
(Catalan participants)
(4)                     
Proportion of points 
allocated to Spanish 
book                       
(Spanish participants)
(5)                                 
Proportion of points 
allocated to Spanish 
book                         
(Indifferent participants)
Identity gap 0.017 0.018 -0.077*** 0.30*** ---
(0.156) (0.167) (0.031) (0.011) ---
Spanish 0.168*** 0.165*** --- --- ---
(0.064) (0.060) --- --- ---
Spanish x Identity gap 0.028*** 0.026*** --- --- ---
(0.008) (0.008) --- --- ---
Catalan -0.028 -0.047 --- --- ---
(0.107) (0.106) --- --- ---
Catalan x Identity gap -0.092** -0.084** --- --- ---
(0.043) (0.043) --- --- ---
Indifferent 0.012 0.018 --- --- ---
(0.008) (0.011) --- --- ---
Valencian -0.003 -0.001 --- -0.122*** ---
(0.005) (0.017) --- (0.006) ---
Majorcan -0.223*** -0.216*** 0.010 -0.338*** -0.187*
(0.035) (0.033) (0.021) (0.044) (0.036)
Immigrant 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007
(0.089) (0.085) (0.082) (0.031) (0.061)
Total Points 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Shared Points 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Lottery Option 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Difficult 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.016
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
Age -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.014
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
Gender -0.016 -0.019 -0.011 -0.015 -0.021
(0.020) (0.024) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Catalan Positive Information -0.019 --- 0.053 -0.061 0.083
(0.070) --- (0.175) (0.116) (0.196)
Catalan Positive Social Information (PGG) --- 0.022 --- --- ---
--- (0.064) --- --- ---
Catalan Positive Individual Information (Lottery) --- -0.078 --- --- ---
--- (0.075) --- --- ---
Spanish Positive Information 0.111*** --- 0.146*** 0.122** 0.067
(0.038) --- (0.022) (0.051) (0.214)
Spanish Positive Social Information (PGG) --- 0.116** --- --- ---
--- (0.056) --- --- ---
Spanish Positive Individual Information (Lottery) --- 0.098*** --- --- ---
--- (0.035) --- --- ---
Catalan Negative Information 0.055 --- 0.015 0.059*** 0.107
(0.043) --- (0.011) (0.022) (0.170)
Catalan Negative Social Information (PGG) --- 0.034 --- --- ---
--- (0.055) --- --- ---
Catalan Negative Individual Information (Lottery) --- 0.074 --- --- ---
--- (0.054) --- --- ---
Spanish Negative Information 0.060 --- -0.064 0.013 0.261*
(0.055) --- (0.053) (0.049) (0.136)
Spanish Negative Social Information (PGG) --- 0.15 --- --- ---
--- (0.071) --- --- ---
Spanish Negative Individual Information (Lottery) --- 0.032 --- --- ---
--- (0.044) --- --- ---
Constant 0.617** 0.621** 0.764*** 0.634*** 0.504**
(0.286) (0.266) (0.277) (0.251) (0.410)
Observations 392 392 53 242 97
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To summarize, social group member behaviors can shape individual group 
identity. In this experiment, it can be observed at least three different patterns of 
reinforcement and attenuation of individual group identity derived from social group 
member behaviors. Note that increasing the points allocated to one book version 
implicitly means reducing in the same amount the points allocated to the other book 
version. However, participants receive information only about behaviors of participants 
from one linguistic group identity. Therefore, any reaction observed after receiving any 
information is more likely to occur in regards the social group the information is 
referring to.  First, there are participants that increased their group identity intensity 
towards the social group they feel more identified with since Spanish participants 
increased the points allocated to the book written in Spanish after receiving positive 
information about other Spanish participants. Second, there are participants that 
increased their group identity intensity towards the social group they feel less identified 
with since Catalan participants also increased the points allocated to the book written in 
Spanish after receiving positive information about other Spanish participants. And third, 
there are participants that decreased their group identity intensity towards the social 
group they feel less identified since Spanish participants reduced the points allocated to 
the Catalan book version after receiving negative information about other Catalan 
participants.   
 
Result 2. Participants receiving information pointing they have acted like other Spanish 
participants reinforce their Spanish group identity by approximately 10%. This result 
hold regardless the information refers to a social or individual context. Besides, 
Spanish participants attenuate their Catalan group identity by almost a 6% when 




This paper provides experimental evidence that how much individuals identify 
with social groups can be empirically measured through their willingness to acquire 
representative goods of such social groups. Moreover, this paper also investigates the 
effects of social group member behaviors on individual group identities.  
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Results show that participants’ willingness to acquire a Spanish and Catalan 
version of a book significantly depends on their group identity intensity toward both 
languages. For participants who are willing to acquire both book versions, their 
willingness to acquire the book version written in the language they identify more with 
increases as the difference in the group identity intensity between the two languages 
increases. Similarly, the likelihood that a participant would be willing to acquire only 
one of the book versions also increases as the difference in the group identity intensity 
between the two languages increases. Therefore, willingness to acquire goods with 
identity attributes can complement other measures like polarization, fragmentation, and 
radicalization to study the triggers of discriminatory behaviors and the emergence of 
social tensions and conflicts. 
More importantly, this measure enables to quantify the reinforcing and attenuating 
factors of individual group identities. The second contribution of this experiment relates 
to the effects that “positive” and “negative” behaviors of other social group members 
might have on individuals’ group identities. Results show that participants react to both 
“positive” and “negative” information about other social group members. For instance, 
participants that identify more with one than the other language, intensify their Spanish 
language group identity after receiving positive information about Spanish participants. 
On the other hand, “negative” information about Catalan participants attenuates the 
Catalan language group identity of Spanish participants. As mentioned in the 
experimental design section, it is not only whether the information about others’ 
behaviors is “positive” or “negative” that might matter but also whether such behaviors 
occur in a social or individual context. In this regard, participants in the experiment 
seem to similarly react to “positive” information about Spanish participants when the 
information refers to an individual or social context.  
However, this experiment has some limitations. For instance, the total number of 
participants and the unbalanced number between Catalan and Spanish participants in the 
experiment do not allow for separately investigating whether Catalan, Spanish, and 
Indifferent participants would react differently to information about the individual 
context compared to information about the social context. For the same reasons, 
participants who were allowed to choose whether to receive information about Spanish 
or Catalan participants had been pooled together with participants who were not 
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Appendix A  
 
General instructions 
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. You are 
participating in a study on socio-economic preferences. The instructions will be read 
aloud by the experimenter to ensure that all participants perform the different stages of 
the experiment in order and at the same time. 
 
Preliminaries 
You should not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If 
during the experiment any doubt arises, raise your hand, and the experimenter will come 
where you are sitting to resolve the doubt in private. All decisions and responses of the 
experiment you are participating in will be anonymous and confidential. Do not write 
your name anywhere or comment on your choices with the other participants in the 
experiment. Remember that communication between participants is not allowed while 
the experiment is taking place. You will receive a gift for participating that will be 
given to you at the end of the study. All participants will receive this same gift. 
 
The stages 
The experiment consists of 3 stages. You are going to do each stage separately and in 
order. When you finish a stage, wait in silence until the other participants finish. Then 
the experimenter will distribute the instructions of the next stage. 
 
Remember 
In this experiment, there are no right or wrong answers, or better or worse answers. We 
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Stage 1 
In the first stage of the experiment, you will play two games in which you will earn 
more or fewer points depending on what your choices, the choices of your companions, 
and chance. These points are very important and serve to increase your chances of 
winning the final prizes. 
 
Game 1 
In this game, we are going to form groups of 4 students from this same class. The 
composition of the groups will be random and anonymous (no one will know who the 
members of each group are). To start, you will receive 6 points. You will have to decide 
how many points to share with the other group members and how many points to keep 
for yourself. The sum of the points shared by each group member will be multiplied by 
two, and those points will be distributed equally among all the group members. The 
final result of each one will be the sum of the points kept plus the points distributed. 
Let's see a couple of examples. 
 
In a given group, your 3 classmates decide to share 0 points, and you share the 6 points 
you have. Then, the total of shared points is 6, which multiplied by two, make a total of 
12 points to be distributed among the 4 members of the group. Each group member 
receives 3 points. In total, in this case, your three classmates obtain a total of 9 points (6 
+ 3), and you obtain 3 points (0 + 3) 
 
Let's see another example, now, your 3 classmates decide to share 6 points, and you 
share 0 points. Then, the total of points shared is 18 (6x3), which multiplied by two, 
make a total of 36 points to be distributed among the 4 members of the group. Each 
receives 9 points. In total, in this case, your three classmates obtain a total of 9 points (0 
+ 9), and you get 15 points (6 + 9) 
 
Before starting the game, we are going to do a test to see if you understand it. You must 
circle the correct answer. 
 
If your 3 classmates do not share any points and you share 2 points, how many points 








If your 3 classmates share 4 points and you do not share any points, how many points 





If you and your 3 classmates share the 6 points, how many points do YOU have at the 





Now is the time for you to make your own decision. Remember that this decision allows 
you to earn points, and these are very valuable for the last part of the experiment. This 
decision is completely anonymous, and you should not discuss it with anyone. 
 
To begin, we give you 6 points that are now yours. You must decide how many points 
to share and how many to keep for yourself. 
 
I KEEP: _______________ 
I SHARE: __________________ 
 
Make sure that the sum between the points you share and the ones you keep is 6. 
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Game 2 
You must decide which of the 6 options you prefer. The options differ in how many 
points you will be paid if heads or tails occur in a coin toss. 
Once everyone has made their decision, one of the participants (chosen at random) will 
toss a coin, and the result of that toss (heads or tails) will determine the result obtained 
in this game for all participants (we will not toss a coin to each of the participants). 
 







































Option 1 5 points 5  points 
Option  2 4  points 6  points 
Option  3 3  points 7  points 
Option  4 2  points 8  points 
Option  5 1  points 9  points 







1. How much you like reading on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very little and 10 
being very much. ______________ 
2. What is your favorite genre of reading? _________________________________ 
3. About how many books do you read in a year? (do not count those of the school) 
_____________ 
4. Have you read any Harry Potter books? How many?_________________________ 
5. How did you find out about the Harry Potter books? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
6. About how long has it been since you read the first Harry Potter book? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
7. Which Harry Potter book did you like the most? Why? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
8. Who is your favorite character? And the one you like the least? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
9. Rate your fondness for Harry Potter on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all fond 
and 10 being very fond. ________________ 
10. Do you know a new Harry Potter book is going to be published? 
___________________ 
11. Do you know what day it is published? 
___________________________________________ 
12. Do you know the name of the new Harry Potter book? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
13. Did you reserve the new Harry Potter book? _____________________________ 
14. Have you already bought the eighth Harry Potter book? In which language? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
15. Are you planning to buy the eighth Harry Potter book? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
16. Do you know what the eighth Harry Potter book is about? 




17. If you were given a Harry Potter book, would you read it? 
_______________________ 
18. Have you seen any of Harry Potter movies? How many? 
____________________________ 
19. Where have you seen the movies, at the cinema or at home? ___________________ 
20. Is there a book that you like more than Harry Potter? Which? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The final prizes you can win are the Spanish and Catalan versions of the eighth Harry 






We have computed the total points you have earned in previous games of stage 1. The 




You must allocate all your points. You can allocate all the points to a single book or 
split the points between the two books. This decision is completely anonymous and 
should not be discussed with anyone. 
 







Before you decide how to assign your points, you should know that in a previous session 
of this experiment, participants that identified more with CATALAN/SPANISH 
language decided to share 2 points (on average) in the first game. 
 
Before you decide how to assign your points, you should know that in a previous session 
of this experiment, the lottery option 1 (front coin side = 5 points and behind coin side 
= 5 points) in the second game was the favorite lottery option of participant that 








Demographic information questionnaire 
 
1. Where were you born? 
________________________________ 




4. How many siblings do you have? 
_____________________________ 
5. Do you practice any religion? 
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_______________________________________________ 
6. When was the last time you went to church? 
______________________________________ 
7. Quantify on a scale from 0 to 10 the frequency with which you practice your religion, 
being 1 very occasionally and 10 daily. (0 if you don't practice any religion) 
______________________________________ 
8. Do you live in a town or a city? Which one? 
____________________________________________________________ 
9. Do you use public or private transport to get to the school? 
____________________________________________________________ 
10. Do you have a partner? 
____________________________________________________________ 
11. Have you ever smoked? 
___________________________ 
12. Have you smoked any cigarettes in the last 30 days? 
_____________________________ 
13. Do you consider yourself a smoker? 
_____________________________ 
14. How many cigarettes can you smoke in a week? And in one day? 
__________________________________________________________ 
15. Do any of your parents smoke? 
_________________________________________________________ 
16. Do you have a smoker friend? Is he your age or is he older than you? 
_________________________________________________________ 
17. Where, when and with whom did you first try tobacco? You like me? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
18. Quantify your degree of addiction to tobacco on a scale from 0 to 10, with 1 being 
very low and 10 being very high. (0 if you have never smoked) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Have you ever been caught smoking in high school? 
_____________________________________________ 




21. What is your mother's profession? 
_____________________________________________ 
22. How many languages do you speak? Which are? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
23. In what language do you usually communicate with your mother? 
____________________________________________ 
24. And with your father? 
____________________________________________ 
25. And with your grandparents? 
____________________________________________ 
26. And with your friends? 
____________________________________________ 
27. In which language is it more comfortable for you to communicate? 
____________________________________________ 
28. On a scale from 1 to 5, quantify your degree of identification with the Valencian 
language, with 1 being nothing and 5 being a lot. 
__________________________________ 
29. On a scale from 1 to 5, quantify your degree of identification with the Catalan 
language, with 1 being nothing and 5 being a lot. 
__________________________________ 
30. On a scale from 1 to 5, quantify your degree of identification with the Spanish 
language, with 1 being nothing and 5 being a lot. 
__________________________________ 
31. On a scale from 0 to 5, quantify your degree of identification with the English 
language, with 1 being nothing and 5 being a lot. 
_________________________________ 
32. On a scale from 0 to 10 it quantifies the degree of similarity between Catalan and 
Valencian, with 0 being not at all similar and 10 being very similar. 
_________________________________ 
33. In what language do you prefer to read books? 
_________________________________ 
34. Do you practice sports? Which? 
__________________________________________________________ 
35. What is your favorite sport? 




36. What is your favorite team? 
__________________________________________________________ 
37. What is your favorite athlete? 
__________________________________________________________ 
38. Quantify your love for soccer on a scale from 0 to 10, with 1 being very little and 10 
being very high. (0 if you don't like soccer) 
____________________________________ 
39. Did you watch the football Eurocup matches this summer? Who would you have 
liked to win it? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
40. Order the following soccer teams in order of preference: Barcelona, Valencia, 
Madrid, Espanyol, Athletic de Bilbao and Logroñes. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
41. Approximately how long do you watch TV per day? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
42. What is your favorite show? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
43. Do you have paid football at home? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
44. Approximately how long do you surf the internet per day? 
______________________________________________________________________ 










































































The Effects of Group Identity on Interaction 










There is extensive evidence documenting the economic consequences of 
discrimination patterns between individuals belonging to the same or 
different group identities. However, many group identities rely on 
convictions and beliefs that are non-observable, and therefore, might be 
uncertain. This paper investigates the effects of group identity and its 
uncertainty on individual interaction preferences and willingness to 
coordinate. Results from a laboratory experiment using a repeated weakest-
link game with endogenous group formation show that unknown-group 
individuals are discriminated against more than out-group individuals are in 
the long term. Nevertheless, all discrimination patterns vanish when 
interactions entail high and mutual economic incentives. The findings offer 
several managerial implications for deterring discrimination when 
individuals decide who to interact with and increasing their coordination 






























Although similarities and differences between individuals play a major role in 
determining who interacts with whom in most social and economic contexts, they may 
not always be observable. Hence, one may deal with uncertainty about the identity of 
others when deciding with whom to interact. Homophily refers to the fact that 
interactions and bonds among similar people occur more often than among different 
people. Although homophily has been extensively documented (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1954; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009; Bisin 
et al., 2011; Currarini and Mengel, 2016; Goyal et al., 2017), there is a lack of evidence 
on individual willingness to interact with individuals whose group identity is uncertain 
(unknown-group). For instance, would employees be more likely to interact, coordinate, 
and cooperate if they were to know each other’s identity, even if they realize they are 
different by knowing it? The answer to these questions is of special interest to managers 
of organizations and firms, who deal with group identity diversity among their 
employees. Deciding the extent to which employees know each other and its contexts 
may be crucial in determining their willingness to coordinate and cooperate, and 
consequently, their productivity. Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether homophily is 
triggered by a preference for interacting “among” in-group individuals or “without” out-
group and unknown-group individuals.  
As individuals, we define our group identities by categorizing others and 
ourselves into many social categories such as gender, language, religion, or race (Turner 
et al., 1987; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Abrams and Hogg, 2006). Thereafter, we behave 
differently depending on whether we interact with in-group or out-group individuals. 
This phenomenon is widely known as intergroup bias (Hewstone et al., 2002), which 
has been documented in a wide range of individual decision-making. Examples include 
interaction preferences (Currarini and Mengel, 2016; Goyal et al., 2017), coordination 
(Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011; Attanasi et al., 2016), cooperation (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2005), trust (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Heap and Zizzo, 2009), 
punishment and reward (Chen and Li, 2009), and economic resource allocation (Tajfel, 
1970; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010; Kranton et al., 2016; Kranton and 
Sanders, 2017). Group identity also plays an important role in the formation of work-
teams, which are inherent in economic activities requiring different employees to 
coordinate and cooperate in order to develop a joint project or production process 
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successfully.20 Motivating employees who may have different identities to coordinate 
and cooperate is crucial in many activities, especially those in which the worst 
performer in the team determines the overall outcome of the work team. For instance, 
the slowest worker in an assembly line will determine the total number of units 
produced. A team of auditors who split the workload of auditing a large firm will not be 
able to sign the audit until each auditor finishes auditing their corresponding section of 
the balance sheet. In order to increase employee cooperation and coordination when 
working in teams, many organizations and firms try to instill a common sense of 
identity among their employees so that they perceive themselves to be members of the 
same group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). To do so, 
organizations and firms attempt to reduce differences and increase similarities among 
their employees by imposing appearance and behavior codes in the workplace, like 
wearing uniforms, or by organizing team-building exercises that require employees to 
work together to achieve a common goal (Ball, 1999).   
However, other group identities from those instilled in the workplace may become 
salient for employees. In particular, employees might care about group identities based 
on belief and convictions, such as creed, sexuality, or ideology (Golman et al., 2016). 
The fact that some group identities like place of birth, religion, sexual orientation, or 
political convictions are non-observable from physical traits is a source of group 
identity uncertainty that may impede the categorization of an individual into a specific 
social category.21 Therefore, workplace contexts are not only homogeneous or diverse 
with regard to group identity, but may also have uncertainty, which can also affect work 
teams formation, efficiency, and productivity. 
This paper aims to study the effects of group identity uncertainty on individual 
interaction preferences, and its repercussion on collective coordination efficiency. By 
doing so in two contexts of different group identity saliency (weak and strong), this 
paper provides insights on how often in-group, out-group, and unknown-group 
individuals choose to interact, and how efficiently they coordinate. Furthermore, this 
paper also examines how the effects of categorizing individuals into these three group 
                                               
20 78% of U.S. occupations rank working with others in a group/team as either “extremely important” or 
“very important” (O*Net, 2020). https://www.onetonline.org/find/descriptor/result/4.C.1.b.1.e?s=1&a=1 
21 Uncertainty over individual group identities based on their beliefs and convictions can be signaled and 
revealed through possessions like rings, bracelets, necklaces, or representative clothing of a particular 
social group. However, individuals may not be allowed to dress with such possessions in economic 
contexts such as the workplace. 
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identity categories interrelates with group identity salience and potential economic 
incentives for interacting. Results show that both uncertainty and diversity of group 
identity are sources of discrimination on interaction decisions. However, out-group 
participants are discriminated against more than unknown-group participants in the 
short term. In contrast, in the long term, unknown-group participants are discriminated 
against more than out-group participants. On the other hand, when interacting with 
another participant entails high and mutual economic incentives, all discrimination 
patterns on individual interaction preferences vanish.  
In a laboratory experiment, I first replicate the Neighborhood Game of Riedl et al. 
(2016), in which the interaction and coordination decisions of participants are public 
information. The Neighborhood Game is a repeated weakest-link game with 
endogenous group formation in which, in each round, participants simultaneously 
choose which other participants they would like to interact with and an effort level to 
coordinate on. Participant payoffs depend on how many other participants they interact 
with and the differences in effort levels among them. Riedl et al. (2016) found that 
when the previous decisions of participants are public information, allowing them to 
choose with whom they want to interact leads to large groups of participants that 
coordinate fully efficiently. However, as the experiment of Riedl et al. (2016) abstracted 
from considering “who” the "partners" were, a salient group identity over which there 
could be diversity or uncertainty among participants was lacking. 
To evaluate how the identity of potential partners shapes interaction preferences 
(discrimination) and coordination efficiency, I design two additional treatments. In 
these treatments, participants are induced with weak or strong artificial group identity 
before playing the Neighborhood Game. In both identity treatments, group identity 
uncertainty is introduced using a novel three-group frame that allows for comparing an 
individual’s interaction decisions toward the in-group, out-group, and unknown-group 
individuals. Traditionally, experiments using identities induced in the lab to study the 
intergroup bias on individuals’ behaviors use a two-group frame. The two-group frame 
consists of inducing different participants with a different group identity to compare 
decisions toward in-group and out-group individuals.22 Some of these experiments also 
study the effects of group identity on coordination among individuals. Charness et al. 
                                               
22 See Eckel and Grossman (2005); Charness et al. (2007); Heap and Zizzo (2009); Chen and Li, (2009); 
Ben-Ner et al. (2009); Currarini et al. (2009); Chen and Chen (2011); Charness et al. (2014); Chakravarty 
and Fonseca (2014); Currarini and Mengel (2016); Goyal et al. (2017); Muller (2017); Eriksson et al. 
(2017); Dickinson et al. (2018) and Jiang and Li (2019). 
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(2007) and Chen and Chen (2011) showed that sharing a common group identity 
contributes to coordination through their experiments in which in-group individuals 
tended to coordinate better than out-group individuals. Furthermore, group identity may 
also contribute to coordination efficiency through its effects on interaction preferences. 
For instance, Goyal et al. (2020) found that when individuals of different group 
identities have different preferences and interaction groups are formed before deciding 
which action to take, individuals segregate by group identity and coordination 
accelerates on individuals’ preferred action. In this paper, I use a three-group frame that 
introduces unknown-group individuals into the same decision context of in-group and 
out-group individuals.  
The combination of the Neighborhood Game in which interaction and 
coordination decisions made by participants are public information and the three-group 
frame offers two opportunities in relation to the study of individual interaction 
preferences. The first one is that it enables studying how potential economic incentives 
interrelate with the effects of group identity and its uncertainty on interaction 
preferences.  By comparing one's own previous effort level chosen with the previous 
effort level chosen by others, participants playing the Neighborhood Game can assess 
the potential economic incentives of each possible forthcoming interaction, and thus, 
face a trade-off between group identity and potential economic incentives when costless 
decide with whom to interact. Second, since the Neighborhood Game is a repeated 
game, it enables studying how interaction preferences toward in-group, out-group, and 
unknown-group participants evolve over time. These two experimental features enable 
the evaluation of the extent to which differences in interaction preferences toward in-
group, out-group, and unknown-group individuals are triggered either by a positive 
discrimination pattern toward in-group individuals (in-group favoritism) or a negative 
discrimination pattern toward out-group and unknown-group individuals (out/unknown-
group derogation). Additionally, they enable the evaluation of how these differences 
depend on economic incentives and how they evolve over time. 
Results show that in contexts of weak group identity saliency, group identity 
diversity does not have the same effect on individual interaction preferences as group 
identity uncertainty does, in the short and in the long term. While initially, interactions 
among unknown-group individuals occur more often than among out-group individuals, 
in the long term, unknown-group individuals interact less frequently than out-group 
individuals do, which suggests that in the long term, even employees aware of being 
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different would be more likely to work together than employees who do not know each 
other. Interestingly, when the potential economic incentives for interacting become high 
and mutual as a result of previously exerting high efforts to coordinate, individuals do 
not discriminate against each other (neither by known nor by unknown group identities). 
This result suggests that hard-working employees do not discriminate against each 
other, and as we will see later, having more of these workers in a workplace has an 
additional beneficial effect, as they might also push other employees to make greater 
efforts and thereby contribute to collective coordination efficiency. 
This paper first contributes to the literature on Identity Economics, in which 
models incorporate group identity into individual utility functions (e.g., Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009) but do not include specifications regarding group 
identity uncertainty. Nonetheless, there are some experiments that provide evidence on 
the effects of group identity uncertainty on decision-making. Yamagishi and Mifune 
(2008), Güth et al. (2009), and Ockenfels and Werner (2014) used one-shot Dictator 
Games to study the extent to which beliefs contribute to intergroup bias. In doing so, 
their experiments also reported evidence on how uncertainty about the dictator’s group 
identity affects transfers to in-group and out-group recipients. A general finding of these 
experiments is that transfers to in-group recipients decrease when dictators are informed 
that recipients will be unaware of the dictator’s group identity. Guala et al. (2013) also 
found a similar result in a one-shot two-person public good game, in which 
contributions to the public good between in-group participants decreased when the 
group identity of one participant was not revealed to the other. My results on initial 
interaction frequencies among unknown-group participants are in line with these 
previously found results. However, when studying the evolution of interaction 
preferences over time, I find that interaction preferences towards out-group and 
unknown-group participants differ in the short and long term. In particular, unlike in the 
short term, in the long term unknown-group participants are negatively discriminated 
against more than out-group participants. 
Second, my findings also contribute to a better understanding of the effects that 
group identity and potential economic incentives have on interaction preferences, and 
their consequences on coordination efficiency. Endogenous group formation has been 
proven to boost coordination efficiency among individuals both when individual group 
identity is considered (Goyal et al., 2020) and not considered (Riedl et al., 2016). This 
paper adds to this literature by showing that high potential economic incentives for 
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interacting also boosts coordination efficiency and deters discrimination patterns toward 
individuals whose group identity is either known or unknown. 
Finally, I find a remarkably similar intergroup bias on interaction preferences 
toward in-group and out-group participants in the weak and strong identity treatments. 
This result may seem to be in contrast with results found in previous literature  showing 
that intergroup bias between in-group and out-group individuals increases as group 
identity salience increases (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and 
Chen, 2011; Moscatelli and Rubini, 2013). However, in the strong identity treatment, 
initial interaction frequencies among unknown-group participants are significantly 
higher than in the weak identity treatment, which suggests that increasing group identity 
saliency may also indirectly increase discrimination against out-group individuals 
through increasing interactions among unknown-group individuals.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
experimental design. Results are presented in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 interprets 
and discusses the findings. 
 
3.2. Experimental design 
The experiment had two identity treatments and one control, and it consisted of 
three stages. In Stage 1, participants were induced with an artificial group identity. 
Stage 2 was a group-solving task aimed to reinforce group identity. In Stage 3, 
participants played 20 rounds of the Neighborhood Game. While Stage 1 was common 
to all participants in the identity treatments, only participants in one identity treatment 
participated in Stage 2. Participants in the control only participated in Stage 3, which 
was also conducted by participants in both identity treatments. At the end of each 
experimental session, participants filled in a questionnaire on demographic traits and 
answered questions about the experiment.  
In the Control Treatment, I replicated a Neighborhood Game conducted in Riedl 
et al. (2016).23 In the Weak Identity Treatment, participants were merely induced with 
an artificial and arbitrary group identity before playing the Neighborhood Game. In the 
Strong Identity Treatment, participants were also induced with an artificial group 
                                               
23 In contrast to Riedl et al. (2016), I decided to read aloud the experimental instructions and conduct 20 
game rounds instead of 30 to reduce the average time participants spend conducting the experiment. An 
average session of the Neighborhood Game treatment that I was replicating (NT-XL) could have lasted 
up to 128 minutes.  
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identity, which was then reinforced through a cooperative group-solving task before 
playing the Neighborhood Game. Table 1 summarizes the features of each treatment. 
 
Table 1: Sequence of experimental sessions 
 
3.2.1. Stage 1: Group Identity Inducement 
 In the experimental sessions of identity treatments, participants did randomly 
choose an envelope when entering the laboratory. Each envelope contained either a blue 
or a green piece of paper that determined their group identity during the experimental 
session and which computer terminal they would use. This procedure of randomly 
inducing an arbitrary and artificial group identity is widely known as the minimum sense 
paradigm.24 In each experimental session of identity treatments, sixteen participants 
were induced with a green group identity, while eight participants were induced with a 
blue group identity. 
 
3.2.2. Stage 2: Group Identity Reinforcement 
 In the Strong Identity Treatment, the induced group identity was also reinforced 
before participants played the Neighborhood Game. To reinforce group identity as 
much as possible, I decided to design a cooperative group-solving task including two 
factors that had been proven to effectively enhance group identity, communication 
(Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011), and interdependence in payoffs (Moscatelli 
and Rubini, 2013; Charness et al., 2014). 
The group-solving task was carried out in groups of eight participants who had 
been induced with the same group identity. The group-solving task consisted of solving 
a “math puzzle” equation (sum) composed of eight different geometric figures. Each 
                                               
24 The experiments conducted in Tajfel et al. (1971) are considered the first to use the minimum sense 
paradigm. Lane (2016) and Pechar and Kranton (2018) meta-analyzed experiments using the minimum 
sense paradigm and concluded that the mere categorization of participants into different arbitrary groups 
is enough to activate a group sense and make discrimination patterns emerge. 
Treatment Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3











Neighborhood Game             
(three-group frame)
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geometric figure of the math equation had its own value, and each group participant 
knew the value of one figure. To solve the equation, participants needed to 
communicate through an online chat and share their own private information about the 
value of each geometric figure. If all the group participants correctly solved the 
equation, all of them obtained 450 experimental points, and if they did not, nobody 
earned anything.25 Participants did not know whether they had correctly solved the 
equation until the end of the experimental session. 
 
3.2.3. Stage 3: The Neighborhood Game 
The Neighborhood Game is a variation of a tacit coordination game, also known 
as the Weakest-Link Game or Minimum-Effort Game, introduced by Van Huyk et al. 
(1990). In the Neighborhood Game, a set of individuals simultaneously choose which 
other individuals they want to interact with and an effort level to coordinate on. 
Individual payoffs in the Neighborhood Game depend on the number of other 
individuals with whom they are interacting and the difference between one’s effort and 
the minimum effort level chosen by any of the individuals with whom one is interacting 
(including oneself).  
In all my experimental sessions, 24 participants 𝑖 = {1, 2, 3, … , 24} played the 
Neighborhood Game for 20 rounds 𝑟 = {1, 2, 3, … , 20}. In each round, each participant 
choose an effort level ei ∈ {1, 2, … , 7}, and whether to make, or not, an interaction 
proposal Iij = {0,1} to each of the other 23 participants j in the experimental session. 
The strategy set of a participant i is defined as si  = (ei , Iij). For any pair of participants, 
an interaction proposal to each other, i ∈ Ij  and  j ∈ Ii , is required to interact and 
become “neighbors” in a particular round. The participant groups effectively interacting 
in a particular round are referred to as interaction groups Ki = {K1, K2, K3, ... ,  K24}. The 
number of other participants with whom a particular participant interacts in each round 
is denoted as Gi. Note that the fact that two participants interact between them does not 
imply they interact with the same other participants, since each participant makes their 
own interaction proposals and forms their own interaction group for each round.  
In each round r, a participant’s payoff 𝜋i depends on the effort level chosen ei, its 
marginal cost, which is set at b = 20, the minimum effort level chosen by any other 
                                               
25 We design the group solving-task in a way that makes it easy to solve the math equation. In fact, all 
groups correctly solved it. We chose to make participants earn nothing if they wrongly, or do not solve 
the equation, in order to incentivize them to take the task seriously. 
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“neighbor” min{eKi} and its marginal return set at a = 60, and a component c > 0 that 
guarantees all possible payoffs are positive. These parameters yield to the payoff matrix 
(expressed in experimental points) of Table 2, which was originally proposed by Van 
Huyk et al. (1990). Additionally, in the Neighborhood Game, participant payoffs in 
each round also positively depend on the relative interaction group size  
𝐺𝑖
23
 .  
𝜋i,r (s) =  
𝐺𝑖
23
 [a (min{eKi}) – bei + c] . 
Participant payoffs in each round are the result of multiplying the Table 2 payoff 
in the cell of the intersection between the participant’s effort level and the minimum 
effort level chosen in the interaction group by the result of dividing the number of 
“neighbors” by 23.  
Table 2: Participant payoff matrix 
 
Note: In this table, payoffs are expressed in experimental points. Rows refer to a 
participant’s effort level, and columns refer to the minimum effort level chosen by any 
“neighbor” within that participant’s interaction group (including one’s own effort level).  
 
Thus, participant payoffs are an increasing function of the interaction group size 
and a decreasing function of the difference between one’s effort level and the minimum 
effort level in one’s interaction group. Consequently, in each round, an isolated 
participant that does not interact with any other participant will earn 0 experimental 
points regardless of the effort level s/he chooses, whereas a participant that chooses the 
effort level of 1 and interacts with the other 23 participants in the experimental session 
will earn 70 points regardless of the effort levels chosen by the other participants. 
 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 130 110 90 70 50 30 10
6 - 120 100 80 60 40 20
5 - - 110 90 70 50 30
4 - - - 100 80 60 40
3 - - - - 90 70 50
2 - - - - - 80 60





Smallest effort level chosen in your interaction group
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3.2.4. The Three-group Frame  
The three-group frame aims to introduce unknown-group individuals into the 
same decision context as in-group and out-group individuals. The three-group frame 
established three sets of eight participants each. All participants within the same 
participant set were induced with the same group identity. Participants of two sets were 
induced with a green group identity, whereas participants of another set were induced 
with a blue group identity. Table 3 shows which color group identity participants in 
each set were induced with, and the group identity categorization between participants 
in each set. The participant sets formation, the color group identity inducement, and the 
group identity categorization between participants, were kept constant across all 
experimental sessions in both the Strong and Weak Identity Treatments. 
Table 3: Three-group frame structure 
 
Note: The table reports how participants in identity treatments categorize each other 
depending on the participants set they are allocated to. 
As shown in Table 3, most participants in the Weak and Strong Identity 
Treatments symmetrically categorized each other as in-group, out-group, or unknown-
group. The only exceptions in which participants differently categorized each other 
occurred with participants in Sets 2 and 3. While participants in Set 2 categorized 
participants in Set 3 as an unknown-group, participants in Set 3 categorized participants 
in Set 2 as an out-group. For this reason, in the experimental instructions, participants 
were only informed about how they would observe other participants’ group identity, 
but not about how they would be observed by the other participants. 
The three-group frame was implemented in the Neighborhood Game through 
participant experimental codes. Each experimental code referred to the same participant 
during the entire experimental session. Figure 1 shows a screen-shot example of one 







Other participants in Set 1 Other participants in Set 2 Other participants in Set 3
1 Green in-group/in-group out-group/out-group unknown-group/unknown-group
2 Blue out-group/out-group in-group/in-group unknown-group/out-group
3 Green unknown-group/unknown-group out-group/unknown-group in-group/in-group
Group Identity Categorization between Participants
 
80 
Figure 1: Three-group frame implementation 
 
 
Note: During the Neighborhood Game, participants observe two screen sections. In both 
screen sections, Decision and History, participants are referred to through experimental 
codes (Yo, N1, N2,... N23). In the Decision section, participants choose which other 
participants they want to interact with and their effort level for coordinating. In the History 
section, circles and their codes on the outside also refer to the other participants in the 
experimental session. The numbers within the circles are the effort levels chosen by each 
participant in a previous round (round 2 in this case). Black lines are participant interaction 
proposals to each other (each participant interaction proposal starts from inside its circle). 
When two participants mutually consent to interact, a thick line connecting the two circles 
appear. Participants can observe previous decisions made in any previous round using the 
three buttons at the bottom of the History screen section. 
 
While playing the Neighborhood Game, participants could observe the other 
participants’ group identity through the color of the experimental codes displayed in the 
Decision screen section. However, each participant only observed the group identity of 
participants in their own set and the group identity of participants in another set; the 
group identity of participants in the remaining set was not observable as their 
experimental codes were displayed in black. All participants in the identity treatments 
were aware that participants whose experimental code was displayed in black had also 
been induced with one of the two color group identities, although they did not know 
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which one, and neither did they know the probability of whether they had been induced 
with a green or blue group identity.26 
In each round of the Neighborhood Game, therefore, each participant in the Weak 
and Strong Identity Treatments made seven interaction decisions regarding in-group 
participants (participants whose experimental code was displayed in the same color, 
green or blue, as their own group identity), eight regarding out-group participants 
(participants whose experimental code was displayed in a different color, green or blue, 
than their group identity), and eight regarding unknown-group participants (participants 
whose experimental code was displayed in black).  
Participants in the Strong Identity Treatment were informed that their in-group 
participants were the same participants with whom they had previously conducted the 
group-solving task. 
   
3.2.5. Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis concerns the results in the Control Treatment. In the 
Neighborhood Game (NT-XL treatment) conducted in Riedl et al. (2016), the authors 
found that after few game rounds large groups of participants are formed and fully 
efficiently coordinate. Their results show that participants choosing high effort levels 
for coordinating exclude participants choosing lower effort levels during the first game 
rounds. Then, excluded participants gradually increase their effort levels, and finally, 
once most participants are choosing the highest effort level, all participants interact with 
each other fully efficiently coordinating. Since the Neighbourhood Game played by 
participants in the Control Treatment is a replication of the Neighbourhood Game 
conducted in Riedl et al. (2016), I expect similar results in the Control Treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 1: After few game rounds, most participants in the Control Treatment 
interact with each other coordinating their efforts at the highest effort level.   
 
The second hypothesis concerns the repercussions on interaction frequencies and 
coordination efficiency from introducing diversity and uncertainty over group identity 
                                               
26 The only difference between the Neighborhood Game played by participants in the Control Treatment 
and participants in the identity treatments was the color of the experimental codes displayed in the 
Decision screen section. In the Control Treatment they were all displayed in black and did not have any 
group identity connotation.  
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of participants in identity treatments. In the same line as Goyal et al. (2020), I expect 
participants to segregate by group identity, and therefore total interactions reduce, even 
though participants keep efficiently coordinating in smaller groups. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of diversity and uncertainty over group identity of 
participants in identity treatments reduce interactions but not coordination efficiency. 
 
The third hypothesis refers to the triggers of discrimination patterns on individual 
interaction preferences. By definition, homophily is an intergroup bias on individual 
interaction preferences referring to the fact that individuals interact with other similar 
individuals more frequently than with different individuals. However, it is not clear yet 
whether homophily is caused due to individuals prefer to interact with other similar 
individuals (positive discrimination towards the in-group or in-group favoritism) or 
because they prefer not to interact with different individuals (negative discrimination 
against the out-group or out-group derrogation). To determine the extent to which the 
effects of group identity on interaction preferences are caused by a positive or negative 
pattern of discrimination, I will use the interaction frequency rate of participants in the 
Control Treatment as a benchmark and compare this rate with the interaction frequency 
rate of each group identity categorization in each identity treatment. I define a positive 
discrimination pattern as the cases in which the interaction frequency rate of a particular 
group identity categorization is significantly higher than that of the Control Treatment. 
Similarly, I refer to a discrimination pattern as negative when the interaction frequency 
rate of a particular group identity categorization is significantly lower than that of the 
Control Treatment. Since there is evidence of individuals simultaneously discriminating 
positively and negatively in many domains, I expect to find evidence of an intergroup 
bias on individual interaction preferences partially caused by both positive and negative 
discrimination patterns. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in identity treatments positively and negatively discriminate 
when deciding with whom to interact. 
 
The fourth hypothesis refers to the effects of group identity uncertainty on 
discrimination patterns in individual interaction preferences. Intuitively, I expect 
unknown-group participants not being discriminated against as much as out-group 
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participants, and do not be treated as favourably as in-group participants. Hence, 
interaction frequencies among unknown-group participants will always fall in between 
the interaction frequencies among in-group and out-group participants. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Unknown-group participants interact less than in-group participants but 
more than out-group participants. 
 
The last hypothesis focuses on the interrelation between economic incentives and 
discrimination patterns. Based on evidence found in other contexts pointing individuals 
might weigh economic incentives more than group identity when deciding with whom 
to interact (Charness et al., 2014), I expect participants to attenuate their discrimination 
patterns as the economic incentives to interact with other participants increase.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Economic incentives attenuate discrimination patterns. 
 
3.2.6. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in December 2018 at the experimental laboratory 
of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Nine sessions with 24 participants each were 
conducted, yielding 216 participants in all. Most of our participants (70%) were neither 
students of economics nor business. Participants were recruited through ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004) and were allowed to participate in only one session.27 Each session 
lasted no more than one and a half hours. Aside from the experimental instructions, 
which included the control questionnaire, and the final questionnaire, the experiment 
was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Computer terminals were 
partitioned to impede communication by facial or verbal means. The experimenter read 
aloud the experimental instructions.28 After that, experimental supervisors checked the 
control questionnaire answers of all participants, individually advising subjects with 
incorrect answers before the experimenter proceeded with the experiment. To keep the 
real identity of the participants anonymous, we used experimental codes to refer to 
participants during the experimental sessions. For each participant, each experimental 
                                               
27 Because some registered participants did not show up, we needed to recruit some walk-in participants 
(less than 5%) for some of the experimental sessions. We found out ex-post that three participants 
participated in the experiment for the second time in the last experimental session (Control Treatment 
session). The second observation of these three participants is excluded from the analysis. 
28 See the experimental instructions in Appendix A.  
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code referred to the same participant during the entire experimental session. The 
experiment used experimental points as currency, each worth € 0.33 cents (€ 0.0033). 
At the end of each experimental session, experimental points were converted to cash 
and participants were paid confidentially. Three independent experimental sessions 
were conducted for each of the three experimental treatments. Participants were paid, on 
average, € 7.92 in the Control Treatment, € 7.81 in the Weak Identity Treatment, and € 
11.20 in the Strong Identity Treatment. 
 
3.3. Results 
The results are organized in two sections. In Section 3.1, the effects of introducing 
group identity diversity and uncertainty on the overall interaction frequencies among 
participants and their collective coordination efficiency are analyzed. In Section 3.2, 
first, the discrimination patterns in individual interaction preferences and their 
dependence on group identity saliency are analyzed, and then, how discrimination 
patterns evolve and interrelate with potential economic incentives.  
 
3.3.1. Coordination efficiency 
When playing the Neighborhood Game, participants face two coordination 
failures. First, participants of an interaction group can fail to align their efforts on any of 
the seven effort levels (individual coordination failure), resulting in disequilibrium 
wherein participants making greater efforts waste part of these efforts and suffer a cost. 
Second, participants can align their efforts at the same effort level, but do not do so 
efficiently, that is, not at the highest effort level (collective coordination failure).29 
Within an interaction group, all participants choosing the same effort level is a pure 
Nash equilibria because no participant has an economic incentive to individually 
deviate. Therefore, there are seven pure strategy Nash equilibria that can be Pareto-
ranked from the highest effort level equilibrium, known as payoff dominant 
equilibrium, to the lowest effort level equilibrium, known as risk dominant equilibrium. 
Once participants of an interaction group overcome individual coordination failure and 
there are no wasted efforts, coordination efficiency can be measured by the effort level 
                                               
29 Communication (Cooper et al., 1992; Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Blume and Ortmann, 2007), group 
competition (Bornstein et al., 2002), economic incentives (Brandts and Cooper, 2006) and precedents of 
successful coordination (Webber, 2006), have been proven to enhance coordination efficiency, which 
contributes to solving the collective coordination problem.  
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at which participants are coordinating. When participants coordinate at the payoff 
dominant equilibrium, fully efficient coordination is reached. However, if they do so at 
the risk dominant equilibrium, they coordinate at the least efficient coordination level.  
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the average effort level, the average 
minimum effort levels of interaction groups, interaction group size, as well as 
participant earnings, in each treatment (measures from the NT-XL treatment of Riedl et 
al. (2016) replicated in the Control Treatment are also included). There are no 
significant differences between the Control and Weak Identity Treatments on any 
measure. In contrast, the average and minimum efforts, 6.8 and 6.1, respectively, of 
participants in our Strong Identity Treatment are significantly higher, (p=0.04, n=6)30 
and (p=0.04), than in the Control Treatment, 5.94 and 3.68, respectively. Furthermore, 
the average interaction group size and participant earnings in the Strong Identity 
Treatment, 18.65 and 1879.41 (experimental points), respectively, are also higher than 
in the Control Treatment, 13.3 and 872.94, respectively, although not significantly, 
(p=0.12) and (p=0.12).  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Note: This table reports the mean values of average and minimum efforts, interaction group 
size, and participant earnings expressed in experimental points for each treatment. The 
average earnings of the NT-XL treatment are the average participant accumulated earnings 
up to round 20. The p-values for two-sided MW of measures found in the control treatment 
compared to the measures found in both identity treatments are reported in parentheses. 
 
To evaluate the overall effects of group identity on coordination efficiency, I 
examine the total wasted efforts and the percentage of interaction groups fully 
efficiently coordinated in each treatment.  
                                               
30 To compare treatments, I use the non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney test, using experimental 
sessions as a unit of observation.  
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. No. Of Obs.
Control 5.94 0.8 3.68 1.7 13.3 2.84 872.94 574.09 3
Weak 6.07           
(0.82)
0.36 3.95        
(0.51)
0.75 12.45           
(0.82)
1.66 852.52        
(0.51)
285.57 3
Strong 6.8            
(0.04)
0.13 6.09             
(0.04)
0.34 18.65           
(0.12)
3.18 1879.41          
(0.12)
370.24 3
NT-XL 6.83 0.04 5.41 0.49 20.65 0.41 1915.92 161.3 3
EarningsAverage effort Minimum efforts Interaction group size
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The total wasted efforts are the sum of the difference between the average effort 
and the average minimum effort of the interaction groups in each round. Figures 2 
depict the evolution of wasted efforts and interaction frequencies for each treatment 
throughout the rounds (again including measures from the NT-XL treatment of Riedl et 
al. 2016).  
Figures 2: Wasted efforts and interaction frequencies 
 
a) Control Treatment                                             b) Weak Identity Treatmen 
 
c)  Strong Identity Treatment                                d) NT-XL Treatment 
Note: The figures show the evolution of effort measures and interaction frequencies over 
the rounds. Avg effort is the average of the chosen participant effort level, Avg min effort 
is the average of the minimum effort of each interaction group, and Wasted effort is the 
difference between the Avg effort and Avg min effort, and it depicts how efficiently 
participants coordinate (the lower the Wasted effort, the higher the coordination efficiency). 
Interaction frequency shows the percentage of interactions that occurs.  
 
The average total amounts of wasted effort per session in the Control and Weak 
Identity Treatments, 1026.6 and 1017.6, respectively, are not significantly different 
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(p=0.51), both being approximately three times significantly larger than in the Strong 
Identity Treatment, 340.6 (p=0.04, p=0.04), and approximately twice as large as in the 
NT-XL treatment, 519.6 (up to round 20). The total average interaction frequency rate 
is 81.1% in the Strong Identity Treatment, 57.8% in the Control Treatment, and 54.1% 
in the Weak Identity Treatment. Differences in the total average interaction frequency 
rate between the Control Treatment and the Weak and Strong Identity Treatments are 
not statistically significant (p=0.82, p=0.12, respectively). 
Regarding interaction groups that fully efficiently coordinate, Figure 3 shows that 
the percentages of interaction groups that fully efficiently coordinated in the Control 
and Weak Identity Treatments, 24.78% and 27.78%, respectively, are not significantly 
different (p=0.82). In contrast, 66.81% of interaction groups in the Strong Identity 
Treatment fully efficiently coordinated, a percentage that is significantly higher 
(p=0.04) than that of the Control Treatment, and approximately 10% lower than the 
percentage of interaction groups that fully efficiently coordinated in the NT-XL 
treatment (76.71%). 
 














Note: The figure reports the percentage of interaction groups that efficiently coordinated at 
the highest effort level in each treatment. 
 
Thus, the results show that participants in the Strong Identity Treatment (similarly 
to participants in the NT-XL Treatment of Riedl et al., (2016)) provide statistically 
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significant higher efforts, waste fewer efforts, and fully efficiently coordinate much 
more frequently than those in the Control and Weak Identity Treatments. 
 
Result 1. Results found in Riedl et al., (2016) are not replicated in the Control 
Treatment, but in the Strong Identity Treatment. 
 
A plausible explanation for these results might be the initial willingness of 
participants to provide effort. While the initial interaction frequency rate and average 
minimum effort of 68.3% and 3.98, respectively, in the Strong Identity Treatment are 
not significantly different from those of the Control and Weak Identity Treatments, 
76.2% (p=0.27) and 2.86 (p=0.27), and 64.8% (p=0.51) and 2.3 (p=0.12), respectively, 
the initial average effort level is significantly higher in the Strong Identity Treatment, 
6.45, as compared to the Control and Weak Identity Treatments, 5.58 and 5.75, 
respectively (p=0.04 and p=0.04). This difference is mainly caused by the higher 
proportion of participants in the Strong Identity Treatment initially providing the 
highest effort level of 7, which is 75%, while only 49.3% and 58.33% of participants in 
the Control and Weak Identity Treatments initially chose the highest effort level. This 
result is consistent with results in Charness et al. (2014) in a public good game setting, 
in which the authors found that after being induced with a group identity and 
performing a team-building task, the initial willingness of participants to cooperate and 
contribution rates to the public good significantly increased. 
The higher initial proportion of participants choosing the highest effort level in 
the Strong Identity Treatment increases the potential economic incentive for the other 
participants to choose the effort level of 7 in subsequent rounds for two reasons. First, 
because larger interaction groups of participants choosing the effort level of 7 can be 
formed. Second, because the risk of being excluded by more participants increases for a 
participant who fails to choose the effort level of 7.  
In the Neighborhood Game (NT-XL treatment) conducted in Riedl et al. (2016), 
the authors found that fully efficient coordination can be reached in large groups of 
participants through an exclusion mechanism with three stages (reflected in Figure 2 d). 
In the first stage, participants choosing high effort levels for coordinating exclude 
participants choosing lower effort levels in early rounds, decreasing the initial 
interaction frequency rate. Excluded participants then gradually increase their effort 
levels, which increases the average and minimum effort levels. Finally, excluded 
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participants are gradually included again in the interaction groups of high effort 
providers, thereby increasing interaction frequency rates and decreasing wasted efforts 
while coordinating at the highest effort level. This exclusion mechanism occurs neither 
in the Control nor Weak Identity treatments, perhaps because, in contrast to most of the 
participants in the experiment of Riedl et al. (2016), most participants in the Control and 
Weak Identity Treatments were not students with business or economics academic 
backgrounds. 
However, the same exclusion mechanism occurred in the Strong Identity 
Treatment, although in a much smaller magnitude. In most cases, participants in the 
Strong Identity Treatment increased their effort levels in early rounds without the need 
to be excluded,31 which increased the average and minimum effort levels without a 
decrease in initial interaction frequency rates. These trends are reflected in Figure 2 c) 
and they suggest that, as explained above, participants increase their effort levels in 
order to form larger interaction groups of participants that exert greater efforts and 
increase their earnings. After that, similar to the NT-XL of Riedl et al. (2016), most 
participants in the Strong Identity Treatment interact with each other while coordinating 
with full efficiency. I conclude, therefore, that reinforcing group identity using a 
cooperative group-solving task contributes to coordination efficiency by increasing 
initial willingness to provide greater efforts to coordinate with others, which increases 
the potential economic incentives for those who do not exert high efforts to exert greater 
effort subsequently. 
 
Result 2. Reinforcing group identity using a cooperative group-solving task contributes 
to coordination efficiency through increasing initial willingness to provide high efforts 
for coordinating.  
 
3.3.2. Interaction preferences   
To analyze the effects of group identity and its uncertainty on individual 
interaction preferences, I start by examining initial interaction frequency rates among 
in-group, out-group, and unknown-group individuals. Then, I look at its evolution over 
time. By doing so, I first check if intergroup biases on individual interaction preferences 
                                               
31 Detailed comparison between treatments (including the NT-XL treatment of Riedl et al., 2016) on the 
effect of exclusion on participant effort levels that support my result can be found in Appendix B. 
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exist, and if so, whether intergroup biases increase as group identity salience increases. I 
also study whether intergroup biases are consistent over time and how they interrelate 
with potential economic incentives. 
Figure 4 shows the interaction frequency rates in the first round of the 
Neighborhood Game, in which participants make their interaction proposals without any 
reference to previous efforts or interaction decisions, hence allowing for the isolation of 
the effects of group identity saliency on interaction preferences.32  
 













Note: *,**, and *** denote the 1%, 5% and 10% degrees of significance in pairwise two-
sided Mann-Whitney tests between the interaction frequency rate in the Control Treatment 
and each of the other interaction frequency rates in the Weak and Strong Identity 
Treatments by group identity categorization, in the first round of the Neighborhood Game. 
 
In the Strong and Weak Identity Treatments, interaction frequency rates among 
unknown-group participants, 71.88% and 61.97%, respectively, are significantly lower 
(p=0.03, n=120) 33  and (p=0.001) than interaction frequencies among in-group 
participants, 82.54% and 81.35%,  and significantly higher (p=0.001 and p=0.06) than 
                                               
32  Find measures on the degree of group identity saliency reported by participants in the final 
questionnaire in Appendix C.  
33 To compare the interaction frequency rates across and within treatments, a non-parametric two-sided 
Mann-Whitney test is used with participants as a unit of observation. As explained in the experimental 
design section, participants of two sets do not symmetrically categorize each other. Participants in one of 
these sets are categorized as out-group by participants in the other participant set, while participants in the 
latter set are categorized as unknown-group by participants in the former set. I excluded interaction 
decisions between them in all identity analyses. Nevertheless, results do not significantly change if 
included. 
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among out-group participants, 53.65% and 53.13%. The interaction frequency rates 
among unknown-group participants being between the interaction frequency rates 
among in-group and out-group participants is consistent with the results found by Guala 
et al. (2013) in public good game settings. 
Interaction frequency rates among in-group participants are similar (p=0.49) in the 
Strong and Weak Identity Treatments, 82.54% and 81.35%, respectively. Similarly, 
there is a minor difference (p=0.70) in interaction frequency rates among out-group 
participants in the Strong and Weak Identity Treatments, 53.65% and 53.13%, 
respectively. Furthermore, differences (almost 30%) in the initial interaction frequency 
rates among in-group and out-group participants are statistically significant in both the 
Weak (p=0.001) and Strong (p=0.001) Identity Treatments. In the Control Treatment, 
76.71% of the total possible interactions occur. As shown in Figure 4, in both identity 
treatments, the initial interaction frequency rates among in-group participants are 
approximately 5% significantly higher than among participants in the Control 
Treatment. Moreover, the initial interaction frequency rates among out-group 
participants are approximately 23% significantly lower than among participants in the 
Control Treatment. Therefore, when comparing the interaction frequency rate in the 
Control Treatment and the rest of the interaction frequency rates in the identity 
treatments, the greatest difference in both identity treatments occurs with interaction 
frequency rates among out-group participants. 
 
Result 3. The intergroup bias on initial interaction frequencies is mainly triggered by a 
negative discrimination pattern against out-group individuals, and its magnitude does 
not vary as group identity saliency increases. 
 
The intergroup biases found on initial interaction frequencies are mostly due to a 
negative discrimination pattern against out-group individuals, which is in line with 
Heap and Zizzo (2009), where, using a trust game setting, they concluded that what 
reduces trust in groups is a negative discrimination against out-group members. 
However, the result of a non-increasing intergroup bias on interaction preferences 
toward in-group and out-group individuals as group identity saliency increases might be 
in contrast with previous experimental findings showing that willingness to coordinate 
(i.e., Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011) and to contribute to public goods 
(i.e., Eckel and Grossman, 2005)   increases among in-group members when reinforcing 
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group identity. Nonetheless, as Figure 4 shows, the initial interaction frequency rate 
among unknown-group participants in the Strong Identity Treatment is almost 10% 
significantly higher (p=0.02) than in the Weak Identity Treatment, which suggests that 
individuals might indirectly discriminate more against out-group individuals when 
group identity saliency increases, not by interacting more with in-group or less with out-
group individuals, but by interacting more with unknown-group individuals. 
These results indicate that in the first instance, is it better for individuals to be 
categorized as unknown-group than to be categorized as out-group in order to interact 
more often. Specially, in contexts of strong group identity saliency, in which unknown-
group individuals interact 10% more than in contexts of weak or minimal group identity 
saliency. 
Next, I study how the initial intergroup biases on interaction preferences evolve 
over time, and whether they are sensitive to potential economic incentives. Figure 5 
presents the evolution of interaction frequency rates (by group identity categories in 
identity treatments) for each treatment. When looking at interaction frequency rates in 
the Weak Identity Treatment, it can be observed that the percentage of interactions 
occurring among unknown-group participants is always the lowest from the third round 
onward. The interaction frequency rate among in-group participants becomes, and stays, 
similar to the interaction frequency rate among out-group participants from the eighth 
round to the end. In contrast, in the Strong Identity Treatment, all the initial differences 
between in-group, out-group, and unknown-group interaction frequency rates rapidly 
disappear and these rates become higher than the interaction frequency rates in the 
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Note: The figure depicts the evolution of interaction frequency rates over the rounds in the 
Control Treatment (solid red line), and by group identity categorization in the Strong and 
Weak Identity Treatments (solid grey lines and dashed grey lines, respectively). 
 
To study the interrelation between group identity and potential economic 
incentives on interaction preferences, I conduct a regression analysis. Table 5 shows the 
estimation results for OLS regressions and GLS regressions with random effects at 
participant level, clustering robust standard errors at the participant level. 
In both columns, the dependent variable is the interaction frequency in a particular 
round r+1 between each pair of participants (interaction frequencies of round one are 
not included since there is no previous round from which to obtain some of the 
independent variables). Independent variables are participant efforts in the previous 
round (Own effort in r); the difference (in absolute value) between a participant and 
other participants’ previous effort level (Effort gap in r); a dummy that takes the value 
of 1 for each pair of participants previously choosing the same effort level (No effort 
gap in r); the minimum effort in participant’s previous interaction group (Min effort in 
r); and interaction dummy variables denoting the relationship between each pair of 
participants in terms of group identity (in-group, out-group and unknown-group) in 






Table 5: Regression analysis on interaction frequencies 
 
Note: The dependent variable in all columns is the frequency rate in a particular round r + 
1 between each pair of participants. Own effort is the participant’s own effort level in the 
previous round. Effort gap is the effort difference, in absolute value, between a participant 
and other participants’ effort levels in the previous round. Min effort is the minimum effort 
in a participant’s interaction group in the previous round. No effort gap is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 in cases where a pair of participants chose the same effort 
level in the previous round and 0 otherwise. Weak/Strong are dummy variables that take the 
value of 1 when the observation is from a pair of participants in the Weak/Strong Identity 
Treatment, and 0 otherwise. In-group/out-group/unknown-group are dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 for interaction rates among participants that belong to the 
same/different/unknown group identity, and 0 otherwise. Interaction frequencies of round 
one are not included since there is no previous round. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the participant level, are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
VARIABLES
(1)                                     
Int. Frequency 
(r+1)
(2)                              
Int. Frequency 
(r+1)
(3)                              
Int. Frequency 
(r+1)
(4)                              
Int. Frequency 
(r+1)
Own effort ( r ) 0.011**                   
(0.004)
0.001                   
(0.005)
0.003                   
(0.004)
-0.007                
(0.004)
Effort gap ( r ) -0.067***        
(0.004)
-0.072***        
(0.004)
-0.068***        
(0.004)
-0.072***        
(0.003)
No effort gap ( r ) 0.222***     
(0.021)
-0.264***     
(0.048)
0.200***     
(0.021)
-0.303***     
(0.049)
No effort gap ( r ) x Own effort ( r ) 0.077***     
(0.008)
0.079***     
(0.008)
Min effort ( r ) -0.028***               
(0.004)
-0.031***             
(0.004)
-0.014***               
(0.003)
-0.0018***            
(0.003)
Weak x in-group 0.038             
(0.024)
0.037             
(0.025)
0.035             
(0.024)
0.034             
(0.025)
Weak x out-group -0.069***        
(0.024)
-0.073***        
(0.024)
-0.053**        
(0.023)
-0.057**        
(0.024)
Weak x unknown-group -0.109***     
(0.020)
-0.110***     
(0.021)
-0.116***     
(0.022)
-0.118***     
(0.022)
Strong x in-group 0.037             
(0.028)
0.029              
(0.028)
0.053**             
(0.026)
0.044*              
(0.026)
Strong x out-group -0.017               
(0.032)
-0.023              
(0.031)
0.001               
(0.029)
-0.005              
(0.028)
Strong x unknown-group 0.050                
(0.033)
0.040                 
(0.033)
0.066**                
(0.028)
0.056**                 
(0.028)
Constant 0.545***           
(0.027)
0.620***     
(0.028)
0.551***           
(0.028)
0.631***     
(0.029)
Participant RE No No Yes Yes
Observations 18,957 18,957 18,957 18,957
Number of participants 213 213 213 213
X ² tests
Weak x out-group vs                         
Weak x unknown-group
0.067 0.103 0.013 0.023
p -values
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As shown in Table 5, unknown-group participants are negatively discriminated 
against in the Weak Identity Treatment, as shown by the fact that Weak x unknown-
group coefficients are negative and significant in all columns. Out-group participants 
are also negatively discriminated against in the Weak Identity Treatment, since Weak x 
out-group coefficients are also negative and significant. The X² tests reveal unknown-
group participants are negatively discriminated against significantly more than out-
group participants in the Weak Identity Treatment.  
 
Result 4. After the first round, unknown-group participants interact significantly less 
often than out-group participants in contexts of weak group identity saliency. 
 
This change over time in the discrimination pattern toward out-group and 
unknown-group individuals suggests that similarities and differences between 
individuals are differently perceived in the short and long term. It might be that in the 
first instance, unknown-group individuals are perceived to be less different than out-
group individuals, and consequently, they are less negatively discriminated against. 
However, as time passes, this perception can reverse and unknown-group individuals 
might be perceived as more different than out-group individuals, and consequently, they 
are negatively discriminated against more. 
Table 5 also shows that effort levels play a crucial role in determining interaction 
frequencies among participants. Although, the participant’s own previous effort does 
not significantly affect subsequent interaction frequencies (as the coefficient of Own 
effort (r) is not statistically significant in most columns), the difference between a 
participant and previous efforts by other participants has a significant effect on 
subsequent interaction frequency. Specifically, the interaction frequency rate in a 
particular round decreases by around 6-8% for each additional unit of difference 
between a participant and other participants’ previous effort levels, as shown by the 
negative and significant coefficients of Effort gap (r). In contrast, the coefficient of No 
effort gap (r) is positive and significant in columns 1 and 3, meaning that two 
participants previously choosing the same effort level increases their overall interaction 
frequency rate by approximately 20%. Furthermore, the effects of a participant’s 
previous effort on subsequent interaction frequencies become positive and significant in 
cases when participants previously chose the same effort level. The coefficient of the 
interaction between the Own effort (r) and No effort gap (r) variables is positive and 
 
96 
significant in columns 2 and 4, meaning that once two participants had previously 
chosen the same effort level, their interaction frequency rate increases by almost  8% for 
each additional unit of effort level previously chosen. 
Interestingly, Table 5 only shows a weakly significant positive discrimination 
pattern toward in-group and unknown-group participants in the Strong Identity 
Treatment in columns 3 and 4 (including random effects). We have seen in the previous 
results section that participants in the Strong Identity Treatment exert, on average, 
greater effort than participants in the Control and Weak Identity Treatments do. Since 
most participants in the Strong Identity Treatment choose the highest effort level of 7, 
most of the interaction decisions are between two participants previously choosing the 
effort level of 7 (after round 5, this is the scenario in more than 90% of the cases).34 
Recall that participant payoffs in each round reduce as the difference (effort gap) 
between a participant’s effort level and the minimum effort level in a participant’s 
interaction group increases, which implies that the potential economic incentives of 
possible forthcoming interactions, based on previous effort levels, is asymmetric 
between participants choosing different effort levels. In such cases, for participants 
choosing a lower effort level in the past, interacting with participants who chose a 
higher effort level always entails the same potential profit (regardless of which effort 
level the other participant chooses). Conversely, for participants who chose a higher 
effort level, such interactions always entail a potential cost, which increases with the 
difference in effort levels. 35  In contrast, the potential economic incentives of 
interactions between two participants who chose the same effort level (no effort gap) in 
the past are symmetric, positive, and increase with the effort level chosen. 
Next, I look into interaction frequency rates by different potential economic 
incentives based on a comparison between participants’ previous effort levels, and 
group identity. Figures 6 show the interaction frequency rates of both identity 
treatments by previous effort level gaps, as well as by previous effort levels when the 
previous effort gap is 0 (average interaction frequencies between pairs of participants 
previously choosing the same effort level other than 7 are pooled together since they 
                                               
34 See the cumulative distribution of effort levels on each treatment in Appendix D.   
35  In interactions among participants choosing different effort levels, the payoff of the participant 
choosing the greater effort level will always decrease since the reduction in payoff by interacting with the 
other participant will reduce the payoff by at least 10 experimental points, which is always more than the 
increase in payoff that a participant can obtain by interacting with an additional participant. 
   
 97 
represent a very small percentage of the total cases, 4.7% and 0.3%, in the Weak and 
Strong Identity Treatments, respectively).   
 
Figures 6: Interaction frequency rates by previous effort gaps 
   a) Weak Identity Treatment                                      b) Strong Identity Treatment              
 
Note: The figures show the interaction frequency rates among participants by group 
identity categorization conditional on their effort gap in the previous round. Interaction 
frequency rates among participants previously choosing the effort level of 7 are separately 
depicted. 
 
Figure 6 b) shows that interaction frequency rates in the Strong Identity Treatment 
among the in-group, out-group, and unknown-group participants previously choosing 
the effort level of 7 are 93%, 92.1%, and 93.8%, respectively. Furthermore, a similar 
result is found in the Weak Identity Treatment (Figure 6 a)), in which interaction 
frequency rates among the in-group, out-group, and unknown-group participants 
previously choosing the effort level of 7 are 77.8%, 77.9%, and 74.9%, respectively. 
Therefore, I conclude: 
 
Result 5. Discrimination disappears once potential economic incentives for interacting 
are high enough. 
 
This result shows that high and mutual potential economic incentives for 
interacting deter discrimination patterns since participants previously exerting the 
highest effort level do not discriminate by group identity against other participants that 
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also previously provided the highest effort level. However, when potential economic 
incentives for interacting entail a high cost for a participant previously choosing the 
highest effort level (interactions with participants of a minus six effort gap in the Weak 
Identity Treatment), participants positively discriminate in favor of in-group 
participants. In such cases, in-group participants interact 29.3% of the time, whereas 
out-group and unknown-group participants interact 2.5% and 3.1% of the time, 
respectively. These differences are mostly triggered by a positive discrimination pattern 
toward the in-group participants since in the Control Treatment, the interaction rate 
between pairs of participants previously choosing the effort levels of 1 and 7 is 9.8%.  
 
3.4. Discussion 
Gathering in-group, out-group, and unknown-group individuals in repeated 
coordination games with endogenous interaction group formation enables studying the 
effects of group identity and its uncertainty on interaction preferences, its interrelation 
with economic incentives over time, and, consequently, its effect on collective 
coordination efficiency.  
The results show that reinforcing group identity can contribute to collective 
coordination efficiency through effort levels provided for coordination, which serve as a 
proxy for potential economic incentives of forthcoming interactions. When reinforcing 
group identity through a cooperative group-solving task, participants increase their 
initial willingness to provide high levels of effort on coordination. This increases the 
potential economic incentives of subsequently interacting with these participants, which 
motivates other participants to increase their effort levels as well, and this leads to the 
formation of large groups that are able to coordinate fully efficiently.  
Regarding individuals’ interaction preferences, the results show that when 
interactions entail a potential economic incentive that is high and mutual, that is, in 
interactions among participants who previously exerted the highest effort level, all 
discrimination patterns vanish. However, aside from this particular case, unknown-
group individuals initially interact more often than out-group individuals do, but after 
the first instance, unknown-group individuals may be negatively discriminated against 
more. A plausible explanation for this increase in the discrimination pattern against the 
unknown-group individuals after the first instance might be a change in preferences 
caused by a change in the individual’s cognitive categorization process with regard to 
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other individuals. It might be that in the first instance, individuals feel more similar to 
unknown-group than to out-group individuals, and consequently discriminate more 
against the out-group individuals. However, as time passes, individuals may feel more 
similar to those individuals whose group identity is known, including out-group 
individuals, than to those whose group identity is not known, and consequently, may 
discriminate more against those individuals whose group identity is unknown. An 
important question remains regarding the effects of group identity uncertainty on 
interaction preferences. In our experiment, as participants could not decide whether to 
reveal their group identity, our results apply only to situations in which the uncertainty 
of an individual’s group identity is involuntary. Further research should be conducted to 
examine more comprehensively the effects of group identity uncertainty on interaction 
preferences and determine if individuals are differently discriminated when they have 
the opportunity to reveal their group identity but do not do so compared with when they 
do not have the opportunity to reveal their group identity. 
The results also show that intergroup bias on individual interaction preferences 
toward in-group and out-group participants does not increase as group identity saliency 
increases. While this is consistent with the findings of Chen and Li, (2009), might also 
be in contrast with some previous experimental findings showing that intergroup bias in 
the behavior of others increases as group identity saliency increases (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011). Some plausible 
explanations might be that the intergroup bias on interaction preferences between in-
group and out-group individuals is either dual or it saturates at a certain degree of group 
identity saliency. Perhaps once individuals discriminate between in-group and out-
group individuals, they do it regardless of group identity saliency, or perhaps 
individuals increasingly discriminate until a certain level of group identity saliency is 
reached (which may have been reached in our Weak Identity Treatment)36 from which 
the magnitude of discrimination against out-group individuals stops increasing. The 
results show that unknown-group participants are less negatively discriminated against 
in the Strong Identity Treatment compared with the Weak Identity Treatment, which 
suggests that individuals may indirectly discriminate more negatively against out-group 
individuals when group identity is reinforced by interacting more frequently with 
                                               
36 Lane (2016) surveyed and meta-analyzed discrimination patterns in economics experiments. He found 
that merely categorizing participants into groups, following the minimum sense paradigm criteria to 
induce artificial group identity, does not produce the minimal level of discrimination, which suggests that 
the degree of group identity saliency reached using this procedure is higher than minimal.  
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unknown-group individuals. Further research aiming to disentangle saturation and 
duality would enable a better understanding of the effects of group identity saliency in 
individual decision-making.  
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Appendix A  
A.1. Control Treatment experimental instructions (translated from 




Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. This experiment has the 
objective of studying decision making. In this experiment, your decisions will affect 
your earnings and the earnings of the other participants in this session. Throughout the 
entire experiment, which will last approximately 1 hour, your earnings will be counted 
in points. Points will be converted to Euros (€) at a ratio of: 
 
3 points = 1 € cent 
 
At the end of the experiment, in addition to the € 5 for your participation, you will 
confidentially receive a payment in cash for your accumulated earnings throughout 
the entire experiment (€). 
 
It is important that you understand the rules of the experiment, so please read these 
instructions carefully. At the end of these instructions you will have to answer several 
questions to make sure that you have understood the experiment in which you are going 
to participate. When all participants correctly answer these questions, the experimenter 
will collect your instructions and the experiment will begin. At the end of the 
experiment, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire, while the experimenter 
calculates the earnings in € of each participant. 
 
During the experiment, communication between participants will only be allowed 
under the conditions specified in these instructions. Any other type of 
communication is not allowed and may lead to immediate expulsion from the 
experiment. The use of mobile phones is not allowed. You will not receive information 
about the real identity of the other participants either during the experiment or after the 




If at any time you have a question, raise your hand and the experimenter will come over 
















In this experimental session there are 24 participants, that is, there are 23 other 
participants besides you. Each participant is indicated with a letter and a number. You 
will receive the name "me". The other 23 participants will receive the names N1, 
N2,…., N23. The same name will always refer to the same participant throughout the 
entire experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds of the same game. In each of these rounds you 
can accumulate points. Your earnings during the experiment will be the sum of points 
you accumulate throughout the 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment, we will convert 
all the points you accumulate into Euros (€) at a ratio of 3 points = 1 € cent. 
 
In each round, you and the other participants will have to make two decisions. The first 
decision is "Who do you want to interact with?", and the second decision is "Which 
number do you choose?". Both of your decisions, and the decisions of the other 
participants, will affect your earnings and the earnings of the other participants. These 




Decision: “¿Who do you want to interact with?” 
 
You must decide who you want to interact with in each of the rounds. You can propose 
an interaction to any other participant and you can propose as many interactions as you 
want (not proposing any interaction is also a valid option). Your interaction proposals, 
together with the interaction proposals of the other participants, will determine with 
whom you will interact in each of the rounds as follows: 
 
 You will interact with another participant to whom you propose to interact 
if and only if that participant also proposes to interact with you. This means 
that mutual consent is required for the interaction between two 
participants to be effective. 
 If a mutual consent for interacting between two participants is not reached, 
those participants will not interact in that round. 
 
From now on, we will call the participants you interact with: your neighbors. 
Therefore, your neighbors will be those participants to whom, in a given round, you 
have made an interaction proposal, and at the same time, they have made an interaction 
proposal to you. 
 
 
Decision: “¿Which number do you choose?” 
 
In each round, each participant will choose a number from 1 to 7. This is: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, or 7. Your earnings in each round will depend on: 
 
1. The number you choose. 
2. The lowest number chosen by your neighbors and yourself. 




You must choose only one number in each round. However, you can change your 
choices of who you want to interact with as well as the number chosen in each of the 
rounds. 
 





Since your own decision of the number to choose can be a number from 1 to 7, the 
lowest number can be any number from 1 to 7. Your earnings in each round will be 
determined by the cell at the intersection of the row: "Your chosen number", and the 
column: "Smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you." Note that if your 
choice of "Your number" is 4, then the "smallest number by your neighbors and you" 
never could be a 5, or a 6, or a 7. 
 
The points you will earn in each round will be those indicated in the payoff table, 
multiplied by: number of neighbors / 23. This aspect of the earnings is detailed in the 
examples that you will see below 
 
For each participant in the experimental session that you do not interact with 
(participants who are not your neighbors) you will not get any profit. For example, if 






Suppose you have 12 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 3 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 1. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 12/23 * 50 = 26'08 points. 
 
Suppose you have 23 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 5 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 3. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 23/23 * 70 = 70 points. 
 
Suppose that in a round you have 9 neighbors. You choose the number 6 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 4. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 9/23 * 80 = 31'3 points. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 130 110 90 70 50 30 10
6 - 120 100 80 60 40 20
5 - - 110 90 70 50 30
4 - - - 100 80 60 40
3 - - - - 90 70 50
2 - - - - - 80 60




Smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you
   
 107 
 
Suppose you have 23 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 6 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 6. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 23/23 * 120 = 120 points. 
 
 
3· INFORMATION ABOUT COMPUTER SCREENS 
 
During the experiment you will find screens similar to the one shown below:  
 
 
The screen has two sections: History and Decision.  
 
 History: This screen section provides you with information about the past 
rounds. At the beginning of each of the rounds, the History screen section will 
show you the information about the decisions made in the previous round, (in 
the screenshot example picture, the History screen section shows you the 
decisions made in the round 2; as you can check at the top). On the screen there 
are 24 circles, named me, N1, N2,…, N23. "me" always refers to you, while N1, 
N2, ..., N23 refers to the other 23 participants in the session. 
 
1. A complete bold line between two participants indicates that both 
participants have made a proposal for interacting with each other and have 
become neighbors. Consequently, they have interacted in the round in 









2. An incomplete line between two participants indicates that only one of them 
has made an interaction proposal to the other. In this case, these two 
participants do not become neighbors and consequently do not interact with 
each other in the round in question. These lines originate in the circle of the 
participant who makes the interaction proposal and end just before the circle 
of the participant to whom the interaction proposal has been made (in the 
screenshot example picture, the line between me and N1. In this case, “me” 















3. If no line is observed between two participants, this means that neither of 
them has made an interaction proposal to each other. Therefore they do not 
become neighbors and do not interact in the round in question. 
4. Within the circles of each participant you can see the number, from 1 to 7, 
that each participant chose in the round in question (in the screenshot 
example picture, participants N3 and N8 chose the number 5 in round two, 
while participants N6 and N20 chose the number 7). 
5. At the bottom of the screen you can see two buttons called Previous round 
and Next round. You can use these buttons to view information about the 
decisions made in each of the previous rounds. If you press the button Most 
recent round you will go directly to the information of the round before the 
current one.  
6. Your earnings (in points) from each round are displayed at the top of the 
History screen section where the earnings of the round are indicated. 
 
   
 Decision: This screen section shows the current round that is being carried out. This 
screen section is where you will have to make your own decisions in each round. 
 
1. “Who do you want to interact with? ”: Following this question you can see 
the names of the other 23 participants (N1, N2,…, N23). You can propose an 
interaction with a specific participant by clicking "Yes" (first button), which 
is the button closest to the participant's name. If you do not want to interact 
with a participant or want to reject the interaction proposal of a participant, 
you must click the "No" button, the button furthest from the participant's 
name. Note: At the beginning of each new round, the buttons (interaction 
proposals) will appear in the same way as you selected them in the previous 
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round. In each of the rounds you can change your interaction decisions by 
clicking on the "Yes" and "No" buttons as explained above.  
 
2. “¿Which number do you choose? ”: At the bottom of the decision screen 
section, you will find a small cell called“ My number ”where you must 
enter the number of your choice each round. 
 
Once you have made all your decisions, that is, the interaction decisions and the 
decision of the number, you must confirm your decisions by clicking the "Ok" button. 
Once the "Ok" button is clicked, you will not be able to go back and modify your 
decisions. 
 
Note: At the end of each round, a screen will appear in which you will see to how 
many participants you have made an interaction proposal, how many participants have 
been your neighbors (that is, how many participants have you interacted with), your 
chosen number, the smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you, your earnings 
of the round and your accumulated earnings so far.  
  
This is the end of the instructions. Now you must answer a series of questions to ensure 
that you have correctly understood these instructions. If you have any question, please 
raise your hand. When you finish answering the questions, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come over to verify your answers and collect your instructions.  
 
The experiment will begin when all participants have finished answering these 
questions. If you finish before the other participants, remain silent until the others 
finish. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
4· CONTROL QUESTIONS 
 
Which is your experimental code? (number of the computer you are using) 
 
How many participants are in the session (not including yourself)? 
 
Are they all the same participants throughout the whole experiment? 
 
Using the screenshot example shown above, answer the following questions: 
 
Which is the lowest number chosen by the session participants in round 2? 
 
Which participants have chosen this number? 
 
Which is the lowest number chosen by your neighbors and by yourself in round 2? 
 
Which participants have chosen this lower number? 
 
Who did you interact with in round 2? In other words, who were your neighbors? 
 




How many points did you earn in round 2? 
 
 
A.2. Weak and Strong Identity Treatment experimental instructions 
 
Aside from a couple of sentences indicated with “*”, the only difference between 
experimental instructions of the Weak and Strong Identity treatments is that 
instructions of the “Stage 1” are not included in the Weak Identity Treatment. The 




Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. This experiment has the 
objective of studying decision making. In this experiment, your decisions will affect 
your earnings and the earnings of the other participants in this session. Throughout the 
entire experiment, which will last approximately 1.5 hour, your earnings will be counted 
in points. Points will be converted to Euros (€) at a ratio of: 
 
3 points = 1 € cent 
 
At the end of the experiment, in addition to the € 5 for your participation, you will 
confidentially receive a payment in cash for your accumulated earnings throughout 
the entire experiment (€). 
 
It is important that you understand the rules of the experiment, so please read these 
instructions carefully. At the end of these instructions you will have to answer several 
questions to make sure that you have understood the experiment in which you are going 
to participate. When all participants correctly answer these questions, the experimenter 
will collect your instructions and the experiment will begin. At the end of the 
experiment, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire, while the experimenter 
calculates the earnings in € of each participant. 
 
During the experiment, communication between participants will only be allowed 
under the conditions specified in these instructions. Any other type of 
communication is not allowed and may lead to immediate expulsion from the 
experiment. The use of mobile phones is not allowed. You will not receive information 
about the real identity of the other participants either during the experiment or after the 




If at any time you have a question, raise your hand and the experimenter will come over 
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Inside the envelope that you have randomly chosen when entering the room, you will 
find a green or blue colored paper (do not open the envelope yet, the experimenter will 
indicate when you can open it). This paper will determine which group you will belong 
to throughout the entire experimental session, the green group or the blue group. Do not 
show this paper to any other participant. The participants that will belong to your group 
will be the same throughout the entire experimental session. 
 
In this stage, each participant will carry out a joint task with 7 other participants 
from the same group. When the first stage begins, you will see in your computer 
screen a “math puzzle”, private information about the “math puzzle” and a chat 
box. 
 
In order to solve the enigma, you must communicate with the rest of your group 
members through the chat to share your private information. The chat is 
programmed in such a way that the participants of a group can only communicate 
with the other participants of their group. That is, when a participant in a group texts 
something in the chat, her message will only appear in the chat of the other 
participants who are her group members. 
 
Your task in this stage is to solve the "math puzzle" 
 
Once the "math puzzle" has been solved, you must write the solution, numerically, 
in the "solution" cell, and click the "Ok" button. Once the "Ok" button is clicked, 
you will not be able to go back to modify your answer. If you and all the members 
of your group enter the correct answer to the “math puzzle”, all the members of the 
group will earn 450 points in this stage. You will have 7 minutes to solve the “math 
puzzle”. If you do not enter any solution before the time expires, or you enter an 
incorrect solution, your earnings and the earnings of the rest of your group members 
in this stage will be 0 points. 
 
 
Now you can open the envelope and answer the following questions. Do not show 
this paper to any other participant: 
 
What is your experimental code? (number of the computer you are using) 
I am a member of the color group _______________ 













In this experimental session there are 24 participants, that is, there are 23 other 
participants besides you. Each participant is indicated with a letter and a number. You 
will receive the name "me". The other 23 participants will receive the names N1, 
N2,…., N23. The same name will always refer to the same participant throughout the 
entire experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds of the same game. In each of these rounds you 
can accumulate points. Your earnings during the experiment will be the sum of points 
you accumulate throughout the 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment, we will convert 
all the points you accumulate into Euros (€) at a ratio of 3 points = 1 € cent. 
 
In each round, you and the other participants will have to make two decisions. The first 
decision is "Who do you want to interact with?", and the second decision is "Which 
number do you choose?". Both of your decisions, and the decisions of the other 
participants, will affect your earnings and the earnings of the other participants. These 




Decision: “¿Who do you want to interact with?” 
 
You must decide who you want to interact with in each of the rounds. You can propose 
an interaction to any other participant and you can propose as many interactions as you 
want (not proposing any interaction is also a valid option). Your interaction proposals, 
together with the interaction proposals of the other participants, will determine with 
whom you will interact in each of the rounds as follows: 
 
 You will interact with another participant to whom you propose to interact 
if and only if that participant also proposes to interact with you. This means 
that mutual consent is required for the interaction between two 
participants to be effective. 
 If a mutual consent for interacting between two participants is not reached, 
those participants will not interact in that round. 
 
From now on, we will call the participants you interact with: your neighbors. 
Therefore, your neighbors will be those participants to whom, in a given round, you 
have made an interaction proposal, and at the same time, they have made an interaction 
proposal to you. 
 
Decision: “¿Which number do you choose?” 
 
In each round, each participant will choose a number from 1 to 7. This is: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, or 7. Your earnings in each round will depend on: 
 
4. The number you choose. 
5. The lowest number chosen by your neighbors and yourself. 
6. The number of neighbors you have. 
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You must choose only one number in each round. However, you can change your 
choices of who you want to interact with as well as the number chosen in each of the 
rounds. 
 





Since your own decision of the number to choose can be a number from 1 to 7, the 
lowest number can be any number from 1 to 7. Your earnings in each round will be 
determined by the cell at the intersection of the row: "Your chosen number", and the 
column: "Smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you." Note that if your 
choice of "Your number" is 4, then the "smallest number by your neighbors and you" 
never could be a 5, or a 6, or a 7. 
 
The points you will earn in each round will be those indicated in the payoff table, 
multiplied by: number of neighbors / 23. This aspect of the earnings is detailed in the 
examples that you will see below 
 
For each participant in the experimental session that you do not interact with 
(participants who are not your neighbors) you will not get any profit. For example, if 





Suppose you have 12 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 3 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 1. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 12/23 * 50 = 26'08 points. 
 
Suppose you have 23 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 5 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 3. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 23/23 * 70 = 70 points. 
 
Suppose that in a round you have 9 neighbors. You choose the number 6 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 4. In this case, your earnings in this 
round will be: 9/23 * 80 = 31'3 points. 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 130 110 90 70 50 30 10
6 - 120 100 80 60 40 20
5 - - 110 90 70 50 30
4 - - - 100 80 60 40
3 - - - - 90 70 50
2 - - - - - 80 60




Smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you
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Suppose you have 23 neighbors in a round. You choose the number 6 and the lowest 
number chosen among your neighbors and you is 6. In this case, your earnings in this 




Inside the envelope you have randomly chosen when entering the room, you will find a 
green or blue colored paper (do not open the envelope yet, the experimenter will 
indicate when you can open it). This paper will determine which group identity you 
will belong to throughout the entire experimental session, the green group or the blue 
group. Do not show this paper to any other participant. The participants that will belong 




3· INFORMATION ABOUT COMPUTER SCREENS  
 
During the experiment you will find screens similar to the one shown below: 
  
 
The screen has two sections: History and Decision.  
 
 History: This screen section provides you with information about the past 
rounds. At the beginning of each of the rounds, the History screen section will 
show you the information about the decisions made in the previous round, (in 
the screenshot example picture, the History screen section shows you the 
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decisions made in the round 2; as you can check at the top). On the screen there 
are 24 circles, named me, N1, N2,…, N23. "me" always refers to you, while N1, 
N2, ..., N23 refers to the other 23 participants in the session. 
 
1. A complete bold line between two participants indicates that both 
participants have made a proposal for interacting with each other and have 
become neighbors. Consequently, they have interacted in the round in 








2. An incomplete line between two participants indicates that only one of them 
has made an interaction proposal to the other. In this case, these two 
participants do not become neighbors and consequently do not interact with 
each other in the round in question. These lines originate in the circle of the 
participant who makes the interaction proposal and end just before the circle 
of the participant to whom the interaction proposal has been made (in the 
screenshot example picture, the line between me and N1. In this case, “me” 















3. If no line is observed between two participants, this means that neither of 
them has made an interaction proposal to each other. Therefore they do not 
become neighbors and do not interact in the round in question. 
4. Within the circles of each participant you can see the number, from 1 to 7, 
that each participant chose in the round in question (in the screenshot 
example picture, participants N3 and N8 chose the number 5 in round two, 
while participants N6 and N20 chose the number 7). 
5. At the bottom of the screen you can see two buttons called Previous round 
and Next round. You can use these buttons to view information about the 
decisions made in each of the previous rounds. If you press the button Most 
recent round you will go directly to the information of the round before the 
current one.  
 
116 
6. Your earnings (in points) from each round are displayed at the top of the 
History screen section where the earnings of the round are indicated. 
   
 Decision: This screen section shows the current round that is being carried out. This 
screen section is where you will have to make your own decisions in each round. 
 
1. “¿Who do you want to interact with? ”: Following this question, you 
can see the names of the other 23 participants (N1, N2,…, N23). You can 
identify which participants belong to your group, which participants 
belong to the other group, and which participants belong to a group 
that is not shown to you by looking at the color their names are written 
in. The participants whose name is displayed in black, are the 
participants whose group is not shown. The participants in your group 
are the same participants with whom you developed the first stage of 
the experiment.* You can propose an interaction with a specific 
participant by clicking "Yes" (first button), which is the button closest to 
the participant's name. If you do not want to interact with a participant or 
want to reject the interaction proposal of a participant, you must click the 
"No" button, the button furthest from the participant's name. Note: At the 
beginning of each new round, the buttons (interaction suggestions) will 
appear in the same way as you selected them in the previous round. In 
each of the rounds you can change your interaction decisions by clicking 
on the "Yes" and "No" buttons as explained above.  
 
2. “¿Which number do you choose? ”: At the bottom of the decision screen 
section, you will find a small cell called“ My number ”where you must 
enter the number of your choice each round. 
 
Once you have made all your decisions, that is, the interaction decisions and the 
decision of the number, you must confirm your decisions by clicking the "Ok" button. 
Once the "Ok" button is clicked, you will not be able to go back and modify your 
decisions. 
 
Note: At the end of each round, a screen will appear in which you will see to how 
many participants you have made an interaction proposal, how many participants have 
been your neighbors (that is, how many participants have you interacted with), your 
 chosen number, the smallest number chosen by your neighbors and you, your earnings 
of the round and your accumulated earnings so far.  
  
This is the end of the instructions. Now you must answer a series of questions to ensure 
that you have correctly understood these instructions. If you have any question, please 
raise your hand. When you finish answering the questions, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come over to verify your answers and collect your instructions.  
 
The experiment will begin when all participants have finished answering these 
questions. If you finish before the other participants, remain silent until the others 
finish. 
Thank you very much. 
* Sentence included only in the Strong Identity Treatment. 
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4· CONTROL QUESTIONS 
 
Which is your experimental code? (number of the computer you are using) 
 
How many participants are in the session (not including yourself)? 
 
Are they all the same participants throughout the whole experiment? 
 
Using the screenshot example shown above, answer the following questions: 
 
Which is the lowest number chosen by the session participants in round 2? 
 
Which participants have chosen this number? 
 
Which is the lowest number chosen by your neighbors and by yourself in round 2? 
 
Which participants have chosen this lower number? 
 
Who did you interact with in round 2? In other words, who were your neighbors? 
 
Which participants made you an interaction proposal in round 2? 
 
How many points did you earn in round 2? 
 
Which group do you belong to? 
 
According to the screenshot example:  
 
Which participants belong to your group? Did you develop the stage 1 task with them?* 
 
Which participants belong to the other group? Did you develop the stage 1 task with 
them?* 
 
Which participants do you not know which group they belong to? Did you develop the 
stage 1 task with them?* 
 






























Note: e+ denotes cases in which two participants i and j interact in the round t−1 and 
subject i provides an effort at least as high as subject j; e −  denotes cases in which subject i 
provides strictly less effort than a subject j but higher than the minimum effort in j’s 
interaction group in t−1; e − −  denotes cases where a subject i provides strictly less effort 
than a subject j which is also equal or lower than the minimum effort in j’s interaction 
group in t−1. 
 
When comparing the exclusion rates in the ten first rounds in the Strong and NT-
XL treatments of e- and e- - categories, it can be observed that exclusion rates in the 
Strong Identity Treatment are much lower, 19% and 18.1%, respectively, as compared 
to in the NT-XL treatment 45.8% and 71.9%, respectively. Thus, there are much less 
cases of lower effort providers excluded in the Strong Identity Treatment. These 
differences might be due to the lower wasted efforts observed in the early rounds of 
Strong Identity Treatment in which the average minimum effort levels on interaction 












24.4%          
(6540)
28.5%          
(1211)
31.1%          
(924)
Weak
31.1%          
(6932)
27.3%          
(916)
34.4%          
(977)
Strong
13.3%          
(9836)
19%          
(242)
18.1%          
(525)
NT-XL
1.4%          
(8171)
45.8%          
(653)
71.9%          
(484)
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Note: In panel t + 1, there are the percentage of e- and e- - cases in period t – 1, in which a 
participant increase, decrease, and keep constant its effort level, depending on whether 
being excluded or not in period t. 
 
Table B.2. shows that in the NT-XL there are more cases of excluded, 647, than 
non-excluded, 480, participants, so there are more cases of excluded participants 
increasing their effort level (since the percentage of excluded and non-excluded 
participants oincreasing their effort level is similar, 86.4% and 86.8%, respectively). In 
contrast, and due to the exclusion rates in Table B.1. are lower, in the Strong Identity 
Treatment there are more cases of non-excluded, 328, than excluded, 141, participants. 
Furthermore, the percentage of non-excluded participants that increase their effort in 













































their effort levels, 66%. Thus, in the Strong Identity Treatment, most participants 
increasing their effort in the early rounds do it so without the need to be previously 
excluded. 
 
Appendix C  
 
Table C.1 shows group identity saliency measures reported by participants in the 
final questionnaire. Participants were asked about how much they had felt identified 
with members of the same group identity, members of the different group identity, and 
in overall towards all participants in the experimental session, during and at the end of 
the experiment, in a scale from 1 to 5. 
 
 
Table C.1: Group identity saliency degrees 
 
 
Note: The p-values for two-sided MW tests comparing in-group and out-group identity 
measures are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
Measures reported in Table C.1 show that identification degrees, during and after, 
towards in-group and out-group participants, are significantly higher in the Strong than 
in the Weak Identity Treatment (p=0.00) and (p=0.00), respectively. However, only in 
the Weak Identity Treatment participants felt, during and at the end, significantly more 




During the experiment Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
control 3.18 1 - - - -
weak 3 0.97 3.1 
(0.0616)
1.14 2.8 1.1
strong 4.15 0.8 3.89 
(0.2038)
0.98 3.68 1.1
At the end of the experiment Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
control 3.26 1.06 - - - -
weak 3.1 0.98 3.1 
(0.0665)
1.2 2.7 1.1




Descriptive statistics- identity degrees
Overall in-group out-group
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Appendix D  
Figures D.1. show how the cumulative distribution of each effort level develops 
over rounds on each treatment. In these figures, different gray shades are used to depict 
each effort level frequency, from the darkest area representing the average frequency of 
the effort level 7 to the lightest area representing the average frequency of the effort 
level 1. In Figures D.1. it can be observed that the effort level of 7 is the effort level 
most frequently chosen in all treatments, although it is more frequently chosen, on 
average, in the Strong Identity Treatment (92%) than in the Control (67.8%) and Weak 
Identity treatments (70.7%).  
 
Figures D.1: Cumulative distributions of effort levels 
 
               a) Control Treatment                                      b) Weak Identity Treatment                                   
 
             c) Strong Identity Treatment                             d) NT-XL Treatment 
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As Figure D.1. c) depicts, the frequency of the effort level 7 in the Strong Identity 
Treatment increases from 75% in the first round to more than 90% in the fifth round, 
percentage at which it stabilizes until the last round. When comparing this evolution 
with the evolution of the interaction frequency rates of each group identity category in 
the Strong Identity Treatment (Figure 4), we can observe a clear relationship. During 
the first five rounds, in which participants gradually increase their effort levels, 
differences between the interaction frequency rates of each group identity category 
gradually diminish. After that, more than 90% of participants constantly choose, round 
after round, the effort level of 7, and differences between the interaction frequency rates 
of each group identity category vanish almost by complete. These two correlated trends 
suggest that participants who previously chose the effort level of 7 interact among them 











































































































The covid-19 pandemic declared in 2020 posed a global common threat that 
forced cooperation among individuals, communities, and governments to 
achieve the superordinate goal of reducing the spread of the covid-19 virus. 
This paper studies how redistribution and discrimination between members 
of different social groups in conflict evolved as the superordinate goal was 
gradually achieved in Spain. To do so, an online experiment was conducted 
along the “unlockdown” process implemented by the Spanish government at 
the beginning of summer 2020. Participants first chose whether to conduct 
the experiment in Catalan, Spanish or English, and then made five sets of 
redistribution decisions in a Dictator Game variation along six weeks in 
which they were gradually unlocked from their homes. Results show that 
participants became more selfish as they were gradually unlocked. Besides, 
participants who conducted the experiment in Spanish significantly 
increased their overall degree of discrimination along the “unlockdown” 
process, but not participants that conducted the experiment in Catalan or 
English. These results show discrimination and selfishness increased as the 
superordinate goal was gradually achieved, highlighting that superordinate 
























Group identity is often argued to be an underlying factor of intergroup conflict 
initiation and escalation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). On the other hand, interactions 
entailing cooperation to achieve common goals might effectively mitigate 
discrimination and prejudices between individuals from different social groups in 
conflict Allport (1954). Conflict between groups is a persistent phenomenon in human 
history. Conflict can emerge by disputes over scarce limited resources, through a fight 
on imposing values like culture, religion, and language, or by a combination of both 
structural and psychological factors (Sherif, 1966; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Stephan and 
Stephan, 2000).37 In some cases, conflicts lead to violent and bloody wars while in other 
cases conflicts had developed in a more subtle way and without physical violence. 
Whether a conflict is violent or peaceful, it always exacts human, social, and economic 
costs. It is therefore important to study which factors can mitigate ongoing intergroup 
conflicts and their dire consequences. This paper extends on the hypothesis that 
discrimination between members of social groups in conflict might attenuate through 
interactions to achieve superordinate goals and tests whether discrimination can also 
attenuate by superordinate goals not requiring interaction between individuals.38 To do 
so, this paper presents an online experiment exploiting a natural occurring context in 
which the Covid-19 pandemic situation and the intergroup conflict between Catalans 
and Spaniards overlapped in time.39    
 There exists an extensive literature, especially in Social Psychology, studying 
interventions aimed at reducing and mitigating conflicts between different social 
groups.40  Many of these interventions are rooted in the Intergroup Contact Theory 
proposed by Allport (1954) which held that, under specific conditions; equal group 
status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and support of authorities, interactions 
between members of different social groups can reduce stereotypes and discrimination 
between them, hence preventing the emergence of new conflicts, or deescalating 
                                               
37 See Böhm et al. (2018) for a review of theories on intergroup conflicts emergence and empirical 
measures used to assess conflict-related individual attitudes.  
38  Superordinate goals were defined by Sherif (1958) as “goals which are compelling and highly 
appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained by the resources 
and energies of the groups separately”. 
39 Appendix A further introduces the recently evolution of the conflict between Catalans and Spaniards, 
and the idiosyncrasy of language diversity in Spain.  
40 See Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for a meta-analysis on more than 500 studies testing the intergroup 
contact theory and Paluck and Green (2009) for a literature review.   
   
 127 
ongoing conflicts. These conjectures are supported by the classic natural experiment of 
Sherif et al. (1961) in an Oklahoma summer camp for kids. In their experiment, known 
as Robbers Cave experiment, kids were first randomly assigned to one of two groups. 
Then, kids of each group developed a sense of group by interacting and living together 
for a week. After that, researchers introduced competitive activities between kids of the 
two groups. The competitive atmosphere led to conflicts that extended far beyond the 
competitive activities, resulting in behaviors intended to harm kids of the other group 
during the regular camp life. Finally, researchers tried to mitigate the conflict by putting 
in contact kids of the two groups under neutral conditions (without either a competitive 
or cooperative connotation). However, as later stressed by Pettigrew (1998), intergroup 
contact resulted in a failure on mitigating the conflict between the two groups of kids 
even exacerbating stereotypes and prejudices between them.41 It was not until kids of 
the two groups had to cooperate in order to achieve superordinate goals that the conflict 
was attenuated. 
After Akerlof and Kranton (2000) theoretically introduced the notion of identity 
into economic models, economist have also proposed models based on the two main 
sources originating intergroup conflicts, economic inequalities and group identity 
diversity (Basu, 2005; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012). Within this 
economic literature there is also evidence on how intergroup contact affects 
discrimination, stereotypes and future interactions between members of different social 
groups. Some of these interventions had been implemented in college environments. 
For instance, Boisjoly (2006) exploit roommate random assignations among college 
students at Harvard, and found that after living with Afro-American roommates, white 
students reported in ex-post surveys more positive attitudes toward affirmative action 
policies and having more frequent social interactions with individuals from other 
ethnicities. Similarly, Corno et al. (2019) found that white students in a South African 
university reduced their negative stereotypes (measured using Implicit Association Test) 
and increased their interactions with students of other races after living with a roommate 
of a different race. Interestingly, the authors also found a positive effect on black 
students’ academic performance derived from the intergroup contact as a roommate 
with white students. Black students in mix race rooms increased their average grades 
and the number of exams passed, and decreased their dropout rates. Also in a college 
                                               
41 See Paolini et al. (2010) and Barlow et al. (2012) for studies testing the hypothesis that contact 
between individuals from different social groups might also increase negative stereotypes. 
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environment and as a result of a governmental policy in Delhi, Rao (2019) found that 
integrating poor students in rich student classrooms reduced rich students’ 
discrimination against poor students, and made rich students volunteer in prosocial 
activities more and become more generous in laboratory Dictator Games.    
Despite the vast literature studying intergroup contact as a mitigating factor of 
discrimination and stereotypes, there is a lack of evidence whether discrimination might 
attenuate without requiring individuals to get in contact. In particular, there is no 
evidence on whether superordinate common goals could reduce discrimination between 
members of social groups in conflict even if physical interactions do not occur among 
them. To the best of my knowledge, this paper presents the first experiment exploiting a 
naturally occurring context in which members of two social groups in conflicts see 
themselves exogenously forced “by the nature" to cooperate in order to achieve a 
superordinate common goal without physical interactions. Indeed, in this particular 
context the cooperation required to achieve the superordinate common goal consists on 
not interacting with other individuals.  
Due to the emergence of the covid-19 virus in 2020, governments worldwide 
decreed lockdown policies to reduce the spread of the covid-19 virus. In most countries, 
citizens were locked down at home and restricted their social life and social contact 
with other people for months.  In Spain, for instance, the Spanish government decreed 
the “state of alarm” to impose first a quarantine on all Spanish citizens and after to 
regulate at the national level when and how people's freedom of movement was going to 
be restored. This context offered an opportunity to investigate the role of superordinate 
goals alone, without interaction or contact between individuals, in reducing 
discrimination between members of two social groups currently in conflict, Catalans 
and Spaniards.  
This paper presents an online experiment that takes advantage of the 
“unlockdown” process implemented at a national level in Spain through which the 
Spanish government managed Spanish citizens’ freedom of movement from the 
beginning of May to the end of June 2020. The Spanish “unlockdown” process basically 
consisted on gradually increasing the freedom of movements of citizens in each Spanish 
region as the epidemiological context favorably progressed in each region. The Spanish 
“unlockdown” process offered a natural environment in which the collective perception 
of achieving the common goal of reducing the spread of Covid-19 virus in each region 
gradually increased as people were gradually “unlocked”. However, although the threat 
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was common to all people living in Spain, there might be divergences on who had to get 
the command control to manage the measures to achieve the common goal. For 
instance, the presidents of some Spanish regions claimed for a decentralized command 
control at the regional level to adopt and adapt measures to each region's particularities. 
Along the Spanish “unlockdown” process, participants in the experiment played five 
times a modified version of a Take-or-Give Dictator Game (ToG henceforth) inspired in 
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). In this version of the ToG game, groups of one 
dictator and four receivers are formed. The language each receiver chose to conduct the 
experiment is used as a group identity proxy and displayed to the dictator. In each group 
there is one receiver that chose to conduct the experiment in Catalan, another in 
Spanish, another in English, and another whose language chosen remained uncertain.42 
The dictator and the four receivers are endowed with the same amount of money. The 
dictator can either transfer any amount of its endowment by giving to any receiver, or 
by taking any amount of any receiver’s endowment. Different to List (2007) and 
Bardsley (2008), any amount of money given or taken by the dictator is divided by two 
before arriving to the dictator or receiver. Imposing socially inefficient transfers and 
equal initial endowments to dictators and receivers allows us to disentangle between 
social welfare maximizing and inequity aversion preferences from other social 
preferences based on group identity. The unique equilibria for social welfare maximizer 
or inequity averse dictators is to retain the initial equal split of endowments, whereas 
dictators with preferences to benefit or harm a particular receiver will always have to do 
so at the expenses of a social welfare loss any transaction entails. Furthermore, self-
maximization preferences are not compatible with social maximization preferences 
either since a dictator participant aiming to maximize its own profit by taking all 
receivers’ endowment would cause the highest social cost. 
The main findings of this paper are that superordinate common goals not 
requiring contact between individuals might be an effective tool to reduce 
discrimination and selfishness. Participants that chose Spanish language to conduct the 
experiment significantly increase their overall degree of discrimination as they were 
gradually "unlocked" and the superordinate common goal to slow down the covid-19 
virus contagion was gradually achieved. However, there is no significant effect on the 
                                               
42 Including receivers registered in English introduces the reference of out-group participants to whom 
there is no conflict connotation. Not revealing the registration language of one receiver allows for 
studying the effects of group identity uncertainty on redistribution decisions. 
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evolution of discrimination of participants who chose the Catalan and English language 
to conduct the experiment. Even more, participants who chose the Catalan language to 
conduct the experiment and declared to support Catalonia's independence discriminated 
significantly more than other participants. The second main result of this paper is that, 
overall, participants in each language decided to take more money from receivers than 
they gave to them, and this difference significantly increased throughout the Spanish 
“unlockdown” process. These results highlight superordinate goals as a mitigating 
factor of discrimination and selfishness.  
This paper relates to several interrelated bodies of research. First, to the broad 
literature studying and implementing interventions aimed to reduce discrimination and 
prejudices between members of different social groups. This literature has grown and 
evolved since the classic field experiment of Sherif et al. (1961), and has focused more 
on whether the mere contact between individuals might be enough, and indeed has been 
found it is, to reduce negative stereotypes (Van Laar et al., 2005), the likelihood of 
discrimination (Rao, 2019), or increase trust (Finseraas et al., 2019), and future 
interactions (Boisjoly, 2006; Carrell et al., 2019; Corno et al., 2019), between members 
of different social groups. This paper adds to this literature by exploiting a natural 
context that forced members of different social groups, some of them in conflict, to 
achieve a superordinate common goal by restricting interpersonal contact. This context 
offers the opportunity to put the emphasis not in the contact between individuals but in 
the superordinate common goals as a mitigating factor of discrimination, and provide 
evidence that contact between individuals is not always an indispensable condition to 
reduce discrimination.   
Second, this paper also contributes to the literature studying the common-enemy 
effects on individual preferences. The common-enemy effect refers to the effects on 
individual preferences when being confronted with a common threat stemming from a 
natural disaster or an intergroup conflict. 43  In this literature, there is evidence that 
individuals become more cooperative and pro-social with other group members when 
the social group is under threat or involved in a conflict with another social group 
(Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Weisel and Zultan, 2016; Glynn et al., 2003; Penner 
et al., 2005). There is also evidence that natural disaster can increase cooperation (Whitt 
and Wilson, 2007; Solnit, 2010) and trust (Cassar et al., 2017) of individuals who 
                                               
43 See De Jaegher (2021) for a review of multidisciplinary theoretical models of the common-enemy 
effects.  
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suffered the negative consequences of the disaster. This paper adds to this literature 
studying the effects of a common threat on discrimination between members of 
different social groups. 
Finally, this paper also contributes to the recent literature addressing the effects of 
covid-19 pandemic on individuals worldwide. For instance, the results of the review and 
meta-analysis of Salari et al. (2020) show lockdowns imposed by governments caused 
negative psychological effects like stress, anxiety, and depression to people, and 
Cappelen et al. (2021) found the pandemic can increase individual moral views like 
solidarity in the sense of giving priority to social problems. This paper contributes to 
this emerging literature by investigating the evolution redistribution decisions of 
economic resources among individuals of different social groups during the Spanish 
“unlockdown” process, a period in which the collective perception of the common 
threat posed by the covid-19 virus was gradually decreasing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 the Spanish 
“unlockdown” process is explained and the experimental hypothesis presented. Section 
4.3 contains the experimental design and procedures. In Section 4.4 results are 
presented, and Section 4.5 concludes discussing the results.  
 
4.2. The Spanish “unlockdown” process and hypothesis 
 The first symptoms in humans infected by the covid-19 were detected by the 
Chinese healthcare authorities of Wuhan in late December 2019. Since then, the virus 
had spread worldwide causing hundreds of thousands of human deaths, most of them, 
old people suffering from previous diseases. Given the threat the virus did pose to 
people’s health, the 11th March 2020 the World Health Organization declared the covid-
19 outbreak as a global pandemic. At that moment, there were more than 118,000 cases 
diagnosed in more than a hundred countries, and more than 4,000 people had officially 
died due to an infection of covid-19.44  
Although after the global pandemic was declared some governments did consider 
the strategy of letting the virus spread amongst its citizens in order to achieve herd 
immunity, most countries decided to fight against the virus trying to cut down its 
transmission amongst people. To do so, governments gave hygiene recommendations 





such as washing hands very often, wear a mask, and try to avoid touching one’s face, 
eyes, and mouth. More importantly, some governments did implement quarantine to its 
citizens, restricting their movements to basic and essential activities like buying food in 
the supermarket and medicines in a pharmacy. For millions of people around the world, 
this was the first time in their lives that they saw their movements restrained in such a 
drastic way, thus increasing the sense of danger and threat. A threat, get infected, that 
was common for everyone, although its repercussions were known to be much 
catastrophic for older people and those who suffer from previous diseases. 
The 14th of March 2020, the Spanish government decreed the “state of alarm” 
through which movement restrictions and quarantine were imposed to all Spanish 
citizens. The population segments considered essential workers for society's 
subsistence, like workers in the healthcare system and workers in the food and essential 
goods supply sector were allowed to keep developing their professional activity in 
person. However, workers from other economic sectors had to carry out their jobs 
remotely from home or stop working in case remote work was not possible. All local 
businesses, restaurants, shops, and schools were closed. Only supermarkets, food stores, 
and pharmacies remained opened. Citizens could leave home only to buy food and 
medicines, go to the hospital, take care of dependent and disabled people, and walk 
pets. While doing so, citizens were required to keep a physical distance of two meters 
from any other individual they encounter. 
Once the number of new infection cases and deaths of covid-19 had continuously 
decreased for more than a month, the Spanish government designed a five stages 
“unlockdown” process that regulated and gradually increased citizens’ mobility and 
social life, and economic activity. The last stage of the process was called “back to 
normality” and was supposed to restore citizens’ mobility and economic activity fully. 
Figure 1, shows when the lockdown and the “unlockdown” process started and finished 
(back to normality) and the evolution of new cases of infection and deaths from covid-
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Figure 1: Beginning of covid-19 pandemic in Spain 
 
Note: The figure reports the number of new positive cases and deaths of covid-19 virus 
daily reported by Spanish authorities. 
 
The “unlockdown” process design by the Spanish government was complex and 
included many measures that were modified during the process or adapted by the 
regional governments to the particularities of each region. Indeed, the regional 
subdivision of the territory was called healthcare regions. Table 1 shows the main 
measures adopted to regulate individuals mobility and bars and restaurants services.45  
 
Table 1: Restriction measures imposed during the “unlockdown” process in Spain 
                                               
45   See https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/covid-19/Paginas/plan-transicion.aspx for all the official 
information about the “unlockdown” process implemented by the Spanish government.   
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Movility
·Municipal level. ·Healtcare region. ·Healtcare region. ·Healtcare region. ·Back to normality.
Activity
·Go out for a walk or doing some 
exercise at different day times 
depending on age.                               
·Attention to orchards.                                 
·Pray at church.                               
·Only contact with cohabiting 
individuals.
·Groups of maximum 10 
individuals.                                
·Cultural events with capacity 
restrictions.
·Groups of maximum 
15 individuals.                           
·Marriages with 
capacity restrictions.
·Allowed contact between 





·Take away service. ·Outside terraces service at the 
50% of capacity, with a 
maximum of ten clients per 
table, and disinfecting 
regularly.
·Inside table service 
with capacity 
restrictions.





Figure 2, shows when participants were required to make their decisions as 
dictators in the ToG game. It can be observed a decreasing trend on the number of new 
cases and deaths by covid-19 throughout the “unlockdown” process implemented by the 
Spanish government. Therefore, the superordinate common goal of slowing the spread 
of the virus was gradually achieved, which in turn implied a gradual reduction in the 
threat of being infected and dying by the covid-19 virus while participants were making 
their decisions. After receiving an e-mail, participants had five days to access a digital 
platform (Qualtrics) and make their redistribution decisions.   
 
Figure 2: Decisions timeline 
 
Note: The figure shows the five time periods in which participants were required to make 
their redistribution decisions as dictators. 
 
All Spanish regions started the “unlockdown” process the 4th of May at stage 0. 
To move on from one stage to another, regions needed to request the central 
government the stage change providing a report on health, epidemiologic, economic, 
mobility, and social indicators at a regional level. The central government evaluated 
indicators of each request and allowed to implement the stage change in those regions 
with favorable evaluations. Not all requests were favorably evaluated, and therefore, 
there were regions advancing in the “unlockdown” process faster than others, resulting 
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in different “unlockdown” process stage sequence for citizens living in different regions 
(Appendix B shows which regions were created and when all stage changes were 
announced). Depending on the place participants were living during the “unlockdown” 
process they made each of their decisions in one or another “unlockdown” process stage 
and spend longer time under more or less strict restrictions. Although most participants 
in the experiment did experience the slowest stage sequence, it is worth so analyze if 
different “unlockdown” speeds had an effect on participant redistribution decisions. 
Table 2 shows the three different stage sequences experienced by participants and how 
many of them experienced each sequence.   
 
Table 2: ”Unlockdown” process stage sequences of participants 
 
 
As a tool for organizing the results now the hypothesis of the experiment are 
presented. The main hypothesis of this experiment concerns to discrimination between 
individuals from different social groups, specially, between individuals of social groups 
in conflict. Based on previous evidence showing that cooperation to achieve common 
goals is crucial for interactions between members of different social groups to mitigate 
negative discrimination and stereotypes, the first hypothesis goes in the same line but 
ruling out the component of contact between individuals. Discrimination in the ToG 
game is measured as the difference between the redistribution decisions participants do 
toward the receiver registered in the same language and the other receivers. As shown 
before in Figure 2, participants made their redistribution decisions as the superordinate 
common goal was gradually achieve. Moreover, the degree of cooperation required 
through restricting movements’ freedom decrease as participants were gradually 
“unlocked” and moved on through the “unlockdown” process stages. Hence, 
participants made their decisions in a sequence from high cooperation demanding 
context to low cooperation demanding context to achieve a superordinate common goal. 
Then, if superordinate common goals play a role in mitigating discrimination between 
individuals, it would be expected participants discriminate less in their first decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 Participants
stage 0 stage 1 stage 2 stage 3 stage4 41
stage 0 stage 0 stage 1 stage 2 stage4 498






when they are further to achieve the superordinate common goal than in their later 
decisions when they are closer to achieve it.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Discrimination between participants gradually increases as the 
superordinate common goal is gradually achieve, specially, between participants of 
social groups in conflict.   
 
The second hypothesis relates purely to the overall redistribution decisions of 
participants. Participants can either take money from receivers in order to increase their 
payoffs or give money to any receiver, which decreases their payoffs. Each time 
participants play the ToG game the initial endowments of the dictator and receivers are 
the same (wich rules out inequity aversion reasons to do any transfer) and any money 
transfer entail a social cost (which also rules out social welfare maximization reason to 
do any transfer). Therefore, the second hypothesis concerns whether participants will 
exhibit altruistic preferences and will give more money to the receivers than that they 
will take, or the opposite will happen, and self-interested preferences will prevail.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Overall, participants take more money from receivers than that given to 
them. 
 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether overall redistribution preferences will be 
affected by the gradually consecution of a superordinate common goal. However, in the 
same line as the argument exposed for discrimination, cooperation degrees might be 
positively correlated with generosity and altruism, whereas negatively correlated with 
self-interes and selfishness. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Assuming participants are selfish, the degree of selfishness increases as 
the superordinate common goal is gradually achieved. 
 
These three hypotheses are going to be tested both at aggregate level and 
separately for participants that registered in each language. 
 
 
   
 137 
4.3. Experimental design, procedures, and descriptive statistics 
4.3.1. The Take or Give Dictator Game 
Participants play the ToG Dictator Game inspired by Dictator Games used in List 
(2007) and Bardsley (2008) once in each of five time periods 𝑝 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. In each 
period, the endowments (e) of dictators and receivers were all set at € 100. Participants 
decide each period as dictators how to redistribute their own endowment and the 
endowment of four receivers 𝑟 = {1, 2, 3,4}. To redistribute endowments, dictators can 
give any amount of their endowment to any receiver 𝑔𝑟 = [−100,0]  imposing 
∑ 𝑔𝑟
4
𝑟=1 ≥ −100, or take any amount of the endowment of any receiver 𝑡𝑟 = [0,100]. 
Dictators cannot simultaneously give and take from the same receiver, and therefore, if 
𝑔𝑟𝑝  ≠ 0 then 𝑡𝑟𝑝 = 0, and vice versa. The amount of money transferred by any giving 
or taking decision is divided by two before arriving at the dictator or the receiver. 
Dictators are informed about the language each receiver has chosen to conduct the 
experiment. Each period, all dictators decide regarding one receiver who chose the 
Catalan language (C), another that chose the Spanish language (S), another that chose 
the English language (E), and another that it is not known the language s/he chose (U). 
The following equation represents the payoff function of a dictator d in period p: 
 
𝜋𝑑𝑝 = 𝑒𝑑𝑝 +  ∑ 𝑔𝑟𝑝
4





                                       (1) 
 
Similarly, the payoff function of a receiver r in period p is represented by: 
 
𝜋𝑟𝑝 =  𝑒𝑟𝑝 −  
𝑔𝑟𝑝
2
−  𝑡𝑟𝑝                                                   (2) 
 
Models assuming pure rationality and selfish preferences predict dictators would 
take all receivers’ endowment to maximize their profits. However, models assuming 
other-regarding or social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) had been shown to better explain behaviors observed in Dictator and Allocation 
games. Unlike other Dictator Games that are zero-sum games, giving and taking 
decisions reduce the overall amount of money, and therefore are socially inefficient. 
Consequently, identity-based preferences (treat differently the in-group than the out-
group members) always entail a social cost and cannot be simultaneously fulfilled with 
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social welfare maximizing preferences. Furthermore, dictator and receivers' initial 
endowments are the same, making it impossible to fulfill identity-based preferences and 
full inequity aversion preferences simultaneously. These experimental features allow for 
distinguish dictators with stronger concerns for social efficiency or inequity from those 
with stronger identity-based preferences. Besides, combining both giving and taking 
decisions with multiple receivers with different group identity, we can distinguish 
between discrimination patterns in the negative margin (e.g., dictators taking different 
amounts from receivers), in the positive margin (e.g., dictators giving different amounts 
to receivers), and discrimination patterns not, or rarely, explored combining both 
positive and negative domains (e.g., taking from the out-group to give to the in-group). 
 
4.3.2. Procedures 
Participants were electronically recruited from the experimental subject pools in 
ESADE Business School (Universitat Ramon Llull), Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), and through social networks (Twitter). An 
invitational e-mail through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) was sent to all individuals 
registered in the experimental subject pools of UAB and UPF, and through SONA to all 
individuals registered in the experimental subject pool of ESADE. The invitational e-
mail sent was trilingual (written in Spanish, Catalan, and English), and provided three 
different links to choose in which language to conduct the experiment. Three 
consecutive tweets, one in each language, were posted on twitter. Each twit contained 
three registration links to register in the experiment in the preferred language. See the 
invitational e-mail sent and the twits posted in the Appendix C. 
When clicking one of the three links to enroll in the experiment, participants were 
redirected to the Qualtrics digital platform. Participants first filled in a questionnaire in 
which they answered demographics questions, their knowledge level of the three 
languages, and their attitudes toward a redistribution policy and the conflict between 
Catalans and Spaniards. Participants were also required to provide a contact e-mail 
address to receive the links to make their future decisions. After answering the 
preliminary questionnaire the experimental instructions were presented to participants.46 
Participants were provided the experimental instructions explaining the Take or Give 
Dictator Game, how to make their decisions in the digital interface, and the 
                                               
46 See the preliminary questionnaire and the experimental instructions in Appendix D.  
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experiment's payoff structure. Participants were told that at the end of the experiment 
seven participants will be randomly selected to be paid for one of their five 
redistribution decisions as dictators, which also will be randomly selected.47 Participants 
were also told that twenty-four more participants would be randomly selected to 
become the receivers of the seven dictators previously selected. 48  Among the 35 
participants randomly selected to be paid, the maximum payment was € 300 and the 
minimum €0 with an average of €83. 
 
4.3.3. Descriptive statistics  
In the preliminary questionnaire, participants were asked to report basic 
demographics that could affect their redistribution decisions like age, gender, place of 
birth, and whether they were students or not. Participants were also asked where they 
were currently living at the moment of registering in the experiment to identify which 
participants were going to experience the Spanish "unlockdown" process and which 
mobility restrictions they were going to deal with. This information is used to create the 
"unlockdown" process stage sequence of each participant. To check if participants 
would not be able to conduct the experiment in a particular language due to a lack of 
knowledge, they were also required to report their knowledge level (on a scale from 0 to 
10) of Catalan, Spanish, and English languages. Participants also reported if they were 
living with kids and dependent persons since mobility restrictions were a bit flexible 
with people in such cases. Finally, the preliminary questionnaire included two questions 
directly related with the intergroup conflict between Catalans and Spaniards and one 
question about individual redistribution preferences at social level. Participants were 
asked their attitude, in favor, against, or do not care, about the self-determination right 
of Catalans, the independence of Catalonia, and regarding the implementation of a 
universal basic rent in their country. The two questions about the intergroup conflict 
allow for analyzing differences in discrimination patterns between participants with 
different attitudes towards the conflict, whereas the question about a basic rent allow to 
identify participants that supposedly hold stronger prosocial preferences.  
                                               
47 This payoff structure introduces uncertainty on whether participants will be paid or not, which might 
potentially affect their decisions. See Ben-Ner et al. (2008) for a comparison between individual decision 
making in Dictator Games with real and hypothetic economic incentives.  
48  The fact that participants can be selected to be paid either as dictators or receivers entails role 
uncertainty. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2008) study how dictator and receiver role uncertainty in Dictator 
Games can affect experimental participants’ decisions as a dictator.    
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics reported by the 2,139 participants successfully 
register in the experiment (in parenthesis), and the 543 participants living in Spain 
during the Spanish “unlockdown” process that completed the experiment making their 
five redistribution decisions (33 participants living out of Spain during the experiment 
also completed their five redistribution decisions).  
 























Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of the 543 participants living in Spain that 
completed the experiment. Knowledge of each language was reported by participants in a 
scale from 0 to 10. Descriptive statistics of all participants registered in the experiment are 
reported in parentheses.  
 
Among the 543 participants living in Spain during the “unlockdown” process and 
completed the experiment, 336 chose the Catalan language when registered for the 
experiment, 183 the Spanish language, and 24 the English language.  The average age 
of these participants is 24.5 years, almost 60% are female, almost three-quarters of them 
Overall Catalan Spanish English
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Age
24.5                      
(24.9)
23.9                    
(23.7)
25.67                      
(26.7)
25.79                      
(25.42)
Female
59.7%                     
(56.4%)
61.6%            
(61%)
57.4%                
(52%)
50%                  
(44.6%)
Student
74.4%      
(72.9%)
75.3%                         
(75.5%)
72.1%                
(66.6%)
79.2%              
(78.8%)
Born in Catalonia
71.2%           
(69.4%)
89.3%              
(88.2%)
43.7%              
(45.8%)
29.2%          
(27.7%)
Living in Catalonia
88.6%           
(91.2%)
97.6%                
(98.8%)
72.1%             
(73.3%)
87.5%       
(88.1%)
Knowledge of Catalan
8.35                      
(7.69)
9.64                    
(9.54)
6.62                      
(6.18)
3.42                      
(2.09)
Knowledge of Spanish
9.59                     
(9.27)
9.60                    
(9.55)
9.86                     
(9.68)
7.25                     
(6.28)
Knowledge of English
7.63                     
(7.65)
7.53                   
(7.51)
7.57                         
(7.42)
9.29                     
(9.25)
In favor of a universal 
basic rent
69.4%                 
(67%)
73.2%            
(71.2%)
64.5%                    
(60.8%)
54.2%                
(63.3%)
In favor of Catalan's self 
determination right
83.4%                 
(79%)
92.9%                
(89.62%)
69.4%                      
(66.6%)
58.3%                
(59.1%)
In favor of Catalonia's 
Independence
40.5%              
(37.8%)
58%                
(56.4%)
11.5%                  
(11.5%)
16.7%                
(18.7%)
Living with kids
4.8%                  
(5.4%)
4.1%            
(4.1%)
6%            
(7.9%)
4.1%               
(4.6%)
Living with a dependent
3.7%                
(4.9%)
4.7%                  
(4.1%)
2.2%             
(5.2%)
0%                       
(0.8%)
Observations 543                   
(2139)
336         
(1220)
183         
(708)
24         
(211)
Language of registration
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were students, and 88.6% were living in Catalonia while participating in the experiment 
(the remaining 11.4% were living in other Spanish regions). The only participants who 
saw their choice of language conditioned by a lack of language knowledge were 
participants registered in English, who reported an average knowledge of Catalan 
language lower than 5 on a scale from 0 to 10. The majority of participants, regardless 
which language they chose to conduct the experiment, declared to be in favor of 
implementing a universal basic rent in their countries and the self-determination right of 
Catalans. The greatest difference between participants occurs in their attitude toward the 
independence of Catalonia. While 58% of participants registered in Catalan report to 
favor the independence of Catalonia, only 11.5% and 16.7% of participants registered in 
Spanish and English, respectively, reported being in favor of Catalonia’s independence.  
 
4.4. Results 
This section investigates whether superordinate common goals without contact 
between individuals might be an effective tool to reduce discrimination, and its effects 
on redistribution decisions. First, the evolution of redistribution decisions and 
discrimination patterns throughout the “unlockdown” process implemented by the 
Spanish Government is analyzed at the aggregate level, and then, separately for 
participants who chose Catalan, Spanish, and English language when registering for the 
experiment. Only the 543 participants that were living in Spain during the 
“unlockdown” process and completed the experiment are included. Participants not 
living in Spain during the experiment, and therefore did not experience the Spanish 
“unlockdown” process, are not included in the analysis.  
 
4.4.1. Evolution of redistribution decisions and discrimination patterns at aggregate 
level 
 
There are a 6.4% of participants with purely self-interested preferences that 
always maximize their own payoff and take all the endowment of receivers. A 9.5% of 
participants have social welfare maximizing or fully inequity aversion preferences and 
never transfer any amount of money maintaining always the initial split of endowments. 
A 1.1% of participants exhibited pure altruistic preferences and equally split their whole 
endowment among the four receivers always. Hence, at least 17% of participants never 
discriminate and the pandemic context did not influence their redistribution preferences. 
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A 46.7% of participants have identity-based component in their redistribution 
preferences and differently redistribute initial endowments amongst receivers depending 
on their own and receivers’ social identity. Identity-based preferences are defined as 
preferences for a different treatment to other participants based on social identities.  
Hence, identity-based preferences always entail some kind of discrimination. The 
remaining 36.3% of participants did not consistently exhibit any of these types of 
preferences in all their five redistribution decisions.  
Table 4 reports the average of overall redistribution, discrimination, and earnings 
of dictators by “unlockdown” process stages. The variable earnings is defined by the 
payoff function of equation (1) previously provided in section 3.1. The overall 
redistribution variable (ψ) is the difference between the sum of the dictators’ 
endowment given to any receiver and the amount of endowment taken from any 
receiver. Therefore, overall redistribution of each dictator in each period is given by the 
following equation: 
 
 𝜓𝑑𝑝 = ∑ 𝑔𝑟𝑝
4
𝑟=1 + ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑝
4
𝑟=1                                             (3) 
  
Note that when a dictator takes more money from receivers than that given to 
them the value of the redistribution variable is negative. The overall discrimination 
variable (φ) of a dictator is equal to the sum of the discrimination against receivers 
registered in a different language (including the receiver that it is not known which 
language chose to register in the experiment). Using the case of a dictator that chose the 
Catalan language to register in the experiment as an example that extrapolates to 
dictators that chose Spanish and English as a registration language, discrimination in a 




𝐶 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝐶 ) − (𝑔𝑟𝑝
𝑆 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝑆 )]                                (4) 
 





𝐶 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝐶 ) − (𝑔𝑟𝑝
𝐸 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝐸 )]                               (5) 
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Discrimination in a particular period against the receiver whose language chosen 




𝐶 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝐶 ) − (𝑔𝑟𝑝
𝑈 +  𝑡𝑟𝑝
𝑈 )]                               (6) 
 
 
Therefore, the overall discrimination of a dictator that chose the Catalan language 
to register in the experiment is defined in each period by:  
 
 𝜑𝑑𝐶𝑝 = 𝜑𝑑𝐶𝑝
𝑆 + 𝜑𝑑𝐶𝑝
𝐸 +  𝜑𝑑𝐶𝑝
𝑈                                     (7) 
 
The number of observations reported in Table 4 for each “unlockdown” process 
stage is different. This is due to some Spanish regions, among which there were the 
regions were most participants in the experiment were living, remained longer in stage 0 
at the beginning of the “unlockdown” process and move directly from stage 2 to stage 4 
at the end. 
 













Note: The table reports the average redistribution, discrimination, and earnings by 
“unlockdown” process stages. Standard deviations of overall means are reported in 
parenthesis.  
 
The overall redistribution mean is € -59.55, which means that on average, 
dictators took, in total, almost sixty Euros more than that they gave to their receivers 
each time they played the ToG game. The overall dictators’ earnings are € 115.37. 
These results supports Hypothesis 2 and points out that, overall, participants in the 





Overall           
earnings
Mean Mean Mean Obs.
Overall
-59.55€                 
(132.62)
32.43€               
(96.66)
115.37€               
(75.17)
2,715
Stage 0 -50.81 € 29.99 € 111.30 € 1,040
Stage 1 -60.36 € 30.29 € 115.68 € 545
Stage 2 -62.93 € 37.13 € 116.52 € 542
Stage 3 -76.68 € 57.07 € 127.56 € 41
Stage 4 -72.06 € 32.98 € 121.63 € 542
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average, the difference in redistribution decisions towards receivers registered in the 
same language as the dictator and the other receivers is slightly higher than thirty Euros. 
To test if these trends follow a significant ascending or descending trend, a regression 
analysis is conducted.  
Table 5 shows an OLS regression analysis on overall redistribution decisions and 
discrimination, including all control variables obtained from the preliminary 
questionnaire clustering standard errors at participant level. The dependent variables are 
Redistribution in column 1 and Discrimination in column 2. Stage is the “unlokdown” 
process stage of the region where a participant was living when making his/her 
decisions. Last movers is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the region were a 
participant lives is a most backward region in the “unlockdown” process, and 0 
otherwise. Universal basic rent is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
participant declared to be in favor of implementing a universal basic rent in his/her 
country and 0 otherwise. Independence of Catalonia is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a participant declared to be in favor Catalonia’s independence and 0 
otherwise. Self determination is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
participant declared to be in favor of the self-determination right of Catalans and 0 
otherwise. Age is the age of participants. Student is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for student participants and 0 otherwise. Dependent/Kids are dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 for participants living with dependent/kids persons and 
0 otherwise. Gender is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for female 
participants and 0 for male participants. 
As shown in Table 5, participants in the experiment became gradually more 
selfish as they moved on throughout the “unlockdown” process stages, as shows the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of the Stage variable in column 1. 
Participants who declared to be in favor to implement a universal basic rent in their 
country were significantly less selfish since the coefficient of Universal basic rent is 
positive and statistically significant. Finally, women are significantly less selfish than 
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Table 5: Regression analysis at aggregate level 
 

















Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are reported in parentheses 
with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
These results supports Hypothesis 3 at aggregate level since, in overall, 
participants became more selfish as the superordinate common goal to fight against the 
covid-19 virus was gradually achieved. This result suggests that superordinate common 
goals alone, without contact between individuals, are able to attenuate individuals’ self-
interest preferences. However, during the “unlockdown” process implemented by the 
Spanish government individuals’ freedom of movement increases at the same time the 
threat posed by the virus decreased. It is therefore not clear (and might not be possible 
to disentangle in this experiment) whether participants became more selfish along the 
“unlockdown” process because they perceived less threatened, or because their 
opportunities to spend money increased as their freedom of movement and leisure 
activities increased. Another economic factor that could have contributed to this 
evolution of redistribution decisions found is the bad economic forecasts for the future 
that were made public in those days. 
Variables
(1)      
Redistribution
(2)            
Discrimination 
Stage  -5.96***          
(0.98)
 1.44                     
(1.06)
Last movers  -6.96         
(4.82)
0.78                                   
(3.81)
Universal basic rent 23.72**          
(12.06)
-20.29**                        
(8.28)
Independence of Catalonia -2.74                            
(11.73)
 16.99**                           
(6.81)
Self determination -5.24                            
(14.28)
-5.02                            
(9.05)
Age  1.07                         
(0.85)
-0.47                                 
(0.45)
Student -10.08                               
(14.11)
 7.47                               
(8.20)
Dependent  -14.40                           
(32.61)
1.63                              
(11.18)
Kids  -15.35                            
(24.24)
  48.21***                   
(17.68)
Gender 25.78**                           
(11.21)
 -13.29**                      
(6.76)
Constant  -91.66***                            
(31.08)





Regarding discrimination, the Stage variable is not statistically significant.  
However, the attitude towards Catalonia’s independence and implementing a universal 
basic rent significantly affected participants’ discrimination. Participants in favor of a 
universal basic rent in their countries discriminate, on average, by twenty Euros less as 
compare to other participants. The redistribution decisions of participants in favor of 
Catalonia’s independence were, on average, almost twenty Euros higher towards the 
receivers who were registered in the experiment in the same language as compared to 
those receivers who did not. Participants living with kids discriminate considerable 
more than participants who do not, and women discriminate significantly less than men. 
Therefore, there is no evidence supporting hypothesis 1 at aggregate level. 
 
4.4.2 Redistribution and Discrimination of Catalans, Spanish, and English 
Next, the hypothesis that superordinate goals attenuate selfishness and 
discrimination between members of different social groups, especially between 
members of social groups in conflict is tested. This section investigates redistribution 
and discrimination decisions throughout the Spanish “unlockdown” separately for 
participants that chose different languages to conduct the experiment. Table 6 and Table 
7 report the average redistribution decisions and discrimination of participants 
registered in each language by “unlockdown” process stages. Again, and as a 
consequence of the asymmetric implementation of the “unlockdown” process across 
Spanish regions, the number of observations for participants registered in each language 
varies across “unlockdown” process stages.    
 









Note: The table separately reports the average redistribution of participants registered in the 
experiment in each language by “unlockdown” process stages. Standard deviations of 
overall means are reported in parenthesis. 
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Overall
-57.28€                  
(133.46)
1680 -60.77€                  
(130.83)
915 -82.05€                  
(133.32)
120
Stage 0 -48.39 € 655 -52.01 € 338 -75.91 € 47
Stage 1 -60.91 € 337 -56.10 € 184 -85.25 € 24
Stage 2 -60.74 € 335 -64.04 € 183 -85.08 € 24
Stage 3 -79.69 € 13 -77.62 € 27 -12.00 € 1
Stage 4 -68.64 € 335 -75.87 € 183 -90.75 € 24
Language of registration
Catalan Spanish English
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The mean of redistribution decisions made by participants registered in Catalan is 
€ -57.28, which is significantly lower than that of the participants registered in Spanish, 
€ -60.77 (p-value = 0.04),49 and that of participants registered in English, € -82.05 (p-
value = 0.00). Although not included in the table, the overall earnings for participants 
registered in each language are higher than € 100, which support hypothesis 2 for 
participants registered in each language. 
 









Note: The table separately reports the average discrimination of participants registered in 
the experiment in each language by “unlockdown” process stages. Standard deviations of 
overall means are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The mean discrimination of participants registered in Catalan is 37.88, which is 
significantly higher than that of the participants registered in Spanish, 22.13 (p-value = 
0.00), and similar than that of participants registered in English, 34.72 (p-value = 0.25). 
Again, to test if these redistribution decisions and discrimination levels follow a 
significantly increasing or decreasing trend over “unlockdown” process stages a 
regression analysis is conducted. 
To test if these trends follow a significant ascending or descending trend for each 
set of participants that chose a particular language when registered in the experiment, a 
regression analysis is conducted. Table 8 shows an OLS regression analysis of 
participants that chose the Spanish language when registered for the experiment. The 
dependent variable in column 1 is Redistribution, in column 2 it is the overall 
Discrimination, Discrimination toward participants that chose different languages to 
                                               
49  To compare the redistribution and discrimination averages of participants registered in different 
languages, a non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney test is used with participants as a unit of 
observation.  
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Overall
37.88€                       
(92.46)
1680 22.13€                      
(101.99)
915 34.72€                           
(106.42)
120
Stage 0 36.07 € 655 16.62 € 338 41.36 € 47
Stage 1 40.83 € 337 13.07 € 184 14.24 € 24
Stage 2 42.09 € 335 27.26 € 183 43.25 € 24
Stage 3 45.23 € 13 67.26 € 27 -64.00 € 1





register in the experiment are the dependent variables in column 3 and 4, and 
Discrimination toward participants whose registration language is not known in column 
5. Again, independent variables include Stage and Last movers variables, and all control 
variables obtained in the preliminary questionnaire. Standard errors are clustered at 
participant level. 
 
Table 8: Regression analysis of Spanish participants 
 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are reported in parentheses 
with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
As shown in table 8, the main determinant factor of redistribution decisions for 
participants that chose Spanish to register in the experiment was the “unlockdown” 
process stage and gender. Similar to the trend found at aggregate level, participants that 
conducted the experiment in Spanish became significantly less selfish as moved on the 
“unlockdown” process stages, and women were significantly less selfish than men. 
These results support hypothesis 3 for the particular case of participants that conducted 
the experiment in Spanish.  
Participants also significantly increased their overall discrimination throughout 
the “unlockdown” process, as shows the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
of the Stage variable in column 2. However, they do it so towards other participants 
registered in English and participants that is not known which language used to register 
in the experiment but do not do it so toward participants that registered in Catalan. This 
Variables
(1)      
Redistribution
(2)            
Discrimination             
(overall)
(3)            
Discrimination                          
(Catalans)
(4)            
Discrimination                          
(English)
(5)            
Discrimination                          
(Unknown)
Stage -5.93***          
(1.74)
  4.26**                     
(1.95)
1.13                      
(0.73)
 1.39*                      
(0.76)
 1.73**                      
(0.74)
Last movers 0.60                             
(9.64)
1.08                                   
(8.14)
2.68                               
(3.08)
0.14                                   
(3.06)
-1.73                                   
(3.12)
Universal basic rent  -6.59            
(17.86)
-23.86*                      
(13.60)
-10.67**                        
(5.21)
-7.01                        
(5.31)
-6.17                        
(4.82)
Independence of Catalonia -33.24                           
(36.46)
-35.43**                           
(17.78)
-13.92                          
(8.62)
-2.78                          
(6.91)
 -18.73***                          
(5.51)
Self determination -1.87                             
(19.21)
-12.03                           
(12.75)
 -3.36                           
(4.77)
-4.58                           
(4.95)
 -4.08                           
(4.72)
Age  1.32                          
(1.36)
0.17                                 
(0.77)
0.50                                
(0.37)
0.06                                 
(0.28)
-0.39                                 
(0.34)
Student -30.25                             
(22.62)
 14.14                               
(14.27)
12.29**                                
(6.22)
0.80                                
(5.73)
1.04                                
(5.19)
Dependent 9.39                        
(88.07)
2.65                               
(20.49)
6.43                               
(10.80)
  -10.07                               
(6.11)
6.28                               
(6.45)
Kids  -65.68                           
(41.89)
50.51*                     
(29.91)
13.26                   
(13.77)
  18.48                   
(13.20)
  18.76                   
(12.49)
Gender  48.03***                           
(18.73)
-9.78                      
(11.56)
 -5.08                     
(4.37)
 -4.05                     
(4.66)
 -0.64                     
(4.11)
Constant -78.98                             
(48.29)
 30.86                         
(29.26)
-6.20                         
(13.03)
15.47                         
(10.98)
21.60*                         
(11.61)
Observations 915 915 915 915 915
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results partially supports Hypothesis 1, and suggest that superordinate goals might be 
effective on reducing discrimination between members of different social groups but not 
if social groups are currently in conflict. 
Therefore, I conclude that gradually achieving a superordinate common goal 
increases discrimination of some participants, in this case participants that chose 
Spanish language to conduct the experiment, pointing out superordinate common goals 
without contact between individuals can mitigate overall discrimination patterns. 
Next, the same analysis is done for participants that chose Catalan language to register 
in the experiment. Table 9 shows an OLS regression analysis of participants that chose 
the Catalan language when registered for the experiment. The dependent variable in 
column 1 is Redistribution, in column 2 it is the overall Discrimination. Discrimination 
toward participants that chose the Spanish language to register in the experiment is the 
dependent variable in column 3 and 4 separately for participants that registered in 
Catalan and declared to be in favor of the Catalonia’s independence and those who not. 
Discrimination toward participants that chose the English language to register in the 
experiment is the dependent variable in column 5, and Discrimination toward 
participants whose registration language is not known is the dependent variable in 
column 6. Again, independent variables include Stage and Last movers variables, and 
all control variables obtained in the preliminary questionnaire. Standard errors are 
clustered at participant level.  
Table 9 shows that participants that chose Catalan language to conduct the 
experiment also became gradually more selfish throughout the “unlockdown” process 
stages, as shows the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the Stage 
variable in column 1. Hence, Hypothesis 3 also accomplish for participants registered in 
Catalan.  Interestingly, the coefficient of last mover variable is negative and statistically 
significant in column 1, which means that the fact of living in a region at the backward 
of the “unlockdown” process, induced participants to redistribute initial endowment 









Table 9: Regression analysis of Catalan participants 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are reported in parentheses 
with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
Being in favor of implementing a basic rent in their countries is a determinant 
factor for decreasing both selfishness and discrimination. The attitude towards the 
independence of Catalonia strongly affects discrimination. Participants in favor of the 
Catalonia’s independence discriminate significantly more overall. However, 
discrimination of participants registered using the Catalan language towards any 
receivers is not affected by the “unlockdown” process stages (regardless being in favor 
or not to the independence of Catalonia). Hence, Hypothesis 1 does not accomplish for 
participants registered in Catalan. 
Next, the same analysis is done for participants that chose English language to 
register in the experiment. Table 10 shows an OLS regression analysis of participants 
that chose the English language when registered for the experiment. The dependent 
variable in column 1 is Redistribution, in column 2 it is the overall Discrimination, 
Discrimination toward participants that chose different languages to register in the 
experiment are the dependent variables in column 3 and 4, and Discrimination toward 
participants whose registration language is not known in column 5. Again, independent 
variables include Stage and Last movers variables, and all control variables obtained in 
the preliminary questionnaire. Standard errors are clustered at participant level. 
 
Variables
(1)      
Redistribution
(2)            
Discrimination             
(overall)
(3)            
Discrimination 
Independentists                          
(Spanish)
(4)            
Discrimination         
No Independentists                    
(Spanish)
(5)            
Discrimination                          
(English)
(6)            
Discrimination                          
(Unknown)
Stage -6.03***          
(1.25)
 -0.07                      
(1.31)
 0.37                      
(0.68)
 1.15                            
(0.73)
-0.16                      
(0.53)
-0.60                      
(0.54)
Last movers -9.96*                             
(5.49)
-0.08                    
(4.26)
0.20                                  
(1.98)
 1.21                                
(3.04)
0.18                                   
(1.82)
-0.93                              
(1.54)
Universal basic rent 45.90***            
(17.01)
-21.04*                      
(10.79)
-17.04**                        
( 7.60)
-3.69                      
(5.55)
-6.28                        
( 4.20)
-3.93                        
(3.44)
Independence of Catalonia -10.06                            
(15.03)
 18.99**                           
(8.03)
- -
 4.39                         
(3.22)
 4.99*                         
( 2.75)
Self determination  4.20                             
(27.92)
14.37                           
(16.50)
-
 2.50                         
(7.03)
 1.74                           
( 7.32)
 7.58                           
(4.63)
Age 0.87                           
( 1.07)
-0.70                                
(0.52)
-0.10                                
(0.30)
-1.02**                                
(0.45)
-0.21                                 
(0.20)
-0.26                                 
(0.19)
Student 4.58                            
(18.36)
0.38                               
(9.58)
1.63                               
(5.65)
  -1.18                              
(4.68)
-0.98                                
(4.12)
-0.50                                
(3.15)
Dependent   -27.78                         
(36.41)
6.13                               
(13.94)
8.90                                     
(12.25)
6.80                             
(6.69)
1.97                               
(5.04)
-2.73                              
( 4.92)
Kids 23.41                            
(27.18)
25.89                     
(20.68)
  6.99                         
(13.41)
  8.69                             
(11.06)
1.69                  
(5.44)
  14.85*                  
( 8.46)
Gender 7.03                         
(14.33)
 -12.77                      
(8.17)
 -7.58                           
( 4.66)
 1.89                              
(5.21)
-4.15                     
( 3.27)
-4.41                     
(2.69)
Constant  -104.09**                              
(45.34)
51.98**                     
(22.59)
35.58***                        
(13.06)
 29.19                             
(13.26)
22.51**                         
( 9.93)
13.69*                         
(7.31)
Observations 1,660 1,660 960 700 1,660 1,660
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Table 10: Regression analysis of English participants 
 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are reported in parentheses 
with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
Table 10 shows that participants that chose English language to conduct the 
experiment also became gradually more selfish throughout the “unlockdown” process 
stages, as shows the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the Stage 
variable in column 1. Hence, Hypothesis 3 also accomplish for participants registered in 
English. Student participants redistributed endowments significantly more selfishly than 
no student participants.  
Regarding discrimination, the Stage variable is not statistically significant neither 
in columns 2, 3, 4, and 5, which means discrimination levels of participants that register 
in English was not affected by the “unlockdown” process. Participants living with kids 




Intergroup conflicts have caused more than 200 million deaths in the 20th century 
(Rummel, 1997) and have been considered the main problem of the past century by 
social psychologist (Fiske, 2002). Since the end of the Second World War, the number 
of armed conflicts around the world has gradually increased and reached its maximum 
Variables
(1)      
Redistribution
(2)            
Discrimination             
(overall)
(3)            
Discrimination                          
(Catalans)
(4)            
Discrimination                          
(Spanish)
(5)            
Discrimination                          
(Unknown)
Stage -4.71**          
(2.14)
  0.17                     
(4.47)
 0.29                     
(1.88)
 -0.17                      
(1.71)
 0.05                      
(1.53)
Last movers  -8.39                           
(10.45)
9.23                                  
(19.87)
4.70                               
(7.22)
1.73                                  
(6.67)
2.80                                  
(7.26)
Universal basic rent -50.12            
(50.99)
-34.02                      
(41.42)
-3.56                       
(18.15)
-26.11                      
(17.66)
-4.34                       
(11.59)
Independence of Catalonia  7.00                            
(60.93)
-2.40                          
(36.34)
-29.12                       
(20.49)
 23.91                          
(17.12)
2.79                          
(12.68)
Self determination -19.48                          
(40.16)
-30.17                          
(23.01)
-22.34 *                            
(12.98)
-4.06                         
(8.44)
 -3.76                           
(6.95)
Age -3.20                          
(3.67)
-7.05*                                 
(3.91)
-3.63**                                
(1.62)
-2.02                            
(1.42)
-1.38                                
(1.12)
Student -226.27***                           
(78.06)
-40.73                          
(46.91)
-30.27                               
(22.97)
-8.95                        
(15.76)
 -1.50                              
(14.12)
Dependent - - - - -
Kids  -113.30                           
(100.46)
  365.01***                    
(81.62)
223.68***                   
(38.40)
125.54***             
(35.38)
  15.78                   
(25.54)
Gender 104.90*                          
(54.50)
 -74.00                   
(52.54)
-19.62                  
(20.75)
 -35.63                   
(21.13)
 -18.75                     
(14.11)
Constant  180.94                         
(151.57)
 301.60                        
(179.12)
150.15                      
(71.74)
 97.30                         
(63.58)
54.13                         
(51.97)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
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number in 2019, most of them occurring within country boundaries (intrastate 
conflicts).50  
There exists extensive literature studying interventions aimed at reducing 
discrimination and prejudices between members of different social groups. One of the 
main factors that have been found to reduce discrimination and stereotypes between 
individuals effectively is contact and interactions between members of different social 
groups. The emergence of the covid-19 forced cooperation among individuals, 
institutions, and governments restricting contact between individuals, which offers an 
opportunity to investigate the role of superordinate goals in mitigating discrimination 
when there is not contact or interaction between individuals. 
Results show participants who chose to conduct the experiment in Spanish 
significantly increase their discrimination as the common superordinate goal was 
gradually achieved, which points out superordinate goals not requiring contact between 
individuals might be effective in reducing discrimination between members of different 
social groups.  However, they did so toward other participants who chose to conduct the 
experiment in English and participants that was not known which language chose when 
register in the experiment, but they did not so toward participants who register in 
Catalan. On the other hand, participants who conduct the experiment in Catalan and 
English did not alter their discrimination levels during the experiment. These results 
suggest the effectiveness of superordinate common goals in reducing discrimination 
might be limited, specially, between members of different social groups in conflict. One 
plausible explanation for these results might be behind the command control on 
managing the consecution of the superordinate common goal. In this case was the 
Spanish central government who designed and implemented the “unlockdown” process. 
Although regional politic leaders were able to make suggestions and requests about 
implementing new measures or relaxing adopted measures, all of them were subedited 
to the approval of the central government. This different status in the command of 
control over the measures implemented to achieve the superordinate common goal 
might have caused only participants that conducted the experiment in Spanish have seen 
affected their discrimination levels during the experiment. 
Two months after the “unlockdown” process implemented by the Spanish 
government had finished and the “state of alarm” deactivated, the number of new cases 
                                               
50  See https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/ (active dyads and conflicts by year) and 
https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/ (armed conflicts by conflict type and year). 
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and deaths of covid-19 increased again and regional politic leaders were given the full 
command control to manage the situation. Although this experiment did not continued 
until then, it would have been interesting to study how discrimination levels of 
participants in the experiment would have react to the transfer of the command control 
to regional politic leaders, especially, taking into account that Catalonia was governed 
at that moment by pro-independence political parties. 
Also note this experiment was conducted in a period in which the soperordinate 
common goal was gradually achieved and the common threat gradually attenuated. 
However, it would also be interesting to study the “other side of the coin,” that is, how 
participants would have discriminated against each other during the period in which the 
number of infections and deaths increased and the common threat was gradually 
growing.   
 
4.6. References  
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 115(3), 715-753. 
 
Allport, G. W., Clark, K., & Pettigrew, T. (1954). The nature of prejudice. 
 
Bardsley, N. (2008). Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?. Experimental 
Economics, 11(2), 122-133. 
 
Barlow, F. K., Paolini, S., Pedersen, A., Hornsey, M. J., Radke, H. R., Harwood, J., ... 
& Sibley, C. G. (2012). The contact caveat: Negative contact predicts increased 
prejudice more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 38(12), 1629-1643. 
 
Basu, K. (2005). Racial conflict and the malignancy of identity. The Journal of 
Economic Inequality, 3(3), 221-241. 
 
Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2009). War and local collective action in Sierra 
Leone. Journal of public Economics, 93(11-12), 1144-1157. 
 
Ben-Ner, A., Kramer, A., & Levy, O. (2008). Economic and hypothetical dictator game 
experiments: Incentive effects at the individual level. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 37(5), 1775-1784. 
 
Böhm, R., Rusch, H., & Baron, J. (2018). The psychology of intergroup conflict: A 
review of theories and measures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 
 
Boisjoly, J., Duncan, G. J., Kremer, M., Levy, D. M., & Eccles, J. (2006). Empathy or 




Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. American economic review, 90(1), 166-193. 
 
Bornstein, G. (1992). The free-rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and 
continuous public goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(4), 597. 
 
Bornstein, G., & Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in intergroup and single-group 
social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30(1), 52-67. 
 
Cappelen, A. W., Falch, R., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2021). Solidarity and 
fairness in times of crisis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 186, 1-11. 
 
Carrell, S. E., Hoekstra, M., & West, J. E. (2019). The impact of college diversity on 
behavior toward minorities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(4), 159-
82. 
 
Cassar, A., Healy, A., & Von Kessler, C. (2017). Trust, risk, and time preferences after 
a natural disaster: experimental evidence from Thailand. World Development, 94, 90-
105. 
 
Clots‐Figueras, I., & Masella, P. (2013). Education, language and identity. The 
Economic Journal, 123(570), F332-F357. 
 
Corno, L., La Ferrara, E., & Burns, J. (2019). Interaction, stereotypes and performance: 
Evidence from South Africa (No. W19/03). IFS Working Papers. 
 
De Jaegher, K. (2021). Common‐Enemy Effects: Multidisciplinary Antecedents And 
Economic Perspectives. Journal of Economic Surveys, 35(1), 3-33. 
 
Drouvelis, M., & Nosenzo, D. (2013). Group identity and leading-by-example. Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 39, 414-425. 
 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998). Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence 
from dictator experiments. The economic journal, 108(448), 726-735. 
 
Espinosa, M. P., Fatas, E., & Ubeda, P. (2019). Linguistic diversity and out-group 
discrimination in bilingual societies. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics, 81, 102-127. 
 
Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., & Ray, D. (2012). Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical 
study. American Economic Review, 102(4), 1310-42. 
 
Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2011). Linking conflict to inequality and polarization. American 
Economic Review, 101(4), 1345-74. 
 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868. 
 
   
 155 
Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001). Discrimination in a segmented society: An 
experimental approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 351-377. 
 
Finseraas, H., Hanson, T., Johnsen, Å. A., Kotsadam, A., & Torsvik, G. (2019). Trust, 
ethnic diversity, and personal contact: A field experiment. Journal of Public 
Economics, 173, 72-84. 
 
Fiske, S. T. (2002). What we know now about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem 
of the century. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11(4), 123-128. 
 
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring 
trust. The quarterly journal of economics, 115(3), 811-846. 
 
Glynn, S. A., Busch, M. P., Schreiber, G. B., Murphy, E. L., Wright, D. J., Tu, Y., ... & 
NHLBI REDS Study Group. (2003). Effect of a national disaster on blood supply and 
safety: the September 11 experience. Jama, 289(17), 2246-2253. 
 
Gneezy, A., & Fessler, D. M. (2012). Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases 
prosocial punishments and rewards. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 279(1727), 219-223. 
 
Goette, L., Huffman, D., & Meier, S. (2006). The impact of group membership on 
cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social 
groups. American Economic Review, 96(2), 212-216. 
 
Goette, L., Huffman, D., & Meier, S. (2012). The impact of social ties on group 
interactions: Evidence from minimal groups and randomly assigned real 
groups. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(1), 101-15. 
 
Greiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization 
of experiments in economics. University of Cologne, Working paper series in 
economics, 10(23), 63-104. 
 
Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L. (2008). “In-group love” and “out-group hate” as 
motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: A new game 
paradigm. Psychological science, 19(4), 405-411. 
 
Halevy, N., Chou, E. Y., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). Games groups play: Mental 
models in intergroup conflict and negotiation. In Negotiation and groups. Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Iriberri, N., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011). The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator 
games. Experimental Economics, 14(2), 160-180. 
 
Klor, E. F., & Shayo, M. (2010). Social identity and preferences over 
redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 94(3-4), 269-278. 
 
Kranton, R., Pease, M., Sanders, S., & Huettel, S. (2016). Groupy and non-groupy 





Kranton, R. E., & Sanders, S. G. (2017). Groupy versus non-groupy social preferences: 
Personality, region, and political party. American Economic Review, 107(5), 65-69. 
 
Li, S. X., de Oliveira, A. C., & Eckel, C. (2017). Common identity and the voluntary 
provision of public goods: An experimental investigation. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 142, 32-46. 
 
List, J. A. (2007). On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political 
economy, 115(3), 482-493. 
 
Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and 
assessment of research and practice. Annual review of psychology, 60, 339-367. 
 
Paolini, S., Harwood, J., & Rubin, M. (2010). Negative intergroup contact makes group 
memberships salient: Explaining why intergroup conflict endures. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1723-1738. 
 
Penner, L., Brannick, M. T., Webb, S., & Connell, P. (2005). Effects on Volunteering of 
the September 11, 2001, Attacks: An Archival Analysis 1. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 35(7), 1333-1360. 
 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual review of psychology, 49(1), 
65-85. 
 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact 
theory. Journal of personality and social psychology, 90(5), 751. 
 
Rao, G. (2019). Familiarity does not breed contempt: Generosity, discrimination, and 
diversity in Delhi schools. American Economic Review, 109(3), 774-809. 
 
Rummel, R. J. (1997). Death by government. Transaction Publishers. 
 
Salari, N., Hosseinian-Far, A., Jalali, R., Vaisi-Raygani, A., Rasoulpoor, S., 
Mohammadi, M., ... & Khaledi-Paveh, B. (2020). Prevalence of stress, anxiety, 
depression among the general population during the COVID-19 pandemic: a systematic 
review and meta-analysis. Globalization and health, 16(1), 1-11. 
 
Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. American 
journal of Sociology, 63(4), 349-356. 
 
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup conflict 
and cooperation. Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup 
conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment. Institute of Group Relations, 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK. 
 
Solnit, R. (2010). A paradise built in hell: The extraordinary communities that arise in 
disaster. Penguin. 
   
 157 
 
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of 
prejudice. Reducing prejudice and discrimination, 23-45. 
 
Stokes, B. (2017). What it takes to truly be ‘one of us’. Pew Research Center, 1. 
 
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of 
intergroup conflict. Organizational identity: A reader, 56(65), 9780203505984-16. 
 
Van Laar, C., Levin, S., Sinclair, S., & Sidanius, J. (2005). The effect of university 
roommate contact on ethnic attitudes and behavior. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 41(4), 329-345. 
 
Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R., & Van Soest, D. P. 
(2012). Violent conflict and behavior: a field experiment in Burundi. American 
Economic Review, 102(2), 941-64. 
 
Weisel, O. (2016). Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived 
target of threat. European Economic Review, 90, 122-133. 
 
Whitt, S., & Wilson, R. K. (2007). Public goods in the field: Katrina evacuees in 
Houston. Southern Economic Journal, 377-387. 
 
Appendix A 
Intergroup conflict between Catalans and Spaniards and the idiosyncrasy of 
Catalan language 
 
Catalonia is a Spanish region located in the northeast of Spain. Although some 
Catalans identify themselves as Spaniards or as both Catalans and Spaniards to some 
extent, some Catalans identify themselves only as Catalans. A Catalan national identity 
sense often accompanies the Catalan group identity sense of Catalans that do not 
identify themselves as Spaniards. Together with disputes over economic resources, 
governance, and culture, Catalan national identity sense has historically led to an 
intergroup conflict between Catalans and Spaniards regarding Catalans' self-
determination right and the independence of Catalonia from Spain.51 The conflict and 
the support for Catalonias’ independence have gradually intensified in the last decade. 
On the 13th of September 2009, the first referendum about the independence of 
Catalonia at a municipal level was conducted in a small village called Arenys de Munt. 
In this first Catalan independence referendum, 2.569 people voted in favor of the 
independence of Catalonia. During the two next years, more than 500 municipalities 
                                               
51 Catalonia has been uninterruptedly under Spanish governance since Nueva Planta decrees were signed 
in Catalonia on 16 January 1716.    
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organized similar referendums that were not sanctioned by the Spanish government. 
Eight years after the first referendum, in June 2017, the president of Catalonia 
announced a Catalan independence referendum at a national level (Catalonia). 
However, the central government of Spain did not approve nor officially recognize the 
referendum, and tried to prevent it. Four months later, on the 1st of October 2017, 
approximately 2 million Catalans voted in favor of constituting Catalonia as an 
independent republic state. The 1st of October was a turning point in the conflict. On the 
one hand, because despite the efforts made by the central government to prevent the 
referendum, the 1st of October many Catalans voted depositing their votes physically in 
a ballot box. On the other hand, because in the last governmental attempt to impede the 
voting consisting on seizing the ballot boxes the day of the referendum, police officers 
encountered the resistance of the voters and exercise violence captured and published in 
many local and international newspapers cover. 
In the following months and years, the conflict escalated even more. Before 2017 
finished, some members of the Catalan government and Catalan parliament, and some 
social leaders were accused of rebellion and sedition for promoting the referendum.  The 
president of Catalonia and some “councilors” moved to different European countries to 
avoid being judged by the Spanish law system. In contrast, the vice president, some 
“councilors”, the president of the Catalan parliament, and the social leaders were put 
preventively in prison. The 14th October 2019, most of the defendants, including the 
social leaders, were found guilty of sedition and sentenced to prison terms of between 9 
and 13 years. 
Globally, language is seen as one of the most prominent components of national 
identity (Stokes, 2017). The Catalan language is one of the main distinctive and 
symbolic traits of the Catalan identity and pro-independence movements in Catalonia. 
Indeed, Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) found empirical evidence that students 
exposed for a longer time to the Catalan language in the compulsory education system 
developed stronger Catalan feelings and preference for Catalanist political parties (i.e. 
political parties founded in Catalonia). However, Catalans have not always been 
allowed to speak in Catalan. During the Spanish dictatorship period (1940-1975), all 
regional languages in Spain were banned, although its speakers did preserve their usage 
clandestinely. After the dictatorship ended, Spanish regions were conferred the political 
status of autonomous communities and some political powers to legislate through their 
own parliaments. Catalonia was pioneer in recovering the use of the Catalan language, 
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specially, in the education system. In 1983, the Catalan government approved the 
“Catalan Law of Language Normalisation”, which reintroduced the Catalan language 
into all education levels below university and converted the education system into a 
bilingual system. Nowadays the usage of the Catalan language is widely extended and 
required in Catalonia. All high school students in Catalonia must reach an elemental 
knowledge of Catalan and Spanish languages to obtain their compulsory education 
degrees or enter university, and an elemental knowledge of the Catalan language is also 



























































































































































Pictures 1: Electronic recruitment 
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Appendix D 
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment! 
To sign up on the experiment, you must answer several questions that you will only 
answer during this registration process, and accept the terms and conditions in the 
participation consent form that you will find below. You can sign up for the 









Create your anonymous, unique and personal experimental code. Write the first three 










What city or town were you born in? 
 
 
In which city or town are you currently residing? 
 
 


















If so, in which university or institution? 
 
 
On a scale from 0 to 10, being 0 null and 10 perfect, what is your knowledge degree of 
the following languages? 
 









Would you be in favor of implementing a universal basic income in your country? 
Yes 
No 
I do not care 
 
Do you think that Catalans should have the right to vote in a referendum whether they 
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I do not care 
 
Would you like Catalonia to be, as a republic, an independent state? 
Yes 
No 




In order to participate in the experiment, it is very important that you read and 
understand the experimental instructions presented below. In addition, we will ask you 








In this experiment, each participant will potentially have € 100. Your task will consist 
on deciding how to redistribute the € 100 of four other participants. To do this, you 
can transfer any amount of your € 100 to any other of these four participants at a ratio of 
1 to 0.5. This means that for every € 1 you decide to transfer to any of the other four 
participants, that participant will receive € 0.5. You can also take any amount of the € 
100 from any of the other four participants at a ratio of 1 to 0.5. This means that for 
every € 1 you take from them you will receive € 0.5. 
  
The other four participants over which you will decide will be randomly chosen and 
they will be: one that has registered in the experiment through the link in Catalan, 
another through the link in Spanish, another through the link in English and a fourth 
that you will not know which link has used to register in the experiment. None of 
these four participants will be informed about which link you have used to 
register. 
  
We will ask you (via email) to make this redistribution decision five times, once every 






To be an eligible participant to receive a bank transfer, you will have to make your 
redistribution decision five times within a maximum period of three days from the 
moment you receive each of the emails. 
  
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly select 35 participants. From these 35 
participants, we will randomly select one of the five redistribution decisions made 
by 7 of them. These decisions will determine all the payments of randomly selected 
participants. This way, if you are one of the participants whose decision matters for 
payments, your selected redistribution decision will determine your payment and that of 
other 4 participants (one who has registered in the experiment through the link in 
Catalan, another through the link in Spanish, another through the link in English, 
and a fourth that you do not know which link has used to register in the 
experiment). Conversely, if you are randomly selected to be paid but your decisions are 
not the ones that matter, you will receive the payment decided by one of the other 
participants randomly selected whose decisions matter. Therefore, you must behave in 
each of your decisions as if you were going to be selected and your decisions 
mattered to determine payments, also taking into account that if you are not selected 
to be paid or your decisions do not matter for payments, your decisions will not 





Example 1: If you decide not to transfer any euro neither to the participant registered in 
Catalan nor to the one that you do not know what language has registered in, to transfer 
€ 50 to the participant registered in English, and to take € 20 from the participant 
registered in Spanish, then: 
Your final total euros would be: 100 - 50 + (20 * 0.5) = € 60 
The total final euros of the participant registered in Catalan would be: 100 = € 100 
The total final euros of the participant registered in Spanish would be: 100 - 20 = € 80 
The total final euros of the participant registered in English would be: 100 + (50 * 0.5) 
= € 125 
The total final euros of the participant that you do not know what language has 
registered in would be: 100 = € 100 
 
Example 2: If you decided to transfer € 20 to the participant registered in Catalan and € 
40 to the one registered in Spanish, and take € 10 from the participant registered in 
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English and € 15 from the one that you do not know what language has registered in, 
then: 
Your final total euros would be: 100 - 20 - 40 + (10 * 0.5) + (15 * 0.5) = € 52.5 
The total final euros of the participant registered in Catalan would be: 100 + (20 * 0.5) 
= € 110 
The total final euros of the participant registered in Spanish would be: 100 + (40 * 0.5) 
= € 120 
The total final euros of the participant registered in English would be: 100 - 10 = € 90 
The total final euros of the participant that you do not know what language has 




Now is time to make your first redistribution decision in this experiment. 
  
Recall that none of the other four participants whose € 100 you are going to 
redistribute will never know which link you have used to register in the 
experiment. 
  
Decide how many of your € 100 do you want to transfer to each of the following 
participants (maximum you can transfer € 100 in total among the four participants) and 




A participant registered in Catalan 
 
  















   
 
 
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. 
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5.1. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has aimed to extend and advance on the study of group identity effects 
on individual decision-making and mitigating factors of discriminatory behaviors based 
on group identity. The findings offer several implications for policymakers and 
managers of firms and organizations dealing and managing group identity diversity to 
avoid social conflicts or inefficiencies derived from a lack of cooperation and 
coordination among individuals.  
Regarding the effects of group identity on individual decision-making, this thesis 
has explored the role group identity uncertainty has in individual interaction preferences 
and the repercussions of reinforcing group identity on collective coordination in 
Chapter 3. When exploring the effects of group identity uncertainty, it has been found 
that in the short term group identity uncertainty does not deter interaction among 
individuals as much as group identity diversity. However, in the long term group 
identity uncertainty deters interaction among individuals more than group identity 
diversity. These results provide new insights that could be applied when forming 
workgroup and deciding to what extent its members know each other. According to 
these results, to maximize interactions among members of a workgroup diverse in terms 
of group identity its members should not know each other in the short term, whereas 
they should know each other in the long term. On the other hand, Chapter 3 also shows 
that reinforcing group identity through a cooperative group-solving task contributes to 
collective coordination efficiency, which highlights the importance of building up group 
identity through cooperation among group identity members for collective coordination.   
Regarding the mitigating factors of discriminatory behaviors, this thesis has 
investigated the effectiveness of three different factors on reducing discrimination 
between individuals. First, it has been shown in Chapter 2 of this thesis that pointing to 
behavior similarities unifies individuals more than behavior differences disunite them. 
This result indicates that it is possible to make people identify with each other by letting 
them know they behave in the same way in a particular context, which offers an 
alternative mechanism through which mitigating discriminatory behaviors and the 
emergence of intergroup conflicts. In line with a result found by Charness et al. (2014), 
Chapter 3 of this thesis also shows that economic incentives can act as a deterring factor 
of discrimination patterns on interaction decisions of individuals. Concretely, it has 
been found that individuals do not discriminate by group identity when deciding with 
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whom to interact if interactions entail high economic incentives. This result points out 
economic motivations can overcome group identity concerns and provides an additional 
tool to decrease segregation in many social contexts and foster interactions among 
employees in the workplace. Finally, this thesis has tested in Chapter 4 whether 
individuals from different social groups, some of them involved in an ongoing conflict, 
reduce discrimination against each other when they are forced to cooperate to achieve a 
superordinate common goal without being able to get in contact. The results found show 
that some individuals discriminated more when redistributing economic resources as the 
superordinate common goal was gradually achieved. However, discrimination degrees 
between members of the social groups in conflict remain unaltered as the superordinate 
common goal was gradually achieved. These results suggest the effectiveness of 
superordinate common goals in reducing discrimination between individuals that do not 
get in contact might be limited, specially, between members of different social groups 
in conflict. 
 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
This thesis has presented three experiments addressing novel research questions in 
the literature of group identity effects on individual decision-making and discrimination 
between individuals. Like any other research approach, economic experiments also have 
some limitations. Since all experimental participants in the experiments presented in 
this thesis had voluntarily enroll in the experiments it is possible the data obtained 
suffer from a self-selection bias (Harrison et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, as experimenter, I did not have control over the demographics traits 
of experimental participants, which entails a risk of obtaining an unbalanced sample, for 
example, in terms of the group identity of participants. This is the main limitation of the 
lab-in-the-field experiment presented in Chapter 2. Not having enough participants of a 
particular group identity in this experiment has limited some of the analysis that might 
be interesting to address in future research projects. For instance, it has not been 
possible to extend the analysis of how similarities and differences on behaviors among 
social group members in social and individual context differently affect the group 
identity of members of different social group. Besides, and due to not having a sample 
pool of participants big enough, it has not been possible to investigate how group 
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identity of participants fluctuates when they can choose from which social group to 
receive information. 
In the experiment addressing the effects of group identity uncertainty on 
individual interaction preferences presented in Chapter 3 experimental participants were 
not allowed to decide whether to reveal their group identity or not.52 Despite there are 
many contexts in which individuals are not allowed to reveal or signal their group 
identities, there are other contexts in which the decision to reveal one’s group identity 
might have a strategic component. Further research should be conducted to examine 
more comprehensively the effects of group identity uncertainty on interaction 
preferences and determine if individuals are differently discriminated when they have 
the opportunity to reveal their group identity but do not do so as compared to when they 
do not have the opportunity to reveal their group identity. 
Finally, it would be very interesting to complement and extend along two 
dimensions the experiment presented in Chapter 4. First, in regards the status different 
social groups have in achieving the superordinate goal. In the experiment presented the 
“leaders” of one social group had the command control on deciding measures to achieve 
the superordinate common goal. This different status in the command of control over 
the measures implemented to achieve the superordinate common goal might be the 
reasons why members of the other social group did not alter their discrimination degree 
as the superordinate common goal was gradually achieved. Equal status on interaction 
between social groups in conflicts has been proposed to be a crucial factor to reduce 
discrimination (Allport, 1954). Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
equal status in the command of control to achieve superordinate common goals could 
also have a significant effect on mitigating discrimination. Second, the experiment was 
conducted in a period of time in which the superordinate common goal was gradually 
achieved and the common threat simultaneously decreased. In other word, this study 
shows the evolution of discrimination patterns between members of different social 
groups throughout a period in which the situation gradually improved. It would be very 
interesting to complement this study with future research analyzing how discrimination 
patters evolve as the situation gradually worsens. 
 
                                               
52 To the best of my knowledge the few experiments studying how group identity uncertainty affects 
individual decision-making have also imposed group identity uncertainty (Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008; 
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